

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

APRIL, 1914.

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—COUNCIL.

Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Arthur D. Fanshawe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., has been appointed Chairman of the Council for the ensuing year.

Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G., has been appointed Vice-Chairman.

Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., has been appointed a Member of the Council, vice Captain T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., R.N., who has resigned his seat (Bye-Laws, Chap. IV., Section 9).

II.—NEW MEMBERS.

The following officers joined the Institution during the month of March :—

Lieutenant J. R. Hamilton-Dalrymple, King's Own Scottish
Borderers.

Lieutenant L. G. P. Vereker, R.N.R.

Lieutenant B. H. Piercy, R.N.

Second-Lieutenant H. J. Masters, R.E. (S.R.).

Second-Lieutenant F. E. Cadge, Essex Regiment.

Sub-Lieutenant W. S. Jackson, R.N.R.

Lieutenant C. E. Smith, 3rd Bn. Durham Light Infantry.

Second-Lieutenant G. V. Naylor-Leyland, Royal Horse Guards.

Lieutenant D. McK. Hartigan, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

Lieutenant F. W. Bewsher, London Rifle Brigade.

Captain D. D. Wilson, I.A.

Lieutenant G. W. T. Robertson, R.N.

Lieutenant C. P. W. Perceval, R.F.A.

Second-Lieutenant J. H. M. Edye, York and Lancaster Regiment.

Lieutenant F. G. L. Willan, R.N.R.

Lieut.-Colonel H. I. E. Palmer, I.A.

Lieutenant T. R. Chamberlin, R.N.

J. Gilbert Mellor, Esq., Deputy Judge-Advocate.

Captain G. M. G. Culley, 4th Bn. Durham Light Infantry.

III.—JOURNAL. (IMPORTANT.)

The Council have decided with the completion of the present volume of the JOURNAL in June next, to make the issue quarterly in place of monthly. The JOURNAL will be of a larger size and will contain 320 pages of matter. The price to non-members and the public will be six shillings a copy; to members who may desire extra copies the price will be three shillings. It will be published on August 15th, November 15th, February 15th, and May 15th.

IV.—ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

- (6662) Brass Fife-Case which formerly belonged to the band of the Royal Artillery. It bears the Royal Arms and the badge of the R.A. From the design of the Arms its date must have been between 1832 and 1837. The Case was carried by the soldier suspended by a cord similar to the trumpet cords of the present day.—Given by Captain H. G. Parkyn, 5th Bn. Rifle Brigade.
- (6663) Collection of embroidered Officers' Cap Badges, worn previous to 1881, of the following Line Battalions, viz:—2nd, 3rd, 12th, 13th, 17th, 20th, 24th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 49th, 51st, 55th, 56th, 58th, 65th, 72nd, 76th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 87th, 94th, and 98th.—Given by Messrs. C. Smith & Co., Gold Lacemen.
- (6664) Collection of embroidered Officers' Collar Badges, worn previous to 1881, of the following regiments:—Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards, 2nd, 4th, 14th, 16th, 21st, 33rd, 40th, 49th, 55th, 63rd, 68th, 76th, 87th, 88th, and King's Own Borderers.—Given by Messrs. C. Smith & Co., Gold Lacemen.
- (6665) A collection of miscellaneous embroidered Officers' Cap Badges.—Given by Messrs. C. Smith & Co., Gold Lacemen.
- (6666) A collection of Officers' Embroidered Cap Badges, worn previous to 1881, of the following Militia Regiments, viz:—3rd Royal Surrey, Herefordshire, Royal London, 4th West York, East Norfolk, West Suffolk, Royal South Lincoln, 2nd Royal Lanark, Royal Meath, South Mayo and Rutland.—Given by Messrs. C. Smith & Co., Gold Lacemen.
- (6667) Coatee of the Royal Tyrone Regiment of Militia of the early part of the 19th century. This regiment was originally numbered the 2nd Regiment of Irish Militia, but was afterwards renumbered the 80th Regiment of Militia (U.K.). In 1854 it became the Royal Tyrone Fusiliers, and is now the 3rd Bn. of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.—Given by Colonel Henry Irvine, C.B.
- (6668) Officer's Belt Buckle of the Royal Tyrone Fusiliers, worn previous to 1881.—Given by Colonel Henry Irvine, C.B.
- (6669) A Shirt of English chain mail with hood, intended to be worn under the plate armour. This Shirt is peculiar for the large rings upon the shoulders. Chain mail is formed by a number of iron rings, each ring having four others inserted into it and thus forming a kind of net-work, every ring being separately riveted. It is probably the 12th century.
- (6670) The head of the Burutu Bird, with a quiver containing a bundle of arrows. The native hunters of Northern Nigeria fasten heads of this description on their foreheads and drape themselves with blue clothes. They then stalk the various buck and when near enough shoot them with arrows. The beak is taken from a snake eating bird, and the remainder of the head is made out of leather. The red seeds on the

neck are to represent the red feathers the bird has. It is very difficult to obtain these heads as the natives place the highest value on them. This specimen was obtained from the village of Kagerko-Baho in the Nassarawa Province of Northern Nigeria.—Given by Lieutenant Donald Greig, R.N.

- (6671) Shoulder-belt plate of the East Somerset Local Regiment of Militia, date about 1808.

The total amount received at the Public Entrance to the Museum during the month of March was £36 6s.

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

March, 1914.

- Personal Narrative of Adventures in the Peninsula during the War in 1812—1813.** By an Officer late in the Staff Corps Regiment of Cavalry. Crown 8vo. 7s. (Second-hand). (John Murray). London, 1827.
- The Royal Highland Regiment, The Black Watch, formerly 42nd and 73rd Foot—Medal Roll, 1801—1911.** 8vo. 21s. (T. & A. Constable). Edinburgh, 1913.
- The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope.** By Peter Holben. Done into English from the original High German by Mr. Medley. 2 vols. 2nd Edition. 8vo. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn). W. Innys and R. Manby). London, 1738.
- Chronicon Balduini Avennensis Toparchæ Bellimontis, sive Historia Genealogica Comitum Hænnonlæ.** By James Baron Le Roy. Fc. fol. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn). Brussels, 1722.
- Relation de l'Inauguration Solennelle de Sa Sacrée Majesté Imperiale et Catholique Charles VI., Empereur des Romains, etc., Comme Comte de Flandres, le XVIII, Octobre, 1717.** Fc. fol. Manuscript. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn).
- Relation de l'Inauguration Solennelle de Sa Sacrée Majesté Léopold II., Empereur des Romains, etc., Comme Comte de Flandres, le VI. Juillet, 1791.** Demy fol. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn). Ghent, 1792.
- Plans et Descriptions des Principales Places de Guerre et Villes Maritimes des Frontières du Royaume.** 4to. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn). n. p., 1751.
- Atlas Nouveau Contenant toutes les parties du Monde.** By Guillaume de l'Isle. Roy. fol. (Presented by Miss J. S. Thorburn). (J. Covens et Corneille Mortier). Amsterdam, 1733.
- Two Original Journals of Sir Richard Granville, viz: 1. Expedition to Cadix, 1625; 2. Expedition to the Isle of Rhee, 1627.** Crown 8vo. (Presented by Colonel J. Biddulph). (John Clarke). London, 1724.
- La Guerre d'Espagne, 1807-1813—Tome 1 (Octobre, 1807—Avril, 1813).** Par le Capitaine A. Grasset. Publié sous la direction de la Section Historique de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée. 8vo. 11s. 3d. (Berger-Levrault). Paris, 1914.

- Guerre de 1870-71—Châlons et Beaumont, 7 Août—30 Août, 1870.** By Alfred Duquet. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Charpentier). Paris, 1912.
- Record of the Fourth Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment from 1859 to 1913.** Compiled by Major B. T. Hodgson. 4to. (Presented by the Author). (Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics.** By Vice-Admiral S. J. Makaroff, I.R.N. Translated from the Russian by Lieut. John B. Bernadou, U.S.N. 8vo. (Presented by the U.S. Naval Attaché). Washington, 1898.
- Flying, Some Practical Experiences.** By Gustav Hamel and Charles C. Turner. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (Longmans, Green & Co.). London, 1914.
- Memories of a Soldier's Life.** By Sir H. M. Bengough. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Edward Arnold). London, 1913.
- The Wellesley Papers.** By the Editor of the Windham Papers. 2 vols. 8vo. 32s. (Herbert Jenkins, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- First Principles of Tactics and Organization.** By Captain J. L. Sleeman. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- La Fortification dans la Guerre Napoléonienne.** By General Camon. 8vo. 2s. (Berger-Levrault). Paris, 1914.
- History of the Royal Irish Rifles.** By Lieut.-Col. G. B. Laurie. 4to. 21s. (Presented by History Committee, Royal Irish Rifles). (Gale & Polden, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti by Emissaries of Spain during the Years 1772—1776, told in despatches and other contemporary documents.** Translated into English and compiled with notes and an introduction by Bolton Glanvill Corney. Vol. 1. (Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, Vol. XXXII.). 8vo. London, 1914.
- Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Tombs, V.C., K.C.B., R.A.** 8vo. (Presented by the Commandant, R.M.A., Woolwich). (R.A. Institution). Woolwich, 1913.

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[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

GOLD MEDAL (MILITARY) PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1913.

Subject:—

"HOW CAN MORAL QUALITIES BEST BE DEVELOPED DURING THE PREPARATION OF THE OFFICER AND THE MAN FOR THE DUTIES EACH WILL CARRY OUT IN WAR?"

"An examination of the requirements of modern war shows that not only are numbers necessary but also moral qualities, developed as highly as possible in each individual according to his rank."

Training and Manœuvre Regulations, Sec. I. (2).

By MAJOR A. LAWSON, ROYAL SCOTS GREYS.

Motto:—Leve et Relius.

THE first and most difficult task of statesmen is the preservation of the national or militant instinct intact in the virtues of the people. Militancy is alone responsible for the creation of every state, its preservation and the peace of mankind. Only when this militancy deteriorates is the state doomed. The causes of militant degeneration in a race or nation are not generally understood. In primitive times militancy was conditioned by necessity, and as this necessity passed the militancy dependent upon it deteriorated. This necessity might return to the race or nation at any subsequent moment, but militancy could not return simultaneously with it. Hence it is that

nations having reached such military greatness and commanding position as to appear to themselves impregnable, the military spirit is allowed to degenerate.

Militancy is divided into three distinct phrases—(a) the struggle to survive; (b) conquest; (c) supremacy or preservation of ownership. It is in the struggle to survive that the military genius of a people reaches its height, for it is that militancy which is common to all forms of life. The harder the struggle for a race or tribe to survive in its combats both with men and the elements, the more highly developed becomes their military spirit. Success in the struggle for survival is followed by the second degree of militancy, that of conquest, in which militancy becomes a positive instead of a negative factor. In the third stage the natural militancy of a nation declines. Commercialism grows as militancy deteriorates, since it is in itself a form of strife, though a debased one. The relegation of the militant ideal to a secondary place in national activity is succeeded by accumulative ignorance concerning military efficiency, while the spirit of it—that intuitive perception of what constitutes militancy—vanishes utterly. Only when a nation endeavours to return to militant ideals, and battles for self-preservation, does it realize the situation. To judge, in time of peace, the worth of an army in warfare will oftentimes prove erroneous. It is only possible to judge the respective merits of national armaments, military systems, and the numerical strength of the forces. By such comparisons one may come to reasonable conclusions as to the probabilities of victory. But, in addition, there must be considered the militancy of the race or nation, upon which, more than any other factor, depends the success or failure of military works. This is by no means an intangible something that the vicissitudes of war alone develops. The presence or lack of it can be determined quantitatively and to a large degree qualitatively, in all nationalities, prior to war. The presence or absence of this quality is, in peace, determined by the attitude of the nation as a whole towards military activity, and by the relative position that men in the army and in civil life bear to society. When the ideal of a nation, its religion, its aspirations, national and individual, are militant, as in Japan, then one can expect to find militancy developed to a high degree.

Warfare, either ancient or modern, has never been nor will ever be mechanical. There is no such possibility as the combat of instruments. It is the soldier that brings about victory or defeat. The knowledge of commanders and the involuntary comprehension and obedience to orders is what determines the issue of battles. According to Scharnhorst, "victory is won by teaching soldiers how to die, not how to avoid dying." But what mankind does not take cognizance of is that, in the alteration of modes of combat by mechanical and scientific inventions, there must be a psychological re-adjustment of the militant

spirit of the combatant. As the instruments of warfare become more intricate, the discipline and *esprit de corps* must be increased accordingly. Lord Haldane, in his address to the American Bar Association on "Law and Ethics," said:¹ "We are bound to search after fresh principles if we desire to find firm foundations for a progressive practical life. It is the absence of a clear conception of principle that occasions some at least of the obscurities and perplexities that beset us in the giving of counsel and in following it. On the other hand, it is futile to delay action until reflection has cleared up all our difficulties. If we would learn to swim we must first enter the water. We must not refuse to begin our journey until the whole of the road we may have to travel lies mapped out before us." And he goes on to say: "Yet the principles and facts to which I shall have to refer appear to me to be often overlooked by those to whom they might well appear obvious. Perhaps the reason is the deadening effect of that conventional atmosphere out of which few men in public life succeed in completely escaping. We can best assist in the freshening of that atmosphere by omitting no opportunity of trying to think rightly, and thereby to contribute to the fashioning of a more hopeful and resolute kind of public opinion."

A thorough knowledge of the secrets of human nature is very essential to a leader. An army is subject to many psychological influences, and its value varies according to its general feeling. Disaster depresses its courage and its confidence; any advantage, though trivial in itself, animates its hopes and strengthens its discipline. The same troops are not to be recognized at different times, so differently do they comport themselves. Influences very keenly felt at one time, at another pass by without notice. It does not signify so much what demands are made, as how and by whom they are made. A leader must understand how to look into the hearts of his soldiers, in order to estimate rightly what may be required of them at a given moment. Scharnhorst bewailed the fact that the psychological side of the science of warfare is so little known, and "that the chief use of history—the difficult and yet so profitable knowledge of the human heart, which is attained by nothing more readily than by the investigation of events, themselves a consequence of great and far-seeing plans—is almost totally lost."

Modern military history, even more than the old, breaks away from a discussion of the psychological element. It is content to record facts or to make critical deductions, without describing the ground colour of the complete picture. Thus it is that many soldiers, excellent in other respects, err in the direction of either judging by their own unwearying energy and overtaxing troops, or by putting too low an estimate upon the

¹ *The Times*, 2nd September, 1913.

power of their personal influence, demanding less of their men than they are capable of performing. Napoleon considered that in war the influence of moral causes is to that of physical as three to one. It is certain that modern experience has thrown no doubt on the accuracy of this estimate. Whatever may be the weapons of the day, war remains a contest between men—a contest in which every quality of brain, heart, nerve and muscle is tried to the utmost; and any study of war which fails to take the human factor into account can only result in false conceptions.

Hamley says: ¹“It is on the battlefield, doubtless, that moral qualities are most severely tested, but they exert great influence on strategy also. In strategy, surprise is the greatest element of victory, and it is the moral results of surprise which make it so potent.” What are the primary factors which have always been the foundation of success? First among them are the moral attributes, courage, energy, determination, endurance, the unselfishness and the discipline that make combination possible—these are the primary causes of all great success.

The soul of the soldier can only be developed by discipline, by honour and martial deeds; it cannot be made to order. Its creation necessitates year after year of sternest labour and toil that callouses not only the hands and wrings sweat from the brow, but also callouses the weakness inherent in man and wrings sweat from his heart.

The soldier spirit, that spark illuminating those chambers of souls ordinarily dark and forgotten, must be struck. Men must be animated by discipline, and exalted by the quest of idealistic honour, such as distinguishes them from those enriched by trade or those who are able to purchase with gold all but that which alone is bought by blood. Wealth is a factor in the military strength of a nation only so long as it is regarded in its true and subordinate capacity. But when wealth becomes so paramount in a nation's life that it forms the chief ambition of individual efforts, then the factors that constitute military strength fall away.

In *The Risen Sun*, Baron Suyematsu says: “The part of our military instruction which we call ‘spiritual education,’ to which the greatest attention is paid, and which really is an elevated ethical teaching, imbues the men with fine moral sentiments, especially on the lines of patriotism and loyalty, and these sentiments are not only of great use to them while in actual service, but also after they have left the ranks. This branch of military instruction does not seem to exist in other countries in the same way as it does in Japan, but, with us, it cannot fail to be beneficial to the country, for these sentiments are carried back to every corner of the land by the men after a few years' active service.”

¹ Operations of War.

And again: "That branch of education when spoken of independently is called 'spiritual education.' Perhaps 'mental' or 'ethical education' is easier to understand, but we call it 'spiritual,' because that branch of our education is regarded as being expressly devoted to the nourishment of the best and highest spirits among all ranks, which at the same time is ethical, and it lays greater stress on the mental operations than on mere conventionalities. This part of education is regarded in our army as being of superlative importance, and the greatest possible attention is paid thereto."

Lord Haldane tells us: "The system of ethical habit in a community is of a dominating character, for the decision and influence of the whole community is embodied in that social habit. Because such conduct is systematic and covers the whole of the field of society, the individual will is closely related by it to the will and spirit of the community. And out of this relation arises the power of adequately controlling the conduct of the individual. If this power fails or becomes weak, the community degenerates and may fall to pieces. Thus we have in the case of a community, be it the City or be it the State, an illustration of a sanction which is sufficient to compel observance of a rule without any question of the application of force. This kind of sanction may be of a highly-compelling quality, and it often extends so far as to make the individual prefer the good of the community to his own. The development of many of our social institutions, of our hospitals, of our universities, and of other establishments of the kind, shows the extent to which it reaches and is powerful. But it has yet higher forms in which it approaches very nearly to the level of the obligation of conscience, although it is distinct from that form of obligation. I will try to make clear what I mean by illustration. A man may be impelled to action of a high order by his sense of unity with the society to which he belongs—action of which, from the civic standpoint, all approve. What he does in such a case is natural to him, and is done without thought of reward or punishment, but it has reference to standards of conduct set up by society and accepted just because society has set them up. There is a poem by the late Sir Alfred Lyall which exemplifies the high level that may be reached in such conduct. The poem is called "Theology in Extremis," and it describes the feelings of an Englishman who had been taken prisoner by Mahomedan rebels in the Indian Mutiny. He is face to face with a cruel death. They offer him his life if he will repeat something from the Koran. If he complies no one is likely ever to hear of it, and he will be free to return to England and to the woman he loves. Moreover, and here is the real point, he is not a believer in Christianity, so that it is no question of denying his Saviour.

¹ "Law and Ethics."—*The Times*, 2nd September, 1913.

What ought he to do? Deliverance is easy, and the relief and advantage would be unspeakably great. But he does not really hesitate, and every shadow of doubt disappears when he hears his fellow-prisoner, a half-caste, pattering eagerly the words demanded. He himself has no hope of heaven, and he loves life:—

Yet for the honour of English race
May I not live and endure disgrace.
Ay, but the word if I could have said it,
I by no terrors of hell perplex.
Hard to be silent and have no credit
From men in this world, or reward in the next,
None to bear witness and reckon the cost
Of the name that is saved by the life that is lost.
I must begone to the crowd untold
Of men by the cause which they served unknown,
Who moulder in myriad graves of old;
Never a story and never a stone
Tells of the martyrs who die like me,
Just for the pride of the old countree.

Why do men of this stamp act so, it may be when leading the battle line, it may be at critical moments of quite other kinds? It is, I think, because they are more than mere individuals. Individual they are, but completely real, even as individual, only in their relation to organic and social wholes in which they are members, such as the family, the City, the State. There is in every truly organized community a common will which is willed by those who compose that community, and who in so willing are more than isolated men and women. It is not, indeed, as unrelated atoms that they have lived. They have grown, from the receptive days of childhood, up to maturity, in an atmosphere of example and general custom; and their lives have widened out from one little world to other and higher worlds, so that, through occupying successive stations in life, they more and more come to make their own the life of the social whole in which they move and have their being. They cannot mark off or define their own individualities without reference to the individualities of others. And so they unconsciously find themselves as in truth pulse beats of the whole system, and themselves the whole system. It is real in them and they in it. They are real only because they are social.

The whole system of preparing for war demands that much is left to those actively responsible for the training. Regulations cannot guide us through the region of moral qualities. Example and encouragement of thought are the weapons with which the higher teachers must be armed. "There is in every truly organized community a common will which is willed by those who compose that community." This will, and the nature

of it, must be created by the commanding officer of the regiment or battalion, such unit representing an example of a self-contained community. It is he alone who can exhale the ethical spirit and watch over its development. If left entirely to themselves, squadron and company commanders are liable, each, to work on different lines, and there will be no unity of code or purpose. This great subject (development of moral qualities) should ever be in the thoughts of the commanding officer, and he must, from time to time, explain the theory of it to his officers. Such training cannot hibernate; it must be ever present. It must grow "from the receptive days of childhood, up to maturity, in an atmosphere of example and general custom." Scharnhorst is the author of the maxim: "Never are moral forces at rest; they decline as soon as they cease to mount upwards." But what is this intangible quality, the existence of which is more important in the man than the shape of his frame?

Lord Haldane again helps us.¹

"The moral organism is not a mere animal organism. In the latter the member is not aware of itself as such, while in the former it knows itself, and therefore knows the whole in itself. The narrow external function of the man is not the whole man. He has a life which we cannot see with our eyes, and there is no duty so mean that it is not the realization of this, and knowable as such. What counts is not the visible outer work so much as the spirit in which it is done."

Our efforts to develop this moral organism must not take academical shape. Nothing could be worse than outward show of a pedantic nature, superficial in its value. That such training is being brought into existence must not suddenly become apparent. It must be inculcated gradually, and the flame gently fanned, without ostentation.

"The spirit animating the corps of officers is the spirit of the army," was a saying of Rüchel's. Influence over the soldiers must be gained in time of peace by a proper application of the superior qualities of intellect and character, in training and leading them. This, above everything, must also include care for the well-being of the soldier. Influence decays immediately officers begin no longer to trouble themselves about the private soldiers, and to confine themselves merely to giving orders. When authority over their men can only be enforced by orders, it is, as a rule, already enfeebled. The worse is the discipline in an army the more despotic a form it assumes.

"Discipline" embraces so many interpretations, that its meaning appears rather vague and to need a more precise explanation. We generally understand by discipline that regularity and order which is maintained by the prompt application of a strict law. All laws arise primarily from the conditions

¹ "Law and Ethics."—*The Times*, 2nd September, 1913.

existing, and only re-act upon them after a time. On the other hand, we must not believe that in a civilized people discipline is a matter of course, and that it simply proceeds from a civil code of morals. For this the tests applied to it are too hard. Discipline demands more than mere negative services. It demands of the soldier that he stakes his life in order to vanquish the enemy; it expects from him something extraordinary, and is to make this extraordinary demand so familiar to him, that he considers it unavoidable, and even natural. We require a code sufficiently rigorous to make the fulfilment of all higher commands appear as something inevitable. "The power of the passions cannot be restrained without the help of law," is a saying of Scharnhorst. Disobedience, whenever it shows itself, must be punished promptly and adequately. It would be a fatal illusion to consider the rigorous enforcement of the law as something with which we could dispense. Such strict application of the law is the foundation of discipline, and it is of even greater importance that the necessity of obedience bear equally on high and low in the army. Example is far more effective than a written or a spoken word. As the soldier sees his superiors obey, so does he always follow their lead. Submission to a superior, who commands something at the moment, is not everything; this habit of obedience should be manifest in all pertaining to the service. The seriousness with which minor duties are performed is in no wise merely the result of tradition or idle pedantry; it pursues the ethical aim of creating in the soldier an idea of duty, in a manner best suited to his intellectual capacity. This faithfulness in little things must not confine itself merely to the parade portion of military life; the many apparently insignificant details necessary to the making of the man as a soldier are also entitled to special notice.

Important conditions affecting the preservation of discipline lie in the existing military organization. One of the foremost is due regard to the preservation of the usual peace constitution. A sudden severance of the tie uniting bodies is bound to have an injurious effect on discipline, and the disadvantage thus created will generally outweigh any advantage gained by any re-distribution.

Considering the feature of family life obtaining in the army, such severance of ancient ties would be particularly ill advised. It lies in the very nature of our military constitution that a commanding officer should feel greater confidence in, and exert greater influence over, his own regiment or battalion, than over a strange body of men assigned to him on the outbreak of war. Inversely, the soldier will yield readier obedience to a superior known to him than to a total stranger. The preservation of existing connections is a matter of such importance that minor strategical and tactical considerations should not prevail. Lord Haldane¹ throws light on this subject, *i.e.*, discipline:

¹ "Law and Ethics."—*The Times*, 2nd September, 1913.

"The system of habitual or customary conduct, ethical rather than legal, which embraces all those obligations of the citizen which it is 'bad form' or 'not the thing' to disregard. Indeed, regard for these obligations is frequently enjoined merely by the social penalty of being 'cut' or looked on askance. And yet the system is so generally accepted and is held in so high regard that no one can venture to disregard it without in some way suffering at the hands of his neighbours for so doing. If a man maltreats his wife and children, or habitually jostles his fellow citizen in the street, or does things flagrantly selfish or in bad taste, he is pretty sure to find himself in a minority, and the worse off in the end. But not only does it not pay to do these things, but the decent man does not wish to do them. A feeling analogous to what arises from the dictates of his more private and individual conscience restrains him. He finds himself so restrained in the ordinary affairs of daily life. But he is guided in his conduct by no mere inward feeling, as in the case of conscience. Conscience and, for that matter, law overlap parts of the sphere of social obligation about which I am speaking. A rule of conduct may, indeed, appear in more than one sphere, and may consequently have a twofold sanction. But the guide to which the citizen mostly looks is just the standard recognized by the community—a community made up mainly of those fellow-citizens whose good opinion he respects and desires to have. He has everywhere round him an object-lesson in the conduct of decent people towards each other and towards the community to which they belong. Without such conduct, and the restraints which it imposes, there could be no tolerable social life, and real freedom from interference would not be enjoyed. It is the instinctive sense of what to do and what not to do in daily life, and behaviour, that is the source of liberty and ease. And it is this instinctive sense of obligation that is the chief foundation of society."

The aim of discipline should be to produce a self-governing being; not to produce a being governed by others. Were soldiers fated to pass their lives as slaves, it would be well to accustom them to slavery during their service; but as they are by and by to be free men, with no one to control their daily conduct, they should be taught self-control. This it is which makes the system of discipline, by natural consequences, so especially appropriate to the social state which we in England have now reached.

The high idea of faithfulness to duty, which is implanted in us by training, induces at last even the timid man to show himself brave and to suppress his fear of death and danger. The numerous examples of such devotion all round him carry him onward in spite of himself. The fear of being despised by his companions in arms as a miserable coward, is, in the end, greater than his fear of death.

But it is not this kind of courage, acquired by training, that can avail the General. He requires that innate courage which is a rare quality of great men, and which serves its possessor without his being conscious of it. Sense of honour and *amour-propre* keep most men firm in the face of peril, and externally, at all events, there will scarcely be any difference between them and those in whom courage springs from a stout and noble heart. But the former are pre-occupied with themselves, with their courage, and with their bearing, and a great part of their moral power is absorbed in self. Their usual lucidity will be found wanting, their mental activity will be dimmed, and they will find themselves unequal to their task. Innate courage does not need an artificial stimulus in order to maintain itself; to it contempt of death is a thing so natural that it does not absorb any of the other intellectual and moral qualities, but, on the contrary, brings them all more actively into play, as the excitement of the moment only augments the internal pressure which intensifies all power. And so we admire, in illustrious soldiers, that they always become more clear-sighted and resourceful in moments of the greatest danger, while all around them are working with blunted senses. Only courage of a kind incapable of understanding how it is possible not to have courage singles out the true soldier among his fellows. It is such courage as Shakespeare attributes to Cæsar when he puts into his mouth the words:—

Of all the wonders that I yet have heard
It seems to be most strange that men should fear;
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come, when it will come.

We read of the contempt for mankind of great Generals. By this is meant a feeling of indifference to the fate of individuals, which is only displayed on occasions when great aims are in question. But the great ends to be attained are not always clear to the masses. They vanish from their minds immediately they are engrossed by their own personal affairs, and thus it happens that necessary severity on the part of the General is interpreted as mere coldness of heart, repulsive to human feeling. The commander who, moved by pity, shows his sympathy for the wounded, or possibly allows himself to be detained by compassion at the scenes of misery, runs the risk of wasting the most valuable moments for action. And yet society is shocked with the man who merely scans the decimated and exhausted battalions, in order to calculate what can still be demanded of them. Inexorability and that seemingly hideous callousness are among the attributes necessary to him who would achieve great things in war. A strong character will continually bear this in mind, and thus being less liable to be moved by the displeasure of those around him, his severity will appear even more pronounced. Not only human, but intellectual imperfections also strike us in Generals of the first rank.

Shakespeare's words on fearlessness point to a tendency to fatalism. This was peculiar to most heroes, and appears to betray a narrowness of soul, which in their case, however, is perfectly explicable. Experience teaches them to recognize the power born of the co-operation of small causes which a man can neither foresee nor control; hence the belief in a fate that, in each individual case, declares either for victory or defeat. This seems, however, to be contradicted by the fact that all heroes, from Alexander to Napoleon, were filled with a belief in their mission, which gave them, in the most difficult situations, an unshakable sense of security. But at the bottom of it all lies the conviction that fortune, in the long run, only remains constant to the deserving, and that chance, ruling with the freedom of divinity—" *sa sacré Majesté le hazard* "—declares quite as often for us as against us. Hence great Generals owed what we call "belief in their mission," not to the favour of fortune, but really to faith in their own ability.

As a result of national characteristics, tradition, training and mode of life, each army has its own predominant sphere, and if compelled to abandon that, its efficiency will generally disappear. The feeling of not being quite in one's element, and the necessity of fighting in unfamiliar circumstances and against strange difficulties, acts quite as prejudicially upon troops as upon individual men. We must, therefore, count among conditions of success the importance of a rôle being assigned to an army which suits its peculiarities. We should make it our constant aim, where circumstances permit, during peace training, to give the utmost possible effect to the national mode of fighting, even if such action be bound up with some material disadvantages.

The object of all war, the crushing of the enemy's forces, can, after all, only be achieved by attack. It goes without saying that the attack demands the greater expenditure, whether of physical or moral force, or of intelligence. The attack possesses, in a much higher degree than the defence, the capacity of exciting to action all the intellectual and moral forces of an army. This qualification explains how it happens that the former scores the greater number of final successes. The attacker proceeds from the first in clearer consciousness of the object in view. He chooses a certain aim, and his intellectual forces are thus guided into a definite groove. His intellect becomes productive as if by force of circumstances. Much is gained by the mere fact that the attack incites greater energy than the defence; for of two opponents, equal in other respects, the more active will be the victor. The defender awaits the blow in order to parry it. He must observe the enemy, and order his own action by that of the other. It is impossible for him to feel the same stimulating impulse as the enemy, who thereby becomes the controlling factor. The consciousness of this fact will speedily and surely pervade the masses, and work

wonders. The bearing of an army which is pressing forward is vastly different from that of a retreating or even of a waiting army. The spirit of enterprise is aroused, and the attack gives it a scope quite different from that of the defence. The former sets a much greater number of active factors in motion. The Commander-in-Chief only lays down general directions. The inferior commanders are called upon to follow independently the lead given them, and to exploit the occasion. Any one of them, even the most junior, may become the chief factor in the drama, if chance should place him on the decisive spot. Since success in attack now depends very much upon the subordinate commanders, it follows that only an army possessing thoroughly experienced, intelligent, and dashing officers, habituated to independent action, can be successful in the offensive. As the absolute power of the attack is continually being expended from the first moment, it follows that a thoroughly well organized system of reinforcements is one of the necessary conditions of success in the offensive. Reinforcements for the army must always be in readiness—reinforcements of the right stamp, capable of fulfilling the arduous tasks of the attack. Hence the idea of the offensive rôle rests upon the supposition of an army carefully trained in times of peace, and of a rigid military system supported by public opinion. None but the former can create the requisite impelling force, while only the latter can ensure the uninterrupted supply of the elements required to maintain this force at a constant level. Rapidity and continuity of action are the elements of the attack. No halt may be thought of before the object has been attained. Any suspension of operations is dangerous on account of the reaction succeeding a period of unwonted activity. It is difficult, during the operations, to resume the offensive once it has been suspended; and to renew an attack in the course of a battle is practically impossible, unless reinforcements arrive and give a greater access of force than is lost during the period of relaxation. Hence the deliberate suspension of an attack is never justified, except by the definite prospect of the arrival of considerable reinforcements. In the face of unassailable positions, the most daring attempts at turning them and at intimidating the enemy are better than waiting for a favourable opportunity. Otherwise the attacker will become the attacked; for the courage of the defender must necessarily grow, as soon as he perceives that the opponent does not dare to attack him. A rapid attack generally entails fewer losses on the whole, although the latter may appear appalling for the time being. Rapidity is an element of particular importance in the tactical offensive. The gradual flagging of energy in the attack demands, moreover, the greatest economy of fighting material. Hence the attack must have but a single object in view at a time, all others being temporarily disregarded. All available physical and moral forces should be devoted to that one single object. In the tactical offensive it

must be clearly understood that everything must be staked upon gaining undisputed mastery at the point designed for the assault, so that the enemy will be absolutely unable to retrieve the situation at that particular point. That being assured, opportunities for lucky strokes elsewhere may be sought.

Psychological elements are of equal influence in war as material ones. If we figure to ourselves a situation in which danger is apprehended, without our knowing when it will occur, we shall also understand the position of an army acting on the defensive, while awaiting the onslaught of the enemy. The defensive lacks the elements of impulsion. It fetters its forces instead of fostering them; it is apt to force upon the soldier the feeling that the army and its commanders are controlled by the situation, instead of controlling it. And this feeling is not dispelled in the absence of a sufficiency of energetic action. The defender, it is true, profits by any protection that the ground, buildings, and artificial means of defence may afford, and he is collected and prepared to meet the attack. He is not subjected to the distress and fatigue of the attacker. In the defence things are simpler. The command can remain entirely in the hands of the supreme authorities; within the army, the scope of independent commanders will be greatly circumscribed. Besides tactical advantages, the defensive is sure of some few other points in its favour. The bringing up of reserves and supplies of all sorts is less uncertain, and the lines of communication are not, as in the case of the offensive, continuously lengthening.

General Robertson finely sums up the whole question of attack and defence as it is applicable to our temperaments and lessons from history. ¹ "As to the battle and your line of action. Go for your man as soon as you can; only by the offensive can you win. But going for your man does not justify making a mere blind rush at him. Of what use is the study of the science of war if, when battle comes, you throw it all to the winds and rush straight on your enemy as if you knew nothing of this science. Still, I repeat, go for your man, for it is only by so doing that you can win. There is only one way, ultimately, of winning a battle, and that is by fighting, hard fighting; and that is why both commander and staff should devote their constant attention to all those matters which tend to increase the fighting power of the troops."

But the Commandant of the Staff College also recognizes that there may be temporary set-backs, even where the stoutest hearts are concerned. He goes on to say: "Our regulations justly lay stress upon the value of the offensive; but think what may be the effect of this teaching upon the troops, if it alone is given, when they are ordered to retire instead of to go forward—that is, to abandon that method of war by which alone, according to the training they have previously received, decisive

¹ Address to Staff College Students.

victory can be achieved. Think, too, of the disintegration and demoralization which nearly always accompany retrograde movements, even when an army has not been previously defeated. It seems to me that there is practically no chance of successfully carrying out this operation in war unless we thoroughly study and practice it beforehand during peace. If we have this previous practice, the operation will then not come as a surprise to the troops in war; they will understand better what they are expected to do; and they will recognize it as being a form of war which may have to be adopted by any army, and can be adopted, not only without failure, but with a certain measure, ultimately, of success."

We must be prepared for the possibility of such things, and trained to adapt ourselves to circumstances. Military history can, as in every case, help us; other requirements are an active imagination, and an acquaintance with the difficulties which ordinarily present themselves in life. We must learn how to take punishment without allowing our moral to suffer. Napoleon, in a letter to Lauriston, defined the spirit of moral teaching: "Keep these three things in mind—assembly of forces, activity, and the firm resolve to perish gloriously. Death is nothing; but to live beaten and without honour, is to die every day."

¹ "The sentiments capable of prevailing on the soldier to face death or to endure extreme hardships are somewhat numerous. All the same, when we examine them closely, they appear to be but the components of these two resultants—courage and discipline. Now, the fundamental basis of both discipline and of valour on the battlefield is confidence."

In Lord Haldane's address² to the American Bar Association he quotes Fichte's definition of "Sittlichkeit." "What, to begin with, does 'Sitte' signify, and in what sense do we use the word? It means for us, and means in every accurate reference we make to it, those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other, and which have become matter of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious. Principles we call them, because we do not refer to the sort of conduct that is casual or is determined on casual grounds, but to the hidden and uniform ground of action which we assume to be present in the man whose action is not deflected, and from which we can pretty certainly predict what he will do—principles, we say, which have become a second nature and of which we are not explicitly conscious."

The confidence so requisite to the soldier is threefold. It consists of confidence in himself, confidence in his comrades, and confidence in his leaders. The confidence of a man in himself increases as his mental and physical powers develop. With

¹ La Confiance by Constantin.

² "Law and Ethics."—*The Times*, 2nd September, 1913.

strength grows self-confidence, with self-confidence courage. Skill in the use of arms is an essential for success in the combat, and it increases self-reliance. Prince Kraft, in his letters on infantry, says, "He who is skilled, knows it, he who knows it presses on." There is nothing that tends to raise the confidence of a man in himself more than education or the consciousness of possessing superior knowledge. "When (said the Prussian officers) our men came in contact with the Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them found that they hardly knew their right hand from their left, there was not one who did not look upon himself as a god in comparison with such ignorant beings, and this conviction increased our strength ten-fold."¹ Fatiguing exercises and long marches successfully accomplished help greatly to give a soldier confidence in himself. Troops should be accustomed to hardships in peace time, if only to give them confidence. "Severe exertion and endurance of privations at peace exercises are valuable factors in the training of the soldier. They promote self-reliance and strength of will."² Some six years ago at Aldershot, during command manoeuvres, the experiment was tried of not putting out of bounds public houses which were in the vicinity of the operations. It was successful in every way, for men knew that they were being trusted as to their good behaviour. It is most galling to know that our superiors are lacking in confidence, and that regulations are framed on the basis that men prefer doing wrong to right.

Next we come to the confidence of the soldier in his comrades. This confidence also cannot be produced in a single day. For to be confident in one another men must have lived together for some considerable time and lived in close association with one another. They must have shared the common toils and hardships of their profession, and drilled, route-marched, and manoeuvred together. It is necessary they should have learnt to know and to trust one another. Von der Goltz writes,³ "the superiority which disciplined soldiers show over undisciplined masses is primarily the consequence of the confidence which each has in his comrades." It was the Russian General, Dragomiroff, who summed up the spirit of confidence in the words, "comradeship in the fight." Lastly, as to the confidence of the soldier in his leaders—a confidence so important and so indispensable that without it the whole fabric of discipline on the battlefield falls to pieces.

Whether the men have confidence in their leaders or not depends almost entirely on those leaders themselves. General de Négrier wrote: ⁴"There is a general agreement that the value

¹ *Précis of Modern Tactics*. Home.

² *Field Service Regulations*, German Army, 1908, p. 8.

³ *Nation in Arms*.

⁴ *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, November, 1905.

of a body of troops depends essentially on its moral. It may even serve to close discussions of strategical or tactical order, because history often records the worst combinations as traits of genius, when the superior moral of the combatants has made them successful. The moral of troops depends upon their determination to win at all costs, upon their confidence in themselves and their leaders. It depends also on their physical condition. The determination to conquer is produced by patriotism, and is the result of a long moral education, founded on race traditions, and which finds in the depth of the hereditary instinct a favourable soil for its cultivation. By this education alone can confidence be improvised. It can only be acquired by a life spent in common for a certain time. In such a case soldiers and leaders know each other, esteem each other, and, passing through the same perils or the same vicissitudes, they understand and are ready to devote themselves to each other." This mutual understanding must be created by working together and exchanging ideas in peace time, so that it may develop into a common instinct which becomes a second nature to all.

The Great Duke of Wellington, being asked if he considered habit to be second nature, replied, "it's ten times nature." An example of the above will be found at the Staff College. Here are officers of every branch of the service whose different tastes cover a wide range, though all are animated by one aim and ambition. The object which it is desired to attain is to put the students in the right way of and on the right lines to study correctly, and to bring out and develop their military character. It is impossible in the time to make their education complete, even if it was desirable to do so. It should be sufficient to show and explain to them what to study and how to do it, leaving them to pursue the practice after they depart from the Staff College. The mode of life there tends to develop their moral qualities. Friendships are formed and a knowledge of men acquired, which are invaluable to any one who wishes to get on in life.

Fritz Hoenig¹ gives a description of the ideal battalion commander: "He loved to incite younger officers to reflection, and shunned no contradiction that was presented after consideration and in becoming form. The impression produced was as if he intentionally challenged contradiction in order to give new directions to conversation and to become acquainted with men."

A General must exercise great influence upon his army, which, irrespective of the natural influence of personality, is based to a considerable extent upon knowledge of the troops. This circumstance, so often overlooked, deeply concerns the influence of officers upon soldiers. It is a humiliating feeling for the subordinate not to be known; every order is sure of better execution where the opposite is the case. Personal

¹ Tactics of the future.

knowledge of each other is accordingly a good bond of union between commanders and troops.

The will to conquer is, in all ranks, of paramount importance. In the balance between victory and defeat it takes very little to turn the scale. Troops which are determined not to yield ground, are in the end regarded as victorious, even though the greater material losses are on their side. This obstinate will to remain victorious speaks most strongly of the spirit animating an army. The previous impressions of life in peace and war here co-operate to produce a great moral effect. Armament also figures largely among conditions of success. There can never be complete disparity between the armament and the moral of an army, since the latter includes intelligence, which takes care to provide good weapons. But ultimately parsimony, technical mistakes, or obstinacy and false pride, which will not allow a weapon, once declared good, to be discarded, may, considering the rapid progress of our times, be productive of considerable inequalities. An armament corresponding to all the demands of the times is, on that account, all the more important, because the want of it immediately re-acts upon the confidence of the soldier. Nothing is worse than that the latter should feel himself neglected in this respect, and to believe himself subject, without his own fault, to an effect against which he is powerless. Included in the above is proper skill in the use of weapons, otherwise the effect gained would not correspond to their value.

The method employed of housing troops by means of billets has done much, and will do a lot more, to develop good behaviour in the rank and file. On such occasions men are trusted to behave properly, and they well repay the trust. Consequently, those civilians who have only a theoretical knowledge of soldiers are surprised at their good behaviour, and discover that the army is a much maligned profession. A healthy reaction is the result, and the presence of troops, if not too frequent, is appreciated. This is proved by the hospitality which is offered to all ranks at these times, and the interest taken in military matters by the civil population. This encourages the soldier, makes him proud of his profession, and gives him confidence and stability. The moral of this is that small parties, composed chiefly of non-commissioned officers and always under an officer, should, from time to time, move about the country under a tactical scheme and should billet. This would be especially beneficial in districts where single units are stationed. The question of money is the stumbling block. The country need be put to no extra expense if a more judicious use was made of the money expended on those staff tours, which are sometimes arranged at the close of the financial year with the object of swallowing up the training grant.

Following closely on the heels of confidence comes "initiative." The latter cannot exist without the former; it is part, in its correct application, of the same machinery.

"Initiative" is the independence, based on intelligence, which prompts an inferior to promote the ends of his leaders. It is not possible to actually teach "initiative," but it will come if subordinates are encouraged to use their own intelligence, if superiors are considerate to their subordinates, if subordinates are loyal to their superiors, and if they both possess the requisite knowledge of their profession, and have the necessary determination. Initiative must not be confused with a bull-like rush at the enemy the moment he is encountered, and made at the instance of a subordinate commander. An attack may be a proof of want of initiative. At times, initiative becomes an inconvenience, by crossing the views of the higher authorities, and thus depriving them of liberty of action, by the creation of an unalterable situation. In the higher positions especially, careful consideration must precede action, because here a part of an army is involved whose fate bears influence on the whole, which is not so much the case when the initiative is taken by commanders of inferior rank. But nothing would be more mistaken than antagonism to initiative in the army generally, and an attempt to establish the principle of restraint on the liberty of action of subordinates, because of the remote chance of a mishap. A hundred healthy impulses would thus be killed, to avoid a single mistake. Initiative is opposed to a number of powerful enemies. Such are: intellectual laziness, *laissez-faire*, the habit of acting by rote, the fear of responsibility, the habit of the majority of men to allow themselves to be carried by the flow of events, of waiting until these clearly impose upon them the duty of action, instead of acting on their own judgment. These negative forces paralyse, as it is, all power of action. If restraint of independence is added, it will not be long before they have choked all life, and the troops have become a soft pulp, which, though easily kneaded by its master will, lacks the elasticity necessary to do great deeds. Initiative can easily be driven out of an army; but it is extremely difficult, perhaps utterly impossible, to rehabilitate it when once banished. A means of preventing possible ill-consequences of initiative is a uniform training of the faculty of judgment. This will not prejudice independence. Commanders must possess a liberal store of generosity in their dealing with the independent actions of their subordinates.¹ "Of these various motives, the most constant in operation, and the most in use in moral training, are praise and blame. It is the sensibility to praise and blame—the joyful feelings associated with the one, and the dread associated with the other—that gives effect to popular opinion, or the popular sanction, and, with reference to men generally, the moral sanction."

It is said of the German commanders in 1870 that they took accomplished facts into their calculations and did not enter into lengthy disputes with the authors, since they were unalterable.

¹ Mental and Moral Science.—Bain.

By acting thus they fostered in all their subordinates courage to act independently, as well as assurance in risky undertakings; for each one knew that he would not be left in the lurch, but might consider himself certain of support from above. It is an unsound doctrine that the General must leave to his fate a subordinate commander who has, without sanction, involved himself in a ruinous engagement with the enemy.

Independence does not embrace arbitrariness. The boundary between them appears to be very indefinite, but can yet be perceived, as soon as the motives for action are closely examined. The verdict must be determined by these motives, and not by the result, which often depends upon accident. Arbitrariness always springs from egotism and not from interest for the common cause. Independence derives its justification from the fact that it promotes higher aims, or, at all events, intends to promote them. Where this motive is excluded, and egotism is indulged in for its own sake, it changes into arbitrariness. Independence risks the person for the sake of the cause; arbitrariness risks the cause for the sake of the person. Each is foreign to the other, and it will, therefore, be quite possible to adopt the one to the exclusion of the other. The resolution is the author of action; firmness its preserver; initiative its nutriment; independence its guard against interruptions; and where these qualities are found, arbitrariness is unknown, for the former spring from good, and the latter from an evil disposition.

Even an Alexander or a Cæsar, if he entered the army to-day, would have to pass through all the intermediate grades from second lieutenant up to commander-in-chief, before being able to make full use of his natural military talents. In life there are many rocks to be avoided, both those incidental to ordinary life and those peculiar to military service, on which open and magnanimous natures particularly are apt to be wrecked. Generosity and the spirit of comradeship have often been disastrous to light purses. Faithful devotion has implicated many in the fate of a superior or a friend. Excellent officers have had to forfeit their career, because they could not help feeling sympathy for subordinates suffering injustice, and thus involved themselves in their fall. In order to escape these perils, it is necessary to observe discreet aloofness. We thus arrive at a point to see the usefulness of a quality which, when speaking of officers as a body, we are obliged to reject as being the most objectionable of all, namely, egotism. It is, however, impossible to escape from it, for it is a fact that no one has ever accomplished anything great in the world without a certain amount of egotism. Still, we should draw a distinct line between the ordinary mortal and those few privileged individuals whom providence has predestined to greatness. In the case of the former, egotism is nothing more nor less than

a predilection for self; in the latter case egotism is a designed husbanding of strength in anticipation of coming opportunities, when it shall be displayed all the less reservedly for the benefit of the world. It must not be prematurely frittered away on lesser objects. A certain indifference to all the trivial daily excitements of the world is most helpful to great natures in preserving themselves from premature exhaustion. But as this quality is not an amiable one, it is explained why heroic historical personages, particularly those of modern times, were but seldom popular among the companions of their youth. They were looked upon as cold and calculating individuals. Cool reserve, whether conscious or instinctive, impresses on the character in process of time a trait of genuine selfishness. Perfectly unselfish natures are sure to fall a prey to some misadventure. There have, it is true, been exceptions—splendid men who, never sparing themselves, yet were never exhausted—but they are a rarity even among the great.

Intellectual discipline, in contradistinction to moral discipline, is necessary. Intelligence, if allowed to work in an army without rule, renders command extremely difficult, a condition which has been the frequent misfortune of improvised armies. In militia and volunteer organisations, who are called out in the hour of danger there is, generally speaking, no lack of able and educated men in the higher ranks. But it is an undisciplined intelligence, wanting in uniform training. Hence there is an absence of unity of action. This latter is guaranteed by a uniform system of training. It is not meant that the scope of a commander's activity must necessarily be defined by rule: war does not tolerate schedules. Yet there must be a certain uniformity in the matter of performing given tasks, and this is obtained by certain general principles being engrafted into the flesh and blood of the commanders of troops by teaching and practice. Good leadership cannot exist without strict schooling, since thus only it is possible to ensure that given tasks are executed by all officers on similar principles, though the methods employed may vary. If such discipline of the intelligence exists, the commander may, with composure, leave much to the initiative of the individual. He will feel assured that in places beyond his personal control, something practical will be done, and in harmony with his intention, though not perhaps exactly what he would have done himself. Uniformity in mental training will only be possible where the whole body of officers is of the same social status.

This condition naturally does not obtain in armies whose officers have partly risen from the ranks and partly graduated from military schools and academies; among such, perfect unity of action will never be assured.

To the Staff College students General Robertson spoke on "the value and culture of an intelligent and appropriate

initiative." He said: "When you become commanders, and expect your subordinates to exercise a due amount of this quality, you must be prepared to see them do things sometimes not quite according to your wishes. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot expect proper initiative to be displayed if, at the same time, you are constantly interfering in matters of detail. So long as principles are being correctly observed you must leave the details to your subordinates. Initiative is a very sensitive thing and is easily checked; consequently you must be careful not to do anything which would unduly interfere with it." To apply initiative at the right time and in a suitable way requires that subordinates have a correct appreciation of the object which the higher commander desires to attain, and his proposed method of attaining it. There is the necessity for them to be in touch with the mental progress of the commander's plan as well as with the general course of the action. This requires, at all times, a good system of inter-communication, the control of which demands forethought, patience and energy. A bond of sympathy, initiated by the commander, must exist between himself and his subordinates. In the field a correct appreciation is only the first step towards solving the problems, whereas, in peace manoeuvres, nothing more is frequently demanded than this appreciation. The surmounting of purely personal difficulties, the objections of subordinates, and the influence of highly-placed advisers are often sufficient to prevent many a good resolve being carried into effect, and to cause it to be replaced by a worse. The friction incidental to the movement of troops and the influence of the enemy, often cause the same effect. Other circumstances are also involved. There are men who set themselves to work with the greatest energy to carry out a plan, once it is formed, but who, nevertheless, find it difficult to form a resolution. For the average man it is not easy, especially when he hears other opinions, to be quite clear as to what he himself intends. Foreign elements are introduced unconsciously, because the mind is accustomed to a state of dependence. The same effect, for another reason, is sometimes found in people of a high order of intellect. Their mind lacks a certain moderation, in being too exacting in the matter of preliminaries to action. They want to take the offensive, but the preparations for it do not appear to them sufficient. They mean to fight, but they draw up in their minds a rigid plan of the grouping of the forces preceding the battle. But circumstances are never quite as favourable as had been wished, when resolution is wanting to try fortune. Unsteadiness of purpose makes each individual case appear an exceptional one, to which established principles are inapplicable. It must be realized that the ideal in war will never be obtained, that what we desire is never fulfilled as we would have it, that things always take another form than the expected, and that we must accordingly be ever ready to take decisive action, even under conditions

only moderately favourable to us. To arrive at a resolution it is not sufficient to possess strength of character, but a certain practical insight into the imperfection of all human action is also essential. We should be content with attaining our object even though it is not attained in the way hoped. Moderation, it is said, furthers resolution. We must not try to force the fulfilment of our favourite ideas in face of everything. Tacticians and strategists having this tendency are dangerous leaders, particularly when they go so far as to crystallize their scientific convictions into systems. In the zeal to inflict injury upon the enemy, a resolution must not aim at the unattainable, though it should venture to go to the extreme limit of the permissible. Very frequently the time will be wanting for a methodical review of the situation. Sometimes excitement prohibits it. A resolution then becomes a matter of instinct. During battles and engagements more action springs from the inspiration of the moment than from conscious labour of the brain. We marvel at the faculty of hitting on just the right thing in such spontaneous ideas, and call it genius or intuition. It is simply the faculty of penetrating at a glance a situation as a whole, and at the same time all its details. What is meritorious in all instinctive action is the moral courage to obey such impulses. Yet there is valid reason to place confidence in them, since they express the total sum of judgment, experience, knowledge, and strength of character, an unconscious combination of all intellectual and moral forces. Shakespeare speaks of the "native hue" of a resolution. The danger which threatens the original resolve from subsequent reconsideration, renders it necessary to take some precautions to uphold it. The orders given must be such as to prevent the possibility of wavering. The first condition to the obtainable of special efforts is, that the man in authority evinces the courage to demand them of his troops. History teaches us that those who dare to demand something extraordinary, are fewer than those who make extraordinary efforts when they are demanded of them.

Since the sense of responsibility is a bitter foe to resolution, irresponsible persons are, as a rule, most fertile in ideas. When a young officer rides with the staff of a Field-Marshal, he, in his ignorance, is apt to form prompt resolutions, and cheerfully to take the most momentous decisions upon his shoulders. As his designs often chance to prove right in practice, he readily believes that he only needs a Field-Marshal's baton to be a great General. The weight of responsibility does not bear the same throughout. It increases with every step in promotion. Subalterns are, naturally, the leaders in dash, since they have the early consciousness of their claims to a Field-Marshal's baton, without, however, as yet having to bear the burden of responsibility of the post. They form an element of energy tending upwards, and the same applies to successive

steps in rank. In this way an impetus is given to the whole mass. The independence of the lower commanders constitutes a force which cannot be replaced by anything else. It is clear that the machinery of an army must work with greater speed and to better effect, when each component works automatically, than when the impetus is waited for from above. If an army cultivates the habit of only doing what is ordered, its movements are bound to be somewhat jerky and intermittent. It will experience an interruption on each occasion of unforeseen circumstances occurring, because all concerned will first await the orders of the higher commanders.

Historical experiences seem to justify the conviction that but little depends upon the conditions of the army, but everything upon the genius of the General. Special qualities are indispensable if the military ladder is to be ascended up to the height requisite to bring out the highest qualities of a talented leader, and to turn them to good account. Undoubtedly character makes the General. But strong characters are apt to disport themselves in a manner more disadvantageous than favourable to their advancement in time of peace. In former times, great Generals could only rise up independently of their surrounding circumstances so long as the armies remained more or less free levies of the people, and primitive naturalists pervaded all their institutions. Under such circumstances, energy and personal influence find the widest scope; it dwindles with the arrival of a settled and orderly state of civilization. The excellence of the troops now stands in a more intimate relation to the excellence of their Generals than was the case in former days. Only where a healthy state of things prevails in any army, will good Generals be found at the head of it. The way of these latter is barred so soon as favouritism and the spirit of clique and partizanship enter in, or subservience is more highly esteemed than sincerity and force of conviction. We must not merely examine what qualities a man needs in these days in order to achieve great things as a General, but also what general conditions must prevail in an army to render the rise of great soldiers possible. The truest friend and promoter of strength of will is ambition. Healthy ambition is indispensable to a soldier. Ambition, however, has wrongly become discredited, because it is so frequently confused with that form of activity which strives after external advantage, and is thus falsely styled ambition. Genuine ambition is an expression of the natural desire, innate in every man, to prolong his existence beyond the pale of death, to snatch an immortal part of his existence from annihilation. Without this active help, the will, even though it assert itself energetically at first, is readily exposed to the danger of gradual extinction. Great deeds are impossible without ambition. It is nearest allied to love of glory, which unceasingly prompts us to rescue our name from historical oblivion, and, with that object in view, to accomplish extraordinary

achievements. A recipe for ambition, called "the salad of success," appeared in a now defunct newspaper.

To choicest cuts of Energy
And eggs of cold, hard cash,
Add freely oil—Diplomacy—
With salt of Tact—a dash—
Bedeck the leaves of Cheerfulness,
And pepper well with nerve—
Behold your Salad of Success
Is ready—stir and serve.

A General must be born to rule men rather than to please them. Dominion over others is essentially founded upon the power of will. It is seen in the case of boys at play, how the one who knows how to give the most definite expression to his will leads the whole band. Some of his comrades yield to him from indolence, others from want of confidence in their own power. In later life the same is repeated. A claim advanced with determination seldom meets with opposition; it inspires respect, and the great masses of mankind like to be impressed by their leaders. Thus they acquire a sense of personal security, and that, again, enhances their courage and capacity.

It is a difficult art to command properly. It does not matter so much what and how much is commanded, than how commands are given. The tone of the voice may imply doubt; a failure to appreciate, or possible non-compliance with the command will result. Nothing should be forbidden where, owing to the force of circumstances, disobedience may be anticipated. Nor should a command be given, the subsequent accomplishment of which is bound to prove impossible. Courage of responsibility is born of a certain nobility of mind which must be inherent in the General, and which ennobles his whole nature. It consists in a sense of superiority which raises above the common herd, without making a man presumptuous and which may be innate, or may be acquired in the school of life. Severe trials purify a well-formed character. They teach us to think little of earthly weal or woe, to face dauntlessly the possibility of suffering fresh disaster, to bear blame, though guiltless, and to be indifferent to condemnation by the crowd and to the displeasure of the powerful. Extensive and thorough knowledge may also produce this nobility of mind. Such knowledge certainly makes us recognise the limitations of human wisdom, while, on the other hand, it teaches that war presents us with no enigmas incapable of solution, but that the employment of the natural powers of intellect is all that is needed. Nowhere, in the whole system of warfare, is there any dark corner which the magician's art alone can illuminate. Knowledge enhances assurance, whilst ignorance is the beginning of moral decadence. The feeling of commanding the means and of having, at worst, to fight against misfortune,

steels self-confidence. Whether this nobility of soul be a natural talent, or whether it be acquired by education, or in the school of experience, it is the very quality which soldiers most highly esteem in their General. It is a guarantee against the unwelcome effects upon them of danger and disaster. It produces an even balance of mind, diffusing a comforting effect over the whole army. Courage of responsibility and nobility of mind are now more necessary to the General than ever, owing to the increasing dimensions of armies, and their wide dispersion in the theatre of war. The uncertainty of subordinate commanders must, of necessity, increase, because of the difficulty of appreciating the situation as a whole from their particular situation. On the other hand, the possibility of immediate control from above is proportionately diminished. The Commander-in-Chief thus finds himself more frequently in the position of being obliged to accept responsibility for events, the course of which he is unable to direct. In these days it is seldom possible to find a position whence the whole battlefield could be surveyed. Messages often take so much time in transit that the circumstances under which they were sent have, in the meantime, completely changed. Information is sometimes contradictory. Hence the General must act, so to say, on hearsay, which demands greater courage of responsibility than was required fifty or a hundred years ago, and only a strong self-conscious mind will thus be equal to the task.

The energy of an army, or its fighting capacity, depends primarily upon the physical vigour of the men that compose it. A body of men to fight and march and endure the hardships of war must be as physically perfect as possible. A sick man entails a greater loss than a man killed on the field. Endurance is called for not only in battle, but in the long marches and the many hardships which are inseparable from the exertions necessary to securing strategical advantage. Fatigue tends to lower the moral of troops to a degree that officers, who have never made a campaign, scarcely suspect. General Robertson's advice is¹ "remember that when the day for fighting comes the qualifications demanded will include, in addition to a good theoretical knowledge of your professional duties, the possession of a quick eye, a good digestion, and an untiring activity."

If the mind, owing to lack of study, is unfit, the strain and anxiety will re-act upon the body, and both mind and body will break down. Conversely, if the body alone be unfit, the strain it will be subjected to will sap the power of thought. The training of mind and body must, therefore, go hand in hand. The body must be put to extreme exertions, and when in this state, the brain must be called upon to act. A battle demands superhuman exertions, which crushes the soul, and

¹ Address to Staff College students.

scarcely admits consciousness of the grandeur of the moment. Exhaustion from fatigue so takes possession of all the senses that they are insusceptible of any impression. History relates how, on the retreat from Jena to Prenzlau, old grenadiers placed their muskets against each other's chests and fired, simply so as not to be obliged to march any further.

So long as his own troops continue to fight well a commander may not be called upon to display any great energy of purpose. It is when his own troops begin to offer resistance that he is required to exercise his force of will. It is when the different parts of the military machinery begin to grate and to jar, when cohesive action begins to fail, when physical and moral powers become exhausted, and when all ranks begin directly or indirectly, one after another, to transfer their fears, anxieties, and difficulties to their commander and to rest their weight upon him. It is then that the real leader shows himself, and in so far as he proves equal to bear the weight thus put upon him will he stand out above the masses and continue to be their master. As far as the physical strength of men is concerned, the test to which it is put in the fight is only severe because of the nervous exhaustion which emotion produces. Of the moral factors, one of the most important is fear. Whatever the foe opposing him may be like, the man in the fight has but one enemy, namely, fear. Various sentiments, natural qualities, passions, and acquired habits, such as native courage, confidence in a leader, patriotism, *esprit de corps*, discipline, fight against fear. There are several kinds of fear. The handful of old soldiers at Solferino who were found squatting in a ditch and talking quietly to each other, had run away from the fight from fear of death, but they remained in full possession of their faculties: they were not a prey to fear like those Germans who had huddled together in the bottom of the Mance ravine during the battle of Gravelotte. These were completely panic-stricken and had lost their heads. The young soldier is moved and anxious from the moment he takes the field. He advances into the unknown, not knowing what is going to happen. The assault and the hand-to-hand fight are not what frightens a soldier, be he inexperienced or no. What makes most impression on him is the long-range fire fight, because it is still the unknown, an enemy he does not see.

Immobility, physical, moral and intellectual stagnation, surrender a man unreservedly to his emotions, whereas movement, work of any kind, tends to deliver him from them. There is every reason to keep the combatant moving, to avoid those halts which are not absolutely imposed by the intensity of the fire, and to force the pace.

Take for example what Fritz Hoenig¹ has to tell about physical exhaustion: "It was impossible to say whether the

¹ Tactics of to-day.

enemy's attack would, or would not, be brought to a standstill to the east of the wood by the fire of the German guns. While this point was still uncertain, swarms of panic-stricken infantry of all regiments, with white, red and blue shoulder-straps, burst suddenly, along the whole front to the south of the main road, out of the western edge of the wood, and poured in upon the artillery who were in action. It was impossible at the first moment to distinguish whether this played-out rubbish was composed of friends or enemies. Since the men, driven on by fright and terror, having entirely lost their reason and all moral power, were rushing along and yelling as they went, it was quite possible that they might be French assailants. There was, therefore, great anxiety in the line of the artillery of the 7th Corps; many eyes were turned to the rear on the 2nd Corps, and officers promptly sprang to the front from the batteries in order to ascertain how the situation stood. These saw nothing but masses of German troops who had lost their heads. But what masses there were of them. Their moral was gone, and they listened neither to word of command nor to orders. Many artillery officers threatened them with drawn swords, and others shouted to them that they would open upon them with case from their own guns; but nothing had any effect upon them. Under such circumstances the soldier becomes irresponsible for his actions. Since it was impossible to collect this dross into any formation, an effort was made to turn them off behind the artillery; but this, too, failed. Driven on by fright and terror, the fugitives ran in a straight line upon their own guns and poured through the intervals, for even the strong expostulations of the gunners were unable to bring them to their senses. The mob did not stop until it had arrived in rear of the line of artillery, where they were met by officers of all arms and of all ranks, from generals to lieutenants. Even headquarters and the commander of the 1st Army were not undisturbed by this event."

How then are we to profit by these lessons? It would seem that a better mutual understanding is required between leaders and their men so as to reduce the physical exertion of command. The energy required by a commander and his officers to manœuvre a body of badly-trained men in the presence of an enemy is almost superhuman. The effort cannot be sustained long, and with the first signs of a flagging will the ranks become demoralized. However good may be the discipline of a regiment in peace time, unless the moral qualities have been fostered and developed, cohesion and swiftness of purpose will be lacking on the battlefield. The time may come when the mental strain is too great and the man surrenders himself to his emotions. If his peace training has prepared him for the possibility of such an occasion he will not so readily succumb to the strain. Voluntary restraint is a safeguard against enforced retreat. But he must have been habituated

to the notion, and, so far as is possible, be practised in the situation, so that it may not, in war, take him permanently by surprise.

It was said of a certain king, once a target for an anarchist's bomb, that he cultivated courage by the habit of mentally taking his life in his hand and acting on the fixed, familiar thought each time occasion arose. In thus disciplining his nerves through his mind he became fearless of regicidal cranks. Again, of Pegoud, the aviator, the newspapers write that the capacity to face danger unmoved seemed to him to be the first requisite in the present state of air navigation; the next, quickness and a perceptive eye. As a training for these qualities, he courted danger, inconvenience, hardship. All the time he was mentally betting that he would undergo, without flinching, the tests he proposed himself of hardihood, endurance, presence of mind, in getting through ugly situations and tight corners. With this he accustomed himself to the idea that death did not matter.

Marshal St. Cyr gave expression to the opinion that every army is made up of three kinds of soldiers: one-third naturally brave, one-third naturally cowards, the other third capable of being made brave by good officers and stern discipline. If, however, the proper officers are lacking or discipline is inadequate, the middle third naturally gravitates to the cowardly third.

The moral effect of fire is, as a rule, more destructive than the material effect. In the purely theoretical sense those tactics ought to be best in which the moral force of the leaders is most effectively manifested. We must face the fact that every attack costs blood; the men should be trained to that, and should be habituated to the idea, and it should be taken into account in adopting tactical forms for battle. Troops learn on active service to become callous to death in action. It is quite possible to accustom them to this before war commences. Military history teaches that attacks on strongly occupied positions, even before the introduction of the breech-loader, cost as many men as now. Attacks by large bodies of troops over open ground may become necessary, and should therefore be practised in peace. Even the knowledge that the attack will fail of its object should not be suffered to remove that necessity. The effect of an attack, though it be unsuccessful, may be very great. Unless the soldier is possessed with a high degree of will-power, unless his training is such as to show him the necessity of self-control and disregard of danger, unless there is vigour and will—the will to advance—all forms will remain artifices and fail to mature results. The majority of men will endeavour to avoid endangering their lives as long as possible, and in battle but few will spontaneously overcome the temptation to seek shelter in the ditch they are crossing. The remainder ultimately obey necessity alone, namely, discipline and

the ascendancy of their officers. We know then how much men will yield up spontaneously, and how much has to be extorted. This extortion requiring, for its most efficient application, closed formations, which are no longer practicable on open ground, has been rendered very difficult by modern arms. Whenever the ground admits of the use of closed formations, they should be retained as the surest means of getting the units to the spot where we want them. Since man, as a rule, exposes himself to danger only under compulsion, the tactical forms should be such that compulsion can be brought to bear on the unit. Column tactics are best suited to the purpose, next the closed line, least of all the skirmishing line. To go back to a close formation for the sake of this compulsion, perhaps by closing the men together in a mechanical way, would entail unjustifiable sacrifices for the sake of a principle without any corresponding gain. Compulsion should, therefore, be supplemented by training the leaders to greater activity, and the men to greater attentiveness. The task of subordinate leaders becomes more difficult since they become the real supports of the fire action in all its stages, and the exercise of their will should be more an intellectual than a mechanical one in consequence of their training and mutual understanding of each other. Moral should be as high as possible so as not to melt under fire. Subordinate leaders should be tacticians to a greater extent than formerly, and the men should be able always to understand the tacticians.

In the articles on the recent army exercise, *The Times* makes the following remarks:¹

"The general headquarters was composed exclusively, on its general staff side, of officers from the War Office. Many of these officers have been for years away from troops, and though the officers themselves were all excellent, it may be doubted whether a system which constructs a general headquarters in the field exclusively from such elements is a wise one, unless the necessary measures are taken to keep these officers in contact with troops and to practise them constantly in staff tours and field operations . . . there is little doubt that divisional and brigade staffs would have been completely worn out in less than a week of war owing to deprivation of sleep by the late arrival of orders. There was no visible necessity for this tardy issue of orders . . ."

This clearly proves how necessary it is to keep staffs in close touch with the physical requirements of a campaign. On active service, generals and staff officers have to be for many hours at a stretch in the saddle, and at the close of day require to have a clear brain to deal with situations and orders. This demands great fitness of body and mind. Added to this, a practical knowledge of the countless worries and anxieties which

¹ *The Times*, October 10th, 1913.

the smaller units experience before an order from army headquarters reaches them, and the time it takes to filter through the various channels. Few officers who work in an office, especially if it is in town, have the means, and still fewer the inclination, to keep their bodies thoroughly well trained and ready for any emergency. The opportunity to do this, from time to time throughout the year, must be forthcoming, and at the public expense. Quite lately some experiments in long distance riding have been tried at the cavalry school with satisfactory results. This, in the case of a staff officer, might dovetail in with a tactical ride or staff tour. It will combine physical with mental training, and should be the means of bringing out the character and capabilities of the officer when subjected to extreme exertion.

As to the behaviour and example of officers.

"Whenever I see during field operations a group of staff officers collected together, chatting, smoking, and taking little or no notice of what is happening around them, I have no doubt in my own mind that they are neglecting their duty. When troops have been on the move I have seldom found time in which to be idle, and even if there be such it is not right to take advantage of it under the eyes of the troops who may be passing you, perhaps hungry, thirsty, and exhausted."¹

The above words of General Robertson equally apply to a regimental staff, such being the commanding officer and his adjutant. The welfare of the tired unit at the end of the day's work on manœuvres, must be their business. By their example and energy they can greatly assist the settling down in bivouac, the smooth working of which helps so much to humour and encourage tired officers and men. During the late army exercise it was not an uncommon sight to see, during operations, hospitality being dispensed to officers from motors. Undoubtedly it is necessary at all times to keep them vigorous and clear-minded for any emergency. But it cannot be good for the moral of troops who are "perhaps hungry, thirsty and exhausted," to see their officers accepting refreshment which is denied to the soldier. In the words of Kipling:

The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each tooth-point goes;
The butterfly beside the road,
Preaches contentment to that toad.

Systematic practice in marching in time of peace is essential, and constant opportunities present themselves in the tactical exercises and marches to the manœuvre ground or rifle range. But special exercises, in which long distances are covered solely in order to practise marching, must not be omitted. The purely mechanical aptitude is certainly lost very quickly, directly the soldier joins the reserve and resumes the life of the ordinary

¹ Address to Staff College students.—General Robertson.

citizen; but the tradition of great achievements is an important factor. An exertion which, by previous experience, a soldier has learnt to regard as anything but extraordinary, he endures far more easily than one quite strange to him. If the fatiguing exercises and long marches in time of peace were discontinued, the army would lose by degrees the standard for measuring what human nature can endure without prejudice. People do not reflect how necessary it is to give individual experience to every soldier, which, later on, will enable him to face the inevitable hardships of war with quite a different spirit than if he were a complete novice, and will help him to endure them more readily. The period of long strategical marches, which formerly afforded the best means of making good lost opportunities, is a thing of the past. The troops are often marched immediately from the railway station against the enemy, and there is no time for training the troops thoroughly in marching, before the commencement of operations. Careful consideration in the arrangement of the marches is of influence upon the moral of the troops. Every extra toil which the plain mind of the soldier recognises as unnecessary, annoys him, whereas he readily submits to a necessary evil, be it ever so much greater. His feeling in this matter is, as a rule, correct, though in no wise regulated by a fixed measure.

In the *Memorandum on Army Training in India*, 1911, Sir Douglas Haig says: "A more thorough knowledge of how to carry out a night march, and when such an operation is advisable, seems called for. Night marches should never be undertaken without full consideration of the object to be attained. But it is certain that the necessity for such operations will become more and more frequent in the future, and particularly when the opposing forces are in contact. All arms may be required to work at night and all must therefore be trained in the duties they may be called upon to perform. . . . A large percentage of our British soldiers are town-bred and consequently require much practice to enable them to work well in darkness. The first essential for the successful conduct of night operations is, therefore, thorough individual training in night work, for if the rank and file are accustomed to work individually in darkness, collective night operations will present fewer difficulties."

It is, then, generally accepted that such operations will frequently be resorted to in future. There is a danger that soldiers who have no actual experience may enter into this extremely risky class of fighting without fully realizing what they are committing themselves to. There is nothing so upsetting to the nerves as the unexpected.

Not that there is anything extraordinary about night fighting; it is all very much what a man of ordinary intelligence and imagination might expect. Nevertheless, the first actual experience always seems to give men an unpleasant surprise.

The general impression left on the mind is one of utter confusion. Each individual knows only what is happening in his immediate neighbourhood, and he is in complete ignorance as to the fortunes of his comrades, and of the success or failure of the plan as a whole. The scheme which, beforehand, seemed so clear and well-thought-out to the minutest details, seemed suddenly dependent on numberless chances impossible to have been foreseen or provided against. If the night is dark there is an uncomfortable feeling that we may fire into our friends, or, what is worse, that they may be firing at us. Even when it comes to bayonet fighting it is difficult to tell friend from foe unless there is some distinctive dress. A knowledge of what to expect will be useful, and many of the risks can be minimised by a little forethought. It seems almost unnecessary to lay stress on such a self-evident fact as the value of discipline. This is put to a high test in night fighting; without it the man will lie down or otherwise seek cover. It may be thought that it is not an easy thing to inculcate a fierce fighting spirit, and that it is a question of the individual temperament of the man. Much, however, can be done by constantly laying stress on the value of fierceness when it comes to hand-to-hand fighting—that the enemy must be killed and without loss of time.

It requires no genius to grasp the fact that peace training, no matter how good it may be, can never reproduce anything like the scene that must inevitably take place when a night collision occurs in actual warfare. Because a certain manœuvre or formation appears to be successful against a flagged enemy, or against troops who have only blank ammunition and do not use the bayonet, it does not in the least follow that similar methods would not lead to disaster against a real enemy. It is to the elementary stages of night operations that special attention must be paid; with more advanced work Brigadiers and higher commanders are concerned. The individual, officer or man, must be sent out to work in the darkness and to grow accustomed to sights and sounds. He must learn the difficulties of moving over an enclosed country, or of finding the way across a plain; the sense of loneliness and self-reliance; the relief which is felt on successfully accomplishing a journey in an unknown part of the country; to appreciate the need of fitness, physically and mentally, to combat the extra strain which night work entails.

It is this individual training which makes for efficiency, and until the lessons have been learnt, collective night work is a waste of time and energy.

In an address on "Bookishness and Statesmanship," given by Lord Rosebery, he refers to the late Mr. Gladstone's love for study. "That intellect, mighty by nature, was fashioned and prepared by the labour of every day and almost every hour until the last day of health." And again, "it was his principle in reading to make his exports balance his imports—

he took in a great deal, but he put forth a great deal. His close study of a book was pretty sure to precede an article on that book. It was impossible for him under this principle to sink into the mere passive and receptive reader." Here, then, are two lessons. The first, the necessity for constant and careful study to develop the intellect and prevent stagnation. The second, that knowledge acquired by reading (as also by other means) must be diffused, not only for the general good, but also to compel the reader to fasten his attention on his subject, so as to extract the best teaching from it.

We must be ever careful to conduct our military studies in the broad light of practical experience and human nature—human nature as it is found in war, as affected by discipline, or the lack of it, confidence, or the want of it, fear, responsibility, and many other things. Human nature will undoubtedly assert itself in war, and with it we must reckon. It will further assist us to keep on the right lines if at all times we remember to study with the definite aim of obtaining guidance for future use in war, and not merely for the sake of amassing a store of information. If we conduct our investigations from this standpoint we shall not burden our minds with too many historical parallels, and will not be so apt to form conclusions which, however attractive they may appear on paper, have little or no connection with the rough work of masses of men trying to kill each other. Mahan¹ points a moral:—

"There is not in modern naval history a more striking warning to the officers of every era, than this battle of Toulon. Coming as it did after a generation of comparative naval inactivity, it tried men's reputations as by fire. The lesson, in the judgment of the author, is the danger of disgraceful failure to men who have neglected to keep themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their profession, but in the sentiment of what war requires. The average man is not a coward; but neither is he endowed by nature only with the rare faculty of seizing intuitively the proper course at a critical moment. He gains it, some more, some less, by experience or by reflection. If both have been lacking to him, indecision will follow; either from not knowing what to do, or from failure to realize that utter self-devotion of himself and his command are required."

A study of the military history of the past is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. Clausewitz says: "The value of the moral powers, and their frequently incredible influence, are best exemplified by history, and this is the most generous and purest nourishment which the mind of the General can extract from it." Napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and

¹ "Influence of Sea Power upon History."—Mahan.

there is a substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles.

Now a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success. War has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy. It is, however, in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre of war, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less great, the necessary movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they must conform remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communications were not altered.

Though the particular battles are, even at this day, not without tactical instruction, it is undoubtedly true that, like all the tactical systems of history, they have had their day, and their present usefulness to the student is rather in the mental training, in the forming of correct tactical habits of thought than in supplying models for close imitation. On the other hand, the movements which precede and prepare for great battles, or which, by their skilful and energetic combinations, attain great ends without the actual contact of arms, depend upon factors more permanent than the weapons of the age, and therefore furnish principles of more enduring value.

It is then in the field of strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are

there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions.

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting—in the handling and disposition of troops on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with military matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences—that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategical considerations which lead nations to put armies in the field, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the student who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the man and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class. This can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

There are few people who, in the course of their life, have not, at some time, expressed the wish to be able to peer into the future. The desire for the unknown is strong in us. But a panorama of the future would lack those instructive details on which history is built and which are there for our education. Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, supposed to be obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent lessons which lie close to the surface of history. Lord Rosebery, in a speech, the subject of which was King Alfred, shows us that, however alluring a peep into the future may be, a study of the past should fill us equally with wonderment, and is better for us.¹ "But suppose that in some such dream a seer had led him up into a mountain and showed him the England of which he had laid the foundations; had not

¹ Lord Rosebery at Winchester, 20th September, 1901.

concealed from him the first dark hour in which his kingdom and race should be overwhelmed by a Norman invasion, of which the iron should enter the English soul—not to slay but to strengthen, to introduce, indeed, the last element wanted to compose an Imperial race; and then passing over the ages, had solaced him by showing him the new England as we see it, had led him to the banks of the Thames, and had shown him the little Saxon fort developed into a world-capital and a world-mart, inhabited by millions, often crowded and distressed, but familiar with comforts unknown to a Saxon prince. And then passing down and beyond the Imperial river he might have been brought within sight of the British fleet, the offspring of his own poor boats, charged with the wardship of a fifth of the world, with the traditions of victory and supremacy, and not unequal to the trust. Suppose, moreover, there could have been spread before him the opulent and brilliant vista of English literature, that promised land for which he was to prepare but scarcely to enter. Suppose, in a word, that he could have beheld, as in an unfolded tapestry, the varying but superb fortunes of that indomitable race by whose cradle he had watched; would he not have seen in himself one of those predestined beings, greater than the great, who seem unconsciously to fashion the destinies and mark the milestones of the world? And as he, looking forward, would have marvelled, so we, looking backward, marvel none the less."

The age (*i.e.*, about 20) at which officers join the Army is the most critical time of their lives. Till then their actions have been controlled at Sandhurst or Woolwich. With the commission comes the freedom from the fetters of school life—the power to come and go at will. The extent to which this freedom can be taken advantage of depends on the size of the individual's purse. Much assistance can be given by a commanding officer to a newly-joined subaltern in directing his energies into the proper channel, either in work or play. "It is his duty to study their characters, to interest himself in their pursuits, to enhance their comforts, to assist and encourage with counsel and praise every good effort."¹ Formerly the older man was often looked upon in the light of a schoolmaster, whose words were those of admonition. Seldom were any steps taken by him to dispel this hallucination. Consequently, between colonel and subaltern was fixed a great gulf. The younger one was allowed to shape his own course, and so long as he did not exceed the limits of conventionality, no notice was taken as to how he spent his time. His teacher was experience, which he had to pay for. And yet much of this drifting existence, where such existed, might have been obviated if the colonel of the regiment had emerged from the fog of obscurity in which he enveloped himself, and appeared to his subordinates in a more

¹ "Military Ends and Moral Means."—Graham.

natural and sympathetic light. Sir Evelyn Wood, discussing the Battle of Marengo, says: "We have one incalculable advantage which no other nation possesses, namely, that our officers are able to hunt, and than which, combined with study, there is, during peace, no better practice for acquiring the gift which Kellermann naturally possessed." Since there is much that the military student can learn in the hunting field, it is necessary that he be made to recognize and appreciate the lessons. The energy which many young officers devote to the chase can be turned to good account, professionally, if those responsible for their military education will teach them how to benefit by their experience. Horsemanship, horsemastership, physical endurance, comradeship, discipline, nerve, control of feelings, an absence of jealousy, an eye for country, self dependence, resolution. These are some of the lessons to be learned. To draw attention to them is not sufficient. A commanding officer must test his young officers on these points. Their love of hunting will make them willing and observant pupils, and they can be trained to apply their knowledge to military requirements.

It is laid down in the regulations that the commander, assisted by the senior major of the regiment, is responsible for the education of his officers. The system of employing a tutor for the purpose of passing examinations is sometimes considered by these senior officers to remove the responsibility from off their unwilling shoulders. Now the education of an officer does not end with the passing of examinations for promotion. These examinations are necessary as an incentive to study. But as a standard of military knowledge the test is purely academical. It is in the daily lessons in the field and in barracks, at work and at play, that a soldier learns the practical part of his profession. It is not sufficient that the lesson is forthcoming; its presence must be felt and emphasized.

Constant thought and preparation on the part of the instructor is necessary to deal with the simplest situations, so that the explanation put forward may be clear and lucid. It is the want of a proper understanding of what the instructor requires which confuses the pupil; doubt and uncertainty are the result. A not uncommon mistake is the belief that the instructor can, on arrival at the place selected for the exercise, then and there think out the problems he wishes to put forward. Even if the ground is familiar to him, the want of preparation of thought will remove from the teaching much of its value. But should he be unacquainted with the Terrain, then the double evil of an unprepared scheme applied to an unexplored piece of ground is present. The ground, the lesson and its moral, must be familiar to the master to enable him to foresee the obstacles which will present themselves to the pupils. If he fails in this he will not have the confidence of his subordinates. The attempt

1 "Achievements of Cavalry."

to accomplish too much at one time is detrimental to the instruction. The uncertainty which sometimes exists is caused by the failure of the instructor to elicit from his pupils in what light the task set before them presents itself. This may be, and probably is, caused by a lack of patience on the part of the instructor. Before studying a pupil's solution of a scheme, the master should be clear in his mind what his own solution is, and it would often be better to make this latter known before going any farther with the closing discussion. Nothing could be worse than that an instructor should study the answers and give a ruling composed of the best products of each solution. Encouragement is the most valuable when most needed. To know what should be done is one thing; to correctly apply that knowledge to a specific case is quite another matter, for which practice alone is the remedy.

It is not always appreciated by commanding officers that a regiment cannot be in an efficient state for active service unless the officers know and understand their colonel's methods of meeting the many situations which are likely to present themselves. In other words, he must make known to his officers his reading of the art of war. If he has failed to do this he will find himself a prey to his fears. This uncertainty will spread to his subordinates and there will be a want of mutual support, owing to doubt. The practice of a commander asking his subordinates how they would act in certain cases might be reversed, for it is he alone who will give the order when the occasion arises for action, and he should be questioned accordingly. This is opposed to the view, taken usually by the person concerned, that the commanding officer is superior to anything which savours of an examination. A school of thought must be inculcated and encouraged. It may be they are not isolated cases where the freedom of thought has been discouraged, for fear the pupil should accrue too great a store of military knowledge—to the detriment of the master. Or again, the fear is sometimes present that extra work may be thrown upon the colonel of a regiment if he personally undertakes the education of his officers. Possibly he sees with the termination of his command the close of a military career. Lack of interest in his profession and the counter attractions of society combine to produce indolence. The remedy is hard to find. Promotion by selection on too large a scale would shake the nerves of the army, and the selection board would be accused of testing what is known to us by what is unknown—and the unknown makes us for ever dissatisfied with the known. It does not follow that a capable instructor in the theory of war has the necessary qualification to lead men in the field. Conversely it has often been proved that a determined and energetic fighter will, in the succeeding period of peace, relapse into indolence, scorning to read, believing that theory is no match for practice, he being well equipped with the latter. Consequently the education of

his subordinates, for which, he, as commanding officer, and with some study, should be so eminently fitted, is neglected. The gift of imparting to others the lessons which have been learnt by experience appears to be given to few. It may be that the mind has not been trained to appreciate the lessons as they occur, and they therefore leave no impression. Or again, it is possible that he who has had the experience does not cherish with interest the memory of it, and neglects to note down its usefulness, for future reference, in his mind's diary. Usually, indolence regarding past things in general and their teachings, combined with neglect to ponder over the moral which each lesson points, are accountable for the lack of desire to diffuse this knowledge among those who have had no opportunity of such experience. Could this teaching become a reality by those in a position to give it, its value would be incalculable. The unknown, as it presents itself in war, will not then appear so terrible to the man who is without experience. He would then set out for a campaign equipped with some knowledge of what is likely to happen, would be able, in some degree, to anticipate events or recognise the signs of the times, and should therefore be, to a lesser extent, a prey to that doubt which saps the nervous system. Experience in the short wars of to-day plays but an insignificant rôle in regard to the private soldier, as, properly speaking, it merely supplies a knowledge of the practical needs of life in the field. It is otherwise with leaders. They must not be taken unawares and confounded by the novelty of the phenomena of war. To them, experience is of genuine value, and such experience can only partially be replaced by a study of military history. We are, as men, the sum total of our experiences—what we have heard, seen, and known. The necessity for congenial surroundings in which to study is often lost sight of. It is well nigh impossible for a man to educate himself in a barrack room where enough noise is going on to distract the most eager attention and the dim gaslight gives little encouragement. There should be a reading-room, in or close to barracks, which is comfortable and attractive, where suitable books of an educational kind can be obtained, a librarian to advise seekers after knowledge what to read, and where silence is compulsory. As in everything else, an example must be set by officers taking an interest in this branch of education, and by various methods of inducement, make it the fashion for men to improve their minds.

"The aim of education," says Beattie, "should be to teach us rather how to think than what to think." Perhaps we shall never attain the ideal state where, although education will adopt a plan, it will never be conducted according to a system. Theories of what subjects should be taught, and the methods adopted in teaching them, have been too abundant to make consistent progress possible. Enthusiasm, so precious a virtue generally, has been a positive embarrassment in the sphere of

education. Even now, despite the serious attention given to the matter, the solution seems to be a long way off. After all, education is, or should be, more concerned with mental powers than with systematized knowledge. The object is to teach the best methods of learning. The real education will commence when men begin to think for themselves. What they want is mental development, not feeding with facts. It appears to be a difficulty to the majority of officers to put their thoughts into words and to be able to give a lucid explanation of their actions, or intended actions. This is due to a want of reflection and knowledge of the subject in question, and a lack of command of the proper words and sentences to make it clear to their hearers. A great deal of the doubt and uncertainty of military movements can be traced to this.

14 "What is that spell that thus his lawless train
Confess and envy, yet oppose in vain?
What should it be that thus their faith can bind?
The power of Thought—the magic of the mind,
Link'd with success, assumed and kept with skill,
That moulds another's weakness to its will."

Granting a certain number of evils to exist, can the principle of suggestion contribute a real remedy? The emphasis which has been placed on mental processes by experiments in suggestion in other fields, would appear to confirm the wisdom of substituting mental training for education—the development of mind as contrasted with the accumulation of facts. The distinction between moral and mental education is rather fine. The moral lesson begets a reflex influence which is seen in a more diligent application to studies: the purely mental lesson which requires close attention to be mastered is never devoid of moral elements. Progress by encouragement should be the prevalent policy. It may, sometimes, be a wise plan to put a better construction on a pupil's effort than is really the case, on the grounds that, at the next attempt, he will do better. A man may be depressed because he is not up to the standard of others. Instead of pointedly accentuating this difference the pupil should be told he is doing better, and thus encouraged, he will work all the harder. What is this but suggestion? Suggestion does not create anything; it simply uses a natural force to develop the powers we have, and to utilize the stores of knowledge already accumulated. Most students do their best in an atmosphere of hope, and he is a wise teacher who trains them by kindly confidence. Education as a science is still in the state of becoming, yet it shows signs of applying the forces of suggestion. The future will have to determine how far these may be pressed into the service of teaching, but we have seen that mental powers can profitably receive more attention than they have done; that backward pupils can be treated with success;

¹ Byron.

that moral can be improved; and that suggestion in the form of encouragement is one of the most helpful features in advancement. It is necessary to adopt a form of teaching which will bring out the man and his character. In matters of character we become like that which we admire. Let a man admire the athlete, and he will tend to develop on the same lines; likewise let a man espouse some lofty ideal of self-sacrifice, and his steps will turn in the direction of a suitable opportunity to benefit others. All practical teachers of ethics are aware of the advisability of acting on the notion that a man's character is better than it really is, in point of fact. Act towards a man as if he had a higher character than he has, and we adopt the best method of improving him, provided, of course, there is some moral basis on which to work. We are often trying to find out the bad in each other. If we ignored evil it would possibly cease to exist. If we always emphasized the good it would become supreme and universal.

If suggestion is so subtle an agency in the evolving of opinions and convictions, and in the formation of character, does it not reduce the dignity of man by representing him as wholly a product of his environment? Without being aware of it, we acquire moral predispositions and prejudices; we are impregnated with the mental atmosphere about us. For the most part we are all copyists, because we receive the same suggestions from the complex life in which we live and move and have our being. The man who is a particular person in a special sense, and can rise above the common level, partly by resisting the ordinary mass of suggestions, partly by absorbing them and bringing out their hidden possibilities—this man is a genius.

Of Kant we are told¹ "that he had a time set apart, as becomes a philosopher, for thinking, pure and simple; and whilst thus engaged, he always placed himself so that his eyes might fall on a certain old tower." In what a different situation the ordinary soldier is placed. How difficult it must be for the man who has little or no imagination to see the picture as the lecturer would have it appear, when the scene of the lecture is a room and the subject a battle. To the untrained mind there is nothing to help to conjure up the spectacle. By the aid of photographs it assumes another aspect. Or again, a carefully prepared word picture on the ground goes a long way to assist imagination. Pope and Swift, being in the country together, observed that if contemplative men were to notice the thoughts which suddenly present themselves to their minds when walking in the fields, etc., they might find many as well worth preserving as some of their more deliberate reflections. Yet we seldom digest the effects which are, or should be, produced in our minds by our surroundings. The emotion

¹ "Methods of Authors."

which a so-called "field-day" creates in our brain by starting a train of thought, is allowed to die down on the way back to barracks before we have had time to make an analysis of it. The sight and sounds of autumn manoeuvres seldom form the basis for further investigations. These sudden thoughts are not all of them accounted for by the law of association. They spring up amid other thoughts as different from themselves as the East differs from the West. When the unconscious element in our deeper reflections becomes more intimately known, we shall be able to appreciate inspiration with reference to its mental and physical associations.

It is necessary, either in peace time as a teacher, or in war as a successful commander, to have imagination. He must be able to picture to himself, at any moment during long and intricate marches and operations, the position of his own troops and the probable situation of those of the enemy; he must foresee the situation as it will be at the expiration of several days. Jomini extols this quality in Napoleon; and attributes to it the rapidity and ease of all his arrangements. Imagination is of assistance, also, in the study of military history; it paints in the small details and facilitates a harvest of experiences being gathered which are, perhaps, merely hinted at in the historical narratives. An ill-controlled imagination, which has not been compensated by a careful study of history, is certainly capable of depicting fantastic dangers. But in anxious minds the same apprehensions are frequently due to a sheer want of imagination, and thence spring doubts bringing wrong conclusions in their train. By the aid of imagination, theory is converted into practice. There are but few men who have original thoughts; the majority only make use of what they have inherited or acquired. But in war, situations are of such a nature that they appear similar without ever being quite the same. The number of causes and forces is too great to admit of absolute similarity. It is impossible to employ the exact means that have been already adopted on a previous occasion. At any rate, there will be something entirely new in the manner of their application. Some slight addition of personal invention is always necessary, and that requires the aid of the ever productive power of the creative mind, as well as the will to employ it. This stimulates and enables us to depart from the beaten track and enjoy freedom of movement. By this alone a commander gains a great advantage over an opponent who lacks this gift. He will continually surprise him.

The importance of a good memory is often under-estimated. Napoleon compared a man full of genius, but without a memory, to a fine house without furniture. War is a perpetual struggle with embarrassments which the enemy either causes us or attempts to cause us. Our object, therefore, must be to discover means to help ourselves out of every strait, and, in this our endeavour, the recollection of similar situations in former

times, and even of instances recorded in military history, is of great assistance. Even the most inventive brain would fail, if a good memory did not afford it effectual aid. The latter alone enables us to profit by our experience. Moreover, war demands great care in numerous details, trivial in themselves, but upon which the well-being of the troops depends. The great utility of a good memory is so manifest that vast ability loses most of its power where recollection is weak. Without memory, there can be no rational life at all; the failure to connect the past experience with the present could not but result in the destruction of reason. Without memory there could be no development or mental education. It supplies us largely with the material for thought and reflection. As a rule, leaders of thought have been men of tenacious memory, whilst men of action have displayed similar tenacity, although in a totally different sphere. The problem of memory training is to enable us to remember what we wish to remember, and to forget the rest. In actual life we often "forget the rest," but fail to remember the things important and valuable. And yet it is as wise to lose sight of life's trivialities as it is to retain its significant lessons. Even with the best of people, unpleasant memories occur, but, fortunately, when the mind becomes engrossed in work, and life is armed with a purpose, the trivialities seem to take their own perspective, and sink into the limbo of the almost forgotten.

A bad memory is really a bad mental habit, and since all bad habits are difficult to get rid of, it follows that a bad memory can only be cured by exercises which, in their severity atone for the wrong methods of mental working that have had their inevitable result in forgetfulness. Of course, the faculty of remembering is not so good in some people as in others, but a man who is careless with a poor endowment soon realizes that forgetting is a rather expensive amusement. The plain truth dawns upon him that a good memory depends on the attention he gives to the things he would remember, and the care with which he links one fact with another. All habits are memory instincts, so that where memory itself is bad, there is no remedy except going back to the old methods of impression by attention and association. We do not think about grammar when we are speaking; nor is our mind full of social regulations when we go to a dinner party. Correct English and good behaviour were once subjects of instruction, but that stage has long since been left behind, and both items have passed into the structure of our character; they are unconscious possessions. The more sure and perfect memory becomes, the more unconscious it becomes; and when an idea or mental state has been completely organized, it is revived without consciousness, and takes its part automatically in our mental operations, just as habitual movement does in our body. No man can develop memory power unless he is deeply interested in what he wishes to remember, and uses his will effectively. In a man with a bad memory, we find a man

with bad mental habits. One of them is a distrust of his memory. He openly accuses it of being treacherous. He tells himself it is. He repeats it from time to time, until at last he has auto-suggested a respectable member of his intellectual faculties into gross unfaithfulness. To recover its character means going over the ground again, affirming that the slandered faculty is really capable of first-class work. Our mental gifts are inordinately sensitive. Say an unkind thing about them and they tend to shrivel up at once; they act according to our estimate of them. Encourage them by confidence, and they will do their best to help us. In a great many cases, flabbiness of will is at the bottom of all the mischief. Only a shock of some kind will bring men to themselves. Once that is accomplished, it is possible to pursue a mechanical plan of improvement, because there will be sufficient force to carry it through. The man is in earnest, and will play at memory training no longer. He wants the real thing; this means he has put forth his will. Mind wandering is really a virtue within certain limits, for concentration does not mean a fixed mental stare, but a moving of the mind's eyes to and fro over the area of a prescribed subject. A chess player must consider a good many possible moves before he is convinced that a particular one is the best; yet the mind has been severely concentrated. Mind wandering of the common type is seen in a man who sits down to read a book, and whilst he is reading he thinks for some time of a game of polo, a hunt, or something of the sort which has no connection with the subject of his book. This is intellectual anarchy.

Than loyalty, there is no more important element in the life of an army. There must be no criticism, spoken or implied, of the action of our superior. Upon him rests the responsibility for the action taken, and therefore it is but bare justice that he should be allowed to decide as he thinks best, and that he should have the right to claim at all times and in all circumstances the full support of his subordinates. Loyalty in this sense is, after all, another word for discipline, and if an example in discipline is not set by officers, we cannot expect to find it in the rank and file. But it is possible for loyalty to be overdone, and the failure to see that "the cause" must not be sacrificed for the individual. The evil must be checked when "subservience is more highly esteemed than sincerity and force of conviction."¹ It equally behoves seniors to be loyal to their juniors. Not unfrequently a commander will shield himself and his shortcomings behind the excuse that his subordinates did not give him the necessary support.

"A rather mischievous spirit is abroad in these days. Men seem to forget sometimes that loyalty is due to the Crown, and still less do they seem to regard it as due to the Ministers of the Crown."² Conversation in officers' messes turns, possibly, on

¹ Nation in Arms.

² Army Review, April, 1913.—General Robertson.

politics, and senior officers are, sometimes, given to discrediting the capabilities of the Ministers and their actions. It is a thoughtless habit, the reason for it being that the discussion places such officers in the light of appearing to their juniors as men who know the inner workings of the Government. And so the evil spreads, and it becomes the fashion, each in his turn, to assume, in presence of his juniors, a knowledge of such matters. Sometimes such conversation is the outcome of nervousness, when, for instance, a distinguished guest dines, and topics of conversation do not come readily to the hosts. Officers do not realize that what is permissible at a private house need not be so at a disciplined institution, such as a regimental mess. It is from not knowing better, not from wickedness.

They have grown up in the atmosphere of ignorant criticism, and the responsible person has not been forthcoming to put the matter before them in its proper light, and, in a kindly manner, to discourage this spirit. Criticism, when permissible, must be of a constructive, not destructive kind.

The bitter disappointment of officers who have hoped and desired "something better," without an effort to accomplish a single aim, for fear of criticism, is only known to those who have experienced it. When the best of all opportunities are gone, and we have to be content with "might-have-beens," there can be no surprise that a teacher of pessimism can gather a multitude of eager disciples. The warmth of fellow feeling is sought for by everybody—somewhere. A study of officers as we find them quickly reveals how far, as individuals, they are moved by conceptions of a good still unattained, and how far they are creatures of habit determined by their environment. As a rule they are actuated by the ideas and customs of the "set" to which they belong. It will be found that there are three possible conditions among officers as to the character ideal. First, there are those who have no ideal at all, and live according to personal habit and social custom; next, those who take a section of life and convert it into a whole; lastly, we have those who lay hold on one great principle which influences every action in favour of itself. This principle may be just the simple desire to think and do the best of which human nature is capable; whatever it may be, it is the only true kind of idealism.

Of the few virtues which appertain to mankind, patriotism is foremost in being universally impersonated and put to a wide variety of uses and turned to all degrees of roguery. When it becomes a national fetish, virtue goes out of it. Under its borrowed cloak crimes are not only committed, but nations betrayed; hence the truth of the old statement that in patriotism rogues find their final refuge. True patriotism is not only the love of the soil, it is the love of the past, it is reverence for the generations that have gone before us. There are two kinds of false patriotism. The commonest is to be found in uncompromising and general contempt for all nations, together with

an inveterate prejudice against some one of them. The next, ordinary and false form shows itself in vaingloriousness, whether over great deeds or greater crimes; the condoning of national faults or their concealment by the exaltation of this fetish worship. True patriotism would melt away if its exemplification lay only in contempt or prejudice toward others. To inspire pride it is not necessary to arouse hatred. In peace and not in war is the time to judge the worth of a man's patriotism; those who are indifferent to their country's welfare in peace will be of no use to it in time of war. As patriotism does not hibernate in the time of peace, it is not difficult to discover the true patriot from the false. To die for one's country, while not less patriotic than to live for it, is by no means as beneficial. But it is in this proposal to die in battle that cowards find subterfuge befitting their evil practices. When, in peace, men postpone their patriotic activity to a time of war, their procrastination is only indicative of their worthlessness. As it is impossible after death to distinguish the coward from the hero, so in national defeat distinctions cannot be made as to the cause of it. The world and the victor take no note of post-bellum explanations. For a nation to suffer defeat through unpreparedness is, to all practical purposes, as bad as though it were through cowardice on the field. In consequence the soldier who, in time of peace, makes no suitable preparations for war, is as unpatriotic and detrimental to the nation as he who shirks his duty or deserts his post in time of battle.

The time is not yet ripe for that peace which passeth all understanding. In the words of Sarpedon,¹ "Ah, friend, if once escaped from this battle, we were for ever to be ageless and immortal, neither would I fight myself in the foremost ranks, nor would I send thee into the war that giveth men reason; but now—for assuredly ten thousand fates of death do every way beset us, and these no mortal may escape nor avoid—now let us go forward."

¹ 22nd Book, Homer's Iliad.

THE IRISH BRIGADE IN THE SERVICE OF FRANCE, 1691-1791.

By F. H. SKRINE, Esq., F.R.Hist. Society (I.C.S. retired).

On Wednesday, January 28th, 1914.

LIEUT.-GENERAL J. H. BOR, C.B., C.M.G., R.M.A.,
in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you will all share with me in great regret that Field-Marshal Lord Roberts is unable to fulfil his intention of presiding here this afternoon. In his absence I have been asked at short notice to take the Chair. It is, therefore, my pleasant privilege to introduce to you the lecturer, Mr. Skrine, who is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and is such a well-known writer that it is unnecessary for me to say anything in introducing him to you. I therefore simply ask him to give us the lecture he has been good enough to prepare for our benefit.

LECTURE.

PHYSICAL environment has a potent but unexplained influence on the evolution of human life. In North America many families of British origin "throw back" to the Red Indian type after three or four generations; Australia is breeding a race which differs profoundly from its Anglo-Saxon forbears; and the Englishman who sets foot on Irish soil feels instinctively that he is in a foreign country. Ireland, in fact, has never formed part of the European Continent. After the thick-ribbed ice of the Glacial Epoch had melted away it emerged as an island from the Atlantic Ocean long ages before Great Britain was severed from the mainland. It has an incalculably ancient geological formation; palaeozoic strata abound, and the vast Jurassic system of the sister island is practically unrepresented. The fauna displays many a strange hiatus as compared with that of Europe. Thus the Iberians, Celts and Scandinavians, who sought its shores, had to traverse a stormy sea in open boats, and the attendant danger favoured vigorous selection. Each wave of invasion represented the hardest elements of our race. After settling down to hunt or fish for a livelihood, the immigrants

crystallized into tribès, which were perpetually at war with each other. Insularity increased the stress of group-selection. On the continent a weaker tribe could flee from its enemy into vast unpeopled hinterlands; in Ireland the combatants fought to a finish, with their backs to the ocean.

But, unlike Great Britain, Ireland never attained national unity under the ægis of a great sovereign; and was rent by perpetual struggles for hegemony. Some of my audience may be acquainted with a legendary correspondence, which is, perhaps, the best instance on record of the figure of speech termed *Aposiopesis*. The King of Munster to the King of Connaught: "Send me a black pig, or else . . ." The King of Connaught to the King of Munster: "I have not got a black pig, and if I had . . ." Internecine anarchy, therefore, placed Ireland at the mercy of Norman invaders, who introduced an utterly alien system of land tenure, and planted colonies in every province. No truce was called to civil war under the stern Tudors' rule, and their attempts to acclimatize the Reformation were thwarted by the people's stubborn adherence to Catholicism. Thenceforward religious hatred increased the tension caused by the struggle for land. Ireland gained little by the advent of the Stuart dynasty. Under James I. the process of forcible colonization continued, and his reign marks the rise of a non-Irish element in Ulster. But when the Revolution of 1688 deprived James II. of his throne the wrongs of six centuries were forgotten. In the eyes of his Irish subjects he was King by right divine, and William of Orange a usurper. On his arrival in Ireland (March 1689) they flocked in thousands to his standard, and a civil war began which lasted for 32 weary months. On one side were ranged 35,000 disciplined troops, commanded by some of the greatest soldiers of that age, and backed by the might of Great Britain, which then numbered six and a quarter million inhabitants. They were stoutly opposed by the youth of a nation barely one million strong, unpaid, clad in rags, and fed on horseflesh. If numbers and resources had been more equal, these poor Irishmen might have anticipated the triumphs of the French Revolutionary levies a century later. But the disparity between Williamites and Jacobites proved too great. King James's hopes were shattered on the Boyne (July 1st, 1690), and he sought refuge in France with 19,000 of his best troops.

That splendid country has always been a magnet for natives of less-favoured regions, and the chivalrous disposition of its people is especially alluring to soldiers of fortune. The French Army has included an unbroken succession of such auxiliaries, from the Royal Guards of the 12th Century down to the Foreign Legion of die-hards which is now helping France to build empires in Africa and Further Asia. Unfortunately for the world's peace, King Louis XIV. used his glorious heritage to compass selfish ends. In 1690 his vaulting ambition had

leagued Europe in arms against him, and this unlooked-for reinforcement was very welcome. The newcomers were organized as regiments in an Irish contingent, nominally under the command of James II., but virtually forming an integral portion of the French Army. In officering them scanty regard was paid to the leaders' susceptibilities. Many noblemen who had raised corps on their own estates were given subordinate rank; lieut.-generals served as captains; officers, holding King James's commission, as volunteers, supported by the generosity of their kinsmen at home. One and all they accepted their lot without a murmur.

An exception was made in the case of three regiments raised and commanded by great nobles. They dated in the old French Army Lists from 1690, and were the nucleus of the far-famed Irish Brigade. These were considered the property of their colonels, who drew an income of £5,000 a year mainly from the privilege of clothing the men, and transmitted the command to their heirs-male. First in precedence was Dillon's regiment, raised in 1688 by the 9th Viscount of that house. After fighting for King James on the Boyne, they followed him to France in 1690 and 1691. Next came Clare's regiment, owned by Daniel O'Brien, 5th Viscount Clare; and third in order, Mountcashel's, which had been raised in 1688 by Charles McCarthy, Earl of that ilk. Most foreign regiments then, and long afterwards, bore the names of their proprietors for the time being, a most inconvenient method for the military historian. In order to avoid confusion, I will preserve the original nomenclature, noting changes as they occur. But we must leave the embryonic brigade in French quarters to follow the fortunes of Jacobites who clung to a lost cause at home.

This remnant continued to struggle against overwhelming odds, but they sustained a crushing defeat at Aughrim (July 12th, 1691), and were finally hemmed in at Limerick. The garrison of King James's last stronghold repelled an assault led by William III. in person, but the city was closely invested by General Ginckel, and pulverized by the fire of 90 heavy guns. Despairing of succour, they were fain to capitulate on most honourable terms. The 14 months' siege of Limerick may rank with that of Saragossa; and it is a noteworthy fact that Irishwomen played a heroic part in the defence. Under the Treaty of Limerick, signed on October 3rd, 1691, Ginckel guaranteed full religious liberty and the restoration of their confiscated property to all who should swear allegiance to King William, while recusants had the option of withdrawing to France. More than 11,000 spurned most tempting offers from the Dutch general, and left Ireland for ever in a French Squadron, which arrived in the Shannon just too late to raise the siege. Many of the leaders sacrificed brilliant worldly prospects to their loyalty and faith. Not least among them was Patrick Sarsfield, created by James II. Earl of Lucan, who had been the heart and

soul of the defence. A man of marvellous personal magnetism, renowned for his courage no less than for a humanity rare in that semi-barbarous age, he cheerfully abandoned great possessions, and was foremost in persuading others to follow his example. Sarsfield was, perhaps, unfitted for supreme command, but as a partisan leader he had no rivals. Enterprising, patient, untiring, he held death in contempt, and inspired the whole army with a measure of his enthusiasm for Ireland. In this "positive" century such self-abnegation may appear Quixotic; but danger for the national soul lurks in the all-prevailing worship of money and material success. Let us hope and pray that the patriotism displayed by Sarsfield and his comrades may blaze forth anew in the time of stress which is surely approaching.

In 1691 the brigade was reinforced by William Lord Dorrington's regiment. It had been raised as the "Royal Regiment of Irish Guards" in 1661, had accompanied James II. to Ireland in 1689, fought for him on the Boyne and at Aughrim, and helped to defend Limerick. The brigade now consisted of Dillon's, Clare's, Mountcashel's and Dorrington's regiments. In March, 1692, it mustered at Brest, as part of an Irish contingent, nearly 16,800 strong, destined to take part in the invasion of England. But Louis's design was thwarted by the Battle of the Hogue (May 19th, 1692), and the resulting loss of sea-power compelled him to employ the Irish troops in continental warfare. The brigade was thus launched on a career fruitful in brilliant exploits, a few of which may be cited in chronological sequence.

At the Battle of Neerwinden, fought in Flanders, July 19th, 1692, Dillon's, Clare's and Dorrington's were posted in the French centre; and their valour contributed to the defeat of an Anglo-Dutch Army under the command of King William III. The joy of victory was damped by Patrick Sarsfield's fall. In October of the same year, Marshal Catinat encountered Prince Eugene of Savoy at Marsaglia, near Pignerol. Again Clare's regiment, raised to three battalions, took post in Catinat's centre, which was furiously assailed by German infantry with cavalry supports. The French regiments in the first line gave way, but Clare's stood firm, repelling a cavalry charge with the bayonet and giving their comrades time to re-form in their rear. Emboldened by the flight of a German battalion on their front, Clare's charged the whole Allied Army. In vain did Catinat endeavour to recall them; there was nothing for it but to order a general advance in their support. It proved irresistible; and Eugene saw that the day was lost. Forming his harassed troops into a solid square, he retreated in good order across the River Po, leaving 103 Colours and all his cannon in Catinat's hands. But for the steadfastness of Clare's regiment, Marsaglia would have been a French defeat. Rejoicing was once more turned to sorrow by the loss of Viscount Clare, who died of his wounds at Pignerol.

Events at home now led to a crisis which secured innumerable recruits for the brigade. Irishmen were hated by the Whig faction, which had gained predominance through the Revolution of 1688. They clung to a religion which British Protestants held in horror; they were pillars of a dynasty dethroned for its despotic tendencies; and their marked industrial progress seemed to menace Great Britain's material interests. Commercialism had received a mighty impetus in 1688, and the trading classes made their influence increasingly felt. *Delenda est Hibernia!* was the cry raised at Whitehall. In 1695 the Protestant Parliament of Dublin, under pressure from London, rescinded the Treaty of Limerick. By a series of Penal Acts, Irish Catholics were forbidden the ordinances of their religion; they might be deprived of their estates in favour of *soi-disant* Protestant kinsmen. The legislature, the army, the learned professions and public offices were closed to them. A proud and warlike race found themselves suddenly degraded to the status of pariahs in the land of their birth. Another set of enactments struck at the roots of the country's economic life. Every industry was proscribed except the linen manufacture, which had no competitors across the St. George's Channel; the export of Irish products to England was prohibited or rendered unprofitable by exorbitant taxation; a narrow colonial policy shut the American market to Irish commodities; the Navigation Laws checked the growth of a national Marine. Englishmen, in fact, believed that the best method of ensuring their own prosperity was to keep Ireland poor and miserable. I will not enlarge on legal atrocities, which were more suitable to the latitude of Dahomey than to that of Dublin. They are mentioned in order to explain the causes which ranged so many thousand Irishmen against their oppressors. It is perfectly true that the vast majority of Britons are now eager to treat Ireland with equity. But, alas, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. The soul of a nation is everywhere somewhat puerile; it cherishes prestige, is prone to resort to brute force, and remembers injuries more tenaciously than benefits. If the average Englishman's imagination were more strongly developed he would realize the exasperation which long-past oppression inspires in a conquered race.

While emigration was stimulated by the Penal Laws, the measures taken to crush Irish commerce offered a direct premium to the smuggler. A fleet of handy craft plied between Ireland and France, bringing wines and spirits, tea, tobacco, silk and lace which had not paid tribute to King William, in exchange for hides and salt provisions. Many thousands of young Irishmen seized this opportunity of joining the brigade. They were popularly spoken of as "Wild Geese," in allusion to a well-known and pathetic legend. On reaching a French port they enlisted in an Irish regiment as cadets or privates according to their social position. The new-comers were received with

open arms by kinsmen serving in the brigade; Irish merchants, who swarmed on the French coast, provided cadets with an outfit gratis; and family remittances from Ireland supplemented their meagre pay of 12 sous per *diem*. The brigade was soon recruited up to its full strength, and burned to avenge its country's wrongs.

In 1697 Dillon's regiment took part in the siege of Barcelona, conducted by the Duc de Vendôme. The beleaguered garrison made incessant sorties which cost the French Army over 9,000 casualties; and a retreat would have been inevitable had not Dillon's succeeded in ousting a superior Spanish force from some heights commanding Barcelona. The city became untenable, and its garrison had no option but to capitulate on honourable terms. Vendôme frankly admitted that his success was due to Dillon's regiment. According to his biographer, this descendant of Henry IV. "had a particular regard for the warlike Irish nation; and stood amazed at the enterprises which these 'Butchers of my Army,' as he said, had often achieved in his presence." By this time, however, Europe was exhausted by nine years of almost incessant war, and the Treaty of Ryswick (September 20th, 1697), called a welcome truce to the contending Powers.

Three years later there occurred another of those dynastic struggles which periodically deluged Europe with blood. Charles II., the last Austrian King of Spain, died in 1700, bequeathing his world-wide empire to the young Duke of Anjou. In accepting the fatal legacy for his grandson, Louis XIV. boasted that the Pyrenees were no more. He did not foresee the storm which a union between France and Spain under Bourbon auspices would arouse. William III. promptly leagued England, Germany, Holland and Savoy in support of the Archduke Charles's candidature; and the War of the Spanish Succession opened. In 1701 Marshal Catinat led a powerful army into Northern Italy, and, when a Court intrigue led to his supersession by the Duc de Villeroy, he deigned to serve under a commander whose capacity he held in just contempt. Chivalrous natures seem to clasp hands across the gulf of time; did not Sir James Outram, the "Bayard of India," display a like selfishness before Lucknow in 1857? Irish visitors in Paris should make a pilgrimage to the Church of St. Eustache, where the dust was laid of an illustrious soldier who often led their forbears in victory.

Villeroy took winter quarters in Cremona, a fortress containing vast stores of war material for use in the ensuing campaign. Its garrison included a battalion of Dillon's, with other Irish details, barely 600 in all, under the command of Major Daniel O'Mahony, the scion of an illustrious family of South Munster. Cremona was a very Capua for the French troops, who revelled in its luxuries and neglected the most elementary precautions. Prince Eugene, who was hovering in

the neighbourhood, resolved to attempt a *coup de main*. On the moonless night of January 31st, 1702, 10,500 picked men under Count Mercy penetrated the *enceinte* through a disused Roman sewer; and made for a gate commanding a bridge spanning the river Po, possession of which would give access to Eugene's main body. By this time the sleeping garrison was effectually aroused. Rushing out of their quarters, half dressed and armed, they could offer no defence; and Villeroy himself was made prisoner by Captain Francis Macdonnell, an Irishman in the Austrian service. Mercy fully believed that he had captured Cremona. He reckoned without Daniel O'Mahony and his handful of Irishmen who, like all good soldiers, slept with one eye open. They turned out in a body and used the bayonet with such effect that the Imperialists fled, leaving Count Mercy mortally wounded in the street. Then O'Mahony led his men to the river gate, which military instinct told him was the enemy's objective. Throwing themselves into a convent hard by, they poured volleys of musketry into the Austrians who were attacking the gate from within. This diversion gave the French garrison time to regain their scattered senses; the intruders were assailed on all sides and slain or captured. Dillon's had fought from early dawn to noon with foes outnumbering them twelve-fold, and saved the French Army wintering in Italy from disaster at a cost of 283 casualties out of their meagre strength. It is pleasant to record that General Count O'Mahony afterwards prospered in the Spanish service; and that his greatest exploit was not soon forgotten. A famous Irish piper named Gansey, who died as lately as 1857, used to play "The Day we beat the Germans at Cremona."

The evening of King Louis's reign was darkened by an almost unbroken series of defeats, each of which may be traced to the blundering of some Court favourite. In 1704 two of these "carpet-generals," as Marshal Saxe used to call them, named Tallard and Marsin, led 56,000 men into Southern Germany; while the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene advanced against them along the Upper Danube with 52,000 English, Austrian and Dutch troops. On August 12th, the rival forces met at Blenheim. In addressing a military audience it is unnecessary to describe the tactics of well-known battles; I will, therefore, confine myself to sketching the part played by our brigade. At Blenheim it consisted of Clare's, Mountcashel's and Dorrington's regiments, which had received drafts bringing the strength of each up to two battalions, under orders from Louis XIV., who expressed confidence that "his Irishmen would perform anything they might undertake." They were posted in advance of the French centre with orders to hold the village of Oberglau. Marlborough began the fray with a feigned attack on the French right wing at Blenheim; and Tallard was induced to denude his centre of 13,000 troops in order to defend the threatened post. Marlborough detected

his false move. Continuing to threaten Blenheim, he concentrated his main forces against Oberglau. They were hurled back in confusion by the Irish and eight French regiments. Five times did our heroes sally forth, to prevent the enemy from mustering for fresh attacks. But the Allies' steady advance turned Oberglau, and forced the French generals to beat a retreat. The Irish Brigade evacuated their post just in time to avoid destruction, and retired in good order, leaving nearly a third of their number on the well-fought field.

Ramillies (May 23rd, 1706), belongs to the same category. It may be described as the finish of a race for Namur between Villeroy and Marlborough, commanding nearly equal forces. Clare's, Mountcashel's and Dorrington's again occupied the post of honour, garrisoning Ramillies in front of the French centre. Although that village was the key of his position, Villeroy left it *en l'air*, and stationed his enormous baggage train between the first and second lines of the army drawn up in battle array; thus obstructing communication between them. Marlborough's practised eye at once divined the disadvantage. He repeated the simple tactics of Blenheim, launching greatly superior forces against Villeroy's right wing to its utter discomfiture. Ramillies then became his objective. A Scottish regiment in the Dutch service attacked it; they were literally destroyed by Clare's. Then Marlborough's own regiment, which afterwards won undying glory as The Buffs, advanced against the position; they were driven back in confusion, losing two Colours, which hung for many years in the Irish Convent at Ypres. Marlborough now developed a vast turning movement against the French right wing, and Villeroy had no option but to sound a general retreat. It was unheard by Clare's, who, like their British foes, never knew when they were beaten. Leaving the shelter of Ramillies, they attacked Marlborough's advancing army. Had they not been supported by some Italian and Croatian troops, who took fire from their example, not one of them would have escaped death or capture. Hewing a path through dense masses of the foe, they rejoined the main body, but 38 officers and 326 men were left killed or wounded on the field. Their severest loss was that of the Colonel-Proprietor, Major-General Charles O'Brien, Viscount Clare. He was borne from the fray bleeding from many wounds, and died a few days later in Brussels. His tomb is still shown in the Church of the Holy Cross at Louvain, with a Latin epitaph recording his death at 36, "after many heroic deeds performed for his God, King, and Country."

Malplaquet was the next pitched battle of this murderous war. On September 11th, 1709, Marlborough and Eugene, engaged in covering the siege of Namur with 90,000 men, were attacked by Villars, who had nearly equal forces at his disposal. For once in a way the French commander knew his

stern business, while the Allied generals were caught napping. They gave Villars ample time to surround Malplaquet with abattis and entrenchments. Its garrison, consisting of Clare's, Mountcashel's, Dorrington's and two other Irish regiments, was assailed by dense columns of infantry with cavalry supports. They failed to penetrate the fortified enclosure, and were content to pound its defenders with the fire of 20 guns. Finding Malplaquet impregnable, Marlborough and Eugene endeavoured, with complete success, to turn the French left wing. Villars received a disabling wound, and Boufflers, who succeeded him, evacuated the position so gallantly held. The Irish Brigade fell in as a rear-guard, and retreated in perfect order on Valenciennes. Malplaquet cost the Allies 20,316 casualties, including the flower of the Dutch infantry, which never recovered from the blow; while 32 Colours were carried off in triumph by the French, whose losses amounted to no more than 9,206 men. John Bull, dearly as he loved a "heavy butcher's bill," was fain to admit that another victory of the kind would spell disaster. The general desire for peace was stimulated by Denain, where Villars signally defeated the Austrians on July 24th, 1712; and the Peace of Utrecht, signed in the following year, gave breathing time to distracted Europe. The Irish exiles had proved their staunchness in disaster, which is a far rarer quality than physical courage.

After a generation of almost unbroken peace the brigade was given another opportunity of showing its mettle by the War of the Austrian Succession. Charles VI., the last Hapsburg Emperor of Germany, had bequeathed his territories to an infant daughter, Maria Theresa, under a solemn instrument termed the "Pragmatic Sanction," in which all the Great Powers had acquiesced. On his death in 1740 the youthful Princess was hailed as "King" of Hungary by her gallant Magyars. But Charles, Elector of Bavaria, disputed her claim under the mischief-working Salic law, which forbade a woman to wield the sceptre. He was supported by France, whose policy it had been for 250 years to weaken the House of Hapsburg. Frederick II. of Prussia seized the opportunity of aggrandizing his own dynasty. Exhuming certain mediæval claims to the Austrian province of Silesia, he invaded it without having declared war, in December, 1740. In a few months all Europe was ablaze. England's heart went out to the young Queen of Hungary struggling for her rights; hatred of France, a legacy from past dynastic struggles, was played upon George II., whose interests as Elector of Hanover were menaced. Lastly, the commercial classes longed to oust their French rivals from North America and India. England enthusiastically championed the cause of Maria Theresa, and an Anglo-Austrian coalition was joined by the Dutch. Let us pause to trace the composition of the Irish Brigade during the War of the Austrian Succession which marked its apogee.

Dillon's regiment still belonged to the noble house whose name it bore; the command of Clare's was held by Charles O'Brien, Viscount Clare and Earl of Thomond; but Mount-cashel's had come into the possession of the Comte de Bulkeley, and Dorrington's into that of the Comte Charles Edouard de Roth, who was descended from an ancient commercial family of Kilkenny. During Marshal Wade's inglorious campaign of 1744 in the Netherlands a fifth regiment joined the brigade. It was raised by Thomas Arthur Comte de Lally and Baron de Tollendal. He came of the O'Mallalys of Tullenadaly, near Tuam; and his father had attained the rank of Brigadier-General in the French Army. Arthur received his baptism of fire at 13, when the Brigadier sent him to join the forlorn hope at the siege of Barcelona, "just as a little amusement during the college vacation." Lally was handsome, ardent, untiring, a scholar no less than a born soldier, but his too masterful disposition brought swarms of enemies upon him who eventually compassed his ruin. The brigade at its full strength mustered 3,870 bayonets. The men's uniform consisted of long scarlet coats (the livery of James III.) with white, black, light-green or yellow facings: a three-cornered hat trimmed with gold or silver lace, red flapped waistcoats, white small-clothes and gaiters. The Colours of the four oldest regiments displayed a crown on each quarter of a cross, with a golden harp in the centre and the motto *In hoc signo vinces*, but Lally's flag bore the words *R. J. Jacobus Rex*. Their pay, though higher than that of the line regiments, was somewhat meagre, and not infrequently in arrears. Assuming the value of money to have been twice as great in 1745 as in our time, we obtain the following scale expressed in British currency:—

		s.	d.	
Lieut.-Colonel	14	0	per diem
(with the privilege of clothing one company)				
First Captain	11	6	" "
Second Captain	10	0	" "
First Lieutenant	5	0	" "
Second Lieutenant	3	8	" "
Sergeant	1	4	" "
Corporal	0	11	" "
Private	0	9½	" "

The Brigade was kept at full strength with comparative ease. A steady stream of "wild-geese" arrived at its regimental depôts from Ireland, and deserters poured in from the British Army in Flanders. They received many unwilling recruits; at the outset of every war King Louis issued an ordinance enjoining Englishmen, Scots, and Irishmen between 18 and 50, resident in his dominions to enlist in a foreign regiment on pain of the galleys.

Dr. Johnson said, with the grim humour that distinguished him, "The Irish, Sir, are a candid people; you never hear one of them speak well of another." Gentleness is certainly not conspicuous in natives of the Emerald Isle, who have often discovered too late that disunion brings weakness. They ordered things better in France. Just as in physics, strong external pressure increases the cohesion of the particles composing a substance, so these exiles were welded together by the consciousness that they lived on alien soil. The regiment was a real home from boyhood to old age, seasoned soldiers abounded, and *esprit de corps* was very strong. My friend, Sir James Moody, of Canehill, has kindly permitted me to exhibit a wooden loving-cup, which must have gone round at the Spartan banquets of an Irish regiment in France, and symbolizes the spirit of brotherhood which animated the brigade. It was commanded by Charles O'Brien, Earl of Thomond, and Viscount Clare, known officially as "Milord Comte de Clare," who became Inspector of Infantry in 1741, and died 25 years later, a Marshal of France. His never-failing tact oiled the wheels of regimental duty. While jealousy and duelling were rife in the French Army, our brigade acted together as one regiment. A memorandum in the Ministry of War runs thus:—"Perfect fraternity prevails between officers and men to prevent the occurrence of any dispute. Such behaviour is as creditable to the brigade as the zeal with which it serves and the transcendent actions which distinguish it." Self-confidence is bred by the knowledge that one is trusted by others. Community of religion endeared his Irish troops to the bigoted King of France, who regarded them as a pillar of his throne, and lost no opportunity of passing them in review. It was customary to give a Prince of the Blood engaged on inspection duty a card suggesting necessary criticisms of the field movements, which he was very careful to conceal in his hat! At the beginning of 1745 the brigade had crystallized into a fighting force whose value was out of all proportion to its numerical strength.

On April 30th of that year H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland marched from Brussels with 46,800 English, Dutch, and Austrian troops, in view of relieving Tournay, which had been closely invested by the French. The Allies wasted 11 days in covering 48 miles, and gave Marshal Saxe ample time to defend the only possible approach with a vast system of field fortifications. His base rested on the walled town of Antoing and the river Scheldt; on his right front the village of Fontenoy bristled with cannon; on his extreme left, and within gunshot of Fontenoy, two redoubts had been run up which were garrisoned by the Regiment d'Eu. Within this improvised citadel he marshalled 59,000 men in battle array, with cavalry as usual in the rear of infantry. The whole Irish Brigade took station on Saxe's left, protected by dense forests and the two

Redoubts d'Eu. Louis XV. and the Dauphin watched events from an eminence in the French rear.

On May 11th the Allies marched boldly into the death-trap so cunningly laid for them. Cumberland's tactics were simplicity itself. Fontenoy was to be taken by his Dutch contingent, with a stiffening of British troops; the Redoubts d'Eu by a brigade under the command of Colonel Ingoldsby of the Guards. When both positions had fallen, their guns were to be turned against the French Army, and a general advance would begin. But both flank adventures failed miserably; the Dutchmen retired out of cannon-shot, and were passive spectators of the fray. Ingoldsby, confused by contradictory orders from his chief, did not press his attack home, and his brigade fell in on the British right. Cumberland now took a desperate step which came within an ace of succeeding. He ordered the British and Hanoverian infantry, over 20,000 strong, to press through the gap between Fontenoy and the redoubts. They advanced in line; but the flanking battalions recoiled under a fearful cross-fire at point-blank range, so that the dense mass took the form of a hollow square. Its momentum proved irresistible: the French Guards broke and fled before withering volleys poured into their ranks; repeated charges of cavalry and infantry beat in vain on the Anglo-German phalanx. At noon-day Cumberland found himself master of the field of battle, and his foes a disordered mass of fugitives.

Hitherto the brigade had strained at the leash, agonized witnesses of the *débâcle*. But Lally ran up to the King and Marshal Saxe, imploring them to employ his brave Irishmen; and the French commander resolved to make a final bid for victory. Four field-pieces were pushed to within 200 yards of the British square, and salvoes of grape-shot cut lanes through the solid mass of human flesh. In the momentary confusion caused by this slaughter a concerted attack was made by the French Army burning to avenge their discomfiture. The whole Irish Brigade hurled itself on the British right, shouting "Remember Limerick." In ten minutes the vast square broke into three isolated fragments. But, such was the power of discipline, that every unit speedily regained its formation and retired in perfect order from the field. Fontenoy cost the Irish Brigade dearly, and its death-roll was swelled by an unfortunate blunder. The scarlet uniforms of Dillon's looming through the smoke of battle, were taken by the French Carabiniers for those of the enemy. Only when they heard the shout "*Vive la France!*" from its ranks did they desist from slaughtering friends. This regiment lost nearly half its strength: the Colonel-Commandant, Chevalier de Dillon, was slain, with Colonel O'Neill of Clare's, and many subaltern officers.

When victory was assured, the Dauphin rode over a plain strewn with 15,000 killed and wounded, offering consolation to

survivors. Seeing Lally-Tollendal seated on a drum, his face streaming with blood, he said that such splendid service would not be forgotten. "Monseigneur," replied poor Lally, pointing to two Irish officers who lay desperately wounded by his side, "His Majesty's favours are like those of the Gospel, they fall upon the halt and the blind." French writers are not inclined to minimize their countrymen's achievements, yet all agree in the opinion that our brigade turned the scale of battle. "Curst be the laws which deprive me of such subjects," was the exclamation wrung from King George by the Fontenoy despatches; and yet a generation passed away ere their severity was in any way relaxed. I exhibit a contemporary bird's-eye view of this battle, which shows the British square attacking, and the Irish Brigade's exact position. Mr. R. Barry O'Brien has also favoured me with this photograph of a fine Celtic cross, erected, mainly through his exertions, at Fontenoy to commemorate his countrymen's valour.

Their next important services were rendered at the battle of Laffeldt, fought on July 2nd, 1747. Here Cumberland was hopelessly outmanœuvred by Marshal Saxe, who placed his army between that of the Allies and Maestricht, which they sought to defend. Laffeldt was the key of their position: six infantry brigades, including our Irishmen, assailed it with the bayonet, supported by a tremendous cannonade. Cumberland's centre was pierced, and his disorganized army retired on Maestricht. Laffeldt was the last pitched battle of the War of the Austrian Succession, which ended most disadvantageously for France, under the terms of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle (1749).

This Treaty marks the commencement of a steady decline in the brigade's fortunes. Like our gallant fellows in the Peninsular War, its officers "conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy." In war, said Napoleon, men are nothing; *A Man* is everything. Genius must have fair play, apart from the accident of birth. But aristocratic prejudice tends to narrow the field of choice for offices of great responsibility. It was revived in France under Louis XV., who sought to compensate his nobles for the loss of prestige resulting from his highly-centralized system of government. An ordinance of 1759 closed field-rank to all officers who failed to prove nobility dating back to the year 1400. It was easy enough for the O'Briens, Dillons, MacCarthys and O'Donnells to satisfy the Herald's Office in this respect; but many capable officers grew old as captains because their pedigrees were not absolutely flawless. It can hardly be doubted that this reactionary measure proved injurious to the brigade. And it was taken at a time when France needed her most efficient sons. The Peace of Aix la Chapelle was of short duration. England and France had started on a race for dominion in Asia and the New World. That great empire-builder, William Pitt, forced King Louis XV. to waste

his strength on Continental campaigns while he organized victory in Canada and India. During the Seven Years' War, which began in 1756, our brigade smelt but little powder in Germany: it was employed in guarding Normandy and Brittany from English raids. But Lally-Tollendal took his regiment to Southern India, where he had been named Commander-in-Chief. After scoring many brilliant successes against the English, he was closely besieged in Pondicherry, and hung out the white flag after a heroic defence. The garrison was taken to England as prisoners of war; but Lally, hearing that enemies were intriguing to blast his reputation, hurried to Paris in order to defend it. He was thrown into the Bastille, and after a long imprisonment was brought to trial for high treason; and beheaded with atrocious brutality in 1766. Such was the reward meted out by the fatuous Government of Louis XV. to his most distinguished servants. If Dupleix, La Bourdonnais and Lally had received a tithe of the support accorded by England to her Indian officers the map of Asia would now present a very different aspect.

George III.'s policy was nearly as mischievous. In 1774 he goaded our American Colonists into rebellion, and they received armed assistance from France, Spain and Holland. In her dire distress, England was compelled to relax the rigour of the Penal Laws. Irish Catholics found their country more habitable; and would-be recruits were not questioned as to their religion. Under a regulation of that era, candidates for promotion to field rank were examined at the Horse Guards by a committee of General Officers. One of them, being asked by the president whether he belonged to the Church of England, said that he was "of the Major-General's religion."

So the flights of "wild geese" diminished, and vacancies in the brigade were filled without much regard for nationality. In losing homogeneousness it was deprived of an element which made for efficiency. At the same time it underwent drastic internal changes. Roth's regiment passed to the Vicomte de Walsh-Serrent in 1770; four years later Dillon's was incorporated in Bulkeley's; and Clare's became the property of the Duc de Fitzjames, one of whose titles it assumed. Despite dwindling numbers and impaired organization, the brigade served with distinction during the War of Independence. Bulkeley's and Walsh-Serrent's took part in the conquest of Tobago by the Marquis de Bouillé in January, 1780. On October 19th of the next year the same regiments, with Berwick's, played a conspicuous part in the operations which compelled Lord Cornwallis to surrender at York Town. Finally, in November, 1781, a wing of Walsh-Serrent's helped de Bouillé to surprise the garrison of St. Eustache; and its Colonel, Fitzmaurice by name, was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of that Island.

But hoary abuses which had clamoured in vain for redress produced a cataclysmic uprising which has not yet spent its force. Under the insults hurled at France by a coalition of Kings, the national soul was lashed to unreasoning fury, and, as often happens in revolutionary periods, sound and obsolete components of the social machinery were involved in a common ruin. In 1791 a decree of the Paris Assembly destroyed the distinctive organization of every foreign regiment; and our brigade ceased to exist. Every Celt is an instinctive loyalist, whatever political opinion he may profess. Filled with horror by the judicial murder of Louis XVI., most of the Irish officers emigrated; and those who clung to the Republic had reason to regret their choice. Among them was General Arthur de Dillon, who had become colonel of his family regiment at 17. He accepted a commission in the Revolutionary armies, and served brilliantly under Dumourier against the German invaders. Suspected of *aristocratism*, he was brought before Fouquier-Tinville's infamous tribunal on a charge of high treason, and sentenced to death. When his batch of victims arrived at the scaffold, Sanson touched one of them, a young lady, on the shoulder, and bade her mount the fatal steps. "Oh, M. de Dillon," she whispered with a shudder, "won't you go up first?" "Anything to oblige a lady," he answered smilingly; and after being strapped to the plank he shouted, "Vive le Roi" as though he were giving the word of command on parade. His cousin, Theobald de Dillon, was hacked in pieces by his mutinous soldiers at Lille.

The disbanded Irishmen "spoiled for a fight," and longed to avenge the sufferings of the Royal Family. The Duc de Fitzjames and Colonel Count Daniel O'Connell, uncle of the Liberator, undertook to form six regiments of Irish Catholics, which would be at the disposal of the British Crown. William Pitt accepted their offer; and the brigade arose from its ashes. Officers and men were led to believe that they would be employed in fighting the Revolution in Europe; but the bigoted Protestantism of George III. ordered things otherwise. The brigade was shipped off to Canada and the West Indies. The heart-sickness of hope deferred conspired with arctic cold and yellow fever to thin its ranks. In 1818 only 36 of its officers survived to draw half-pay on the British establishment.

History is but a study of academic interest if the lessons it teaches be not taken to heart. The Irish Brigade offers a noble example of self-devotion and self-sacrifice which we of the present day must follow on pain of losing the splendid heritage which our ancestors have bequeathed to us. "Only by blood and tears are nations saved."

DISCUSSION.

Mr. Alfred Perceval Graves: I had hoped to be asked to speak after others, because I do not wish to speak so much on the historical or the

military side as on the literary side of the question; but as I have been asked to speak I will say a few words. Thomas Moore immortalized the doings of famous Irishmen in the military service of Spain in that beautiful melody of his with the refrain, "The Shamrock of Ireland and Olive of Spain," and there he refers to the great achievements of the Blakes and the O'Donnells. I am glad to see a distinguished representative of the O'Donnells so close to me. My friend, Mr. Skrine, put, I am afraid, a rather Saxon pronunciation upon the word when he spoke of Mahony; In Ireland we say Mahony. I knew two branches of the Kerry Mahonys, and one of their number, Richard Mahony, of Dromore, wrote a very beautiful poem upon an ancestor of his who belonged to the Spanish-Irish heroes, which began thus:—

"Lone lies his grave by The Quadalquiver
And low is his proud heart laid."

They were a remarkable family, these Mahonys. I stayed once with one of them and had rather a unique experience. It was this: In the middle of the night I woke up very nearly stifled by smoke. My father and I were sleeping in the same room together, and we got up to find that a scuttle full of coal prepared for the morning's fire by a foundation of live ashes had taken flame, fallen over, and was setting fire to the house. We succeeded with the water in our jugs in putting out the flames, and in that way we escaped. I was not surprised to find that our host, who occupied rather a fine house in the county of Kerry, had two wings of it burnt down one after the other, and continued placidly to reside in the centre part that was left standing. Then we have got those two very remarkable ballads by Thomas Davis, whose centenary will occur next September. I hope all Irishmen in the north as well as in the south of Ireland will keep Thomas Davis's birthday in amity, because I trust by that time this great Irish political difficulty will be peaceably settled. Thomas Davis wrote two beautiful ballads, one known as "Clare's Dragoons," which is set to a stirring Irish tune by Sir Charles Stanford, and the other called "The Battle Eve of the Brigade," a very fine and noble poem to a rousing Irish war chanty. Then I may mention that the recapture of Cremona by Irishmen of "The Brigade" has been described in a most stirring ballad by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Those of you who are interested in the battle so graphically described by my friend Mr. Skrine will find it in a past number of the *Cornhill Magazine*. A very touching and beautiful set of poems on the "Wild Geese," which have been described so well by Mr. Skrine, were written by the late the Hon. Emily Lawless; it is really one of the finest groups of Irish poems written in modern times. I may mention also that a very distinguished Irish soldier, Major-General Sir William Butler, has written a peculiarly fine essay, which will be found among his literary remains, upon the subject of the "Wild Geese." And Dr. Drennan's beautiful lament on the subject to an old Irish *Casino* should not be forgotten. Moreover, those of you who know Mr. Froude's writings will be very much interested in a most beautiful novel of his, the only novel he ever wrote, a novel without a heroine and yet entrancingly interesting—"The Two Chiefs of Dunboy"—in which he contrasts the characters of the Englishman and the Irishman, the two chivalrous heroes of his story, in a very subtle and well-informed way. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was to have written a novel on the "Wild Geese," but he has recently been anticipated by an English novelist. I am very sorry, because I am quite certain that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle,

knowing as he does the traditions of the French Army, having written upon French military history, being an Irishman and being a man who would undoubtedly have saturated himself with the Irish atmosphere when writing a book upon the subject—I say I am very sorry that he has not written the book, and I hope he may yet be brought up to the scratch to write a novel on that subject. I am afraid I have detained you too long, but I thought I might be allowed to say a few words upon the literary side of the question.

Mr. O'Donnell: I have put myself to a good deal of trouble to come here to listen to Mr. Skrine, because I am an old admirer of his scholarly and eloquent works upon branches of this subject, and his volume on the Campaign of Fontenoy is certainly a very noble production. Of course, I do not rise to depreciate in any way the campaigns of that Irish brigade in the service of France, which swept in a storm of glory across Europe in the first half of the 18th century. And before going any further I may mention that Count Dillon who gave up his life at the foul command of the French Revolutionary Tribunal did so under circumstances which specially endeared him to every chivalric nation. In the indictment of treason that was brought against him it states that he was engaged in a conspiracy to obtain the escape of the Queen of France and her children from their abominable imprisonment by the Revolutionary gaolers. It was a noble ending to that noble brigade. But I would ask this audience to bear in mind that we have dealt to-day only with the Irish Brigade in the service of France. It is very difficult to refer to the realities of that subject, because it is one thing, in looking to the circumstances out of which the Irish Brigade in the service of France arose, to occupy our local English and Irish standpoints, and it is quite another thing to look at the same struggle from a European standpoint. Take the Battle of the Boyne from the local English and Irish standpoint. At the Battle of the Boyne there were two religions opposed to each other, and according to the opinions of the person referring to the subject, it was either the good religion that won or the good religion that was beaten—just according to the point of view in which you happen to be born. But from a European point of view there was very little of a religious question in the whole matter. The war and the battles in Ireland, out of which the services of the Irish Brigade with the French Army arose, was simply another chapter in the great contest between the House of Hapsburg and the House of Bourbon. I suppose it would give a fit of blue apoplexy to a really conscientious Orangeman to be made aware that the great armada which sailed from Holland with the Dutch deliverer on board had all its expenses paid by the most Catholic Government of Spain; and instead of the Pope praying from night to morning and morning to night for the success of King James, his interests, at any rate, if not his affections, were all on the side of King William. We heard mention of a number of great names in the Irish Brigades in the French service. It is to be noticed that all those great names are south of Ireland names—MacCarthys and O'Briens, and so forth. Those are the names that made the glory of the Franco-Irish Brigade. The fact of the matter is, that the Northern Irish—by that I do not mean the gentlemen who so kindly came from Scotland and elsewhere to occupy our land and goods—but the Princes of the clans of Irish Ulster took quite a different view of the war. Their sympathies, at least the sympathies of their leaders, and especially at the commencement of the war, were on the side of William of Orange, or at least they were

against the side of King James II. And why? Because the Northern clans and their chiefs had had alliances for a century and a half or more with Spain and Austria. The Princes of Ulster, O'Neill and O'Donnell, took refuge in the dominions of Spain and Austria; and all through the 17th and 18th centuries and even down to the present day, the highest ranks of the armies of Spain and Austria were full of O'Donnells and O'Neills and Maguires and similar great clans of the North of Ireland. In fact the O'Donnell Princes sent a special representative to Ireland during the war between William and James, whose position and mission in Ireland are strangely unknown to the usual historians. They wonder why Baldearg O'Donnell made such little use, or no use at all, of the O'Donnell clan in order to lead them to the support of King James II., the popular idea being that it was a mere fight between religions, and that the O'Donnells as Catholics ought to have stood on the Catholic side. But the O'Donnells and the O'Neills of the Continent looked at the matter from the point of view of Austria and Spain as against the over-weening ambition and the terrible tyranny of Louis XIV. and the House of Bourbon. We know that at the Battle of Blenheim, in which the Irish Brigade in the service of France distinguished itself so highly, the Catholic troops of Austria were ranged in the same line of battle by the side of the Protestant troops of England and Holland and North Germany. The religious question hardly appealed to us at all and we were principally concerned in trying to promote the peace and the prosperity of Ireland itself without regard to those disputes between men whom we considered as mere English pretenders. So long as we could keep Ireland, and especially the North of Ireland, out of the vortex of a battle with which we considered we had very little to do, we were not disposed to throw up our hats either for King James or for the future King William. All through the 18th century afterwards there were large bodies of Irishmen in the Austrian and Spanish services. They were not so numerous as the Irishmen in the Irish Brigade in the service of France for various reasons; but in the wars between Austria and Prussia, for instance, there were quite a number of distinguished Irishmen in the ranks of Austria. Down to the present day, during the last century even, the Austrian service, both civil and military, was full of men of Irish descent who had taken refuge in the Austrian dominions, and in those dominions were promoted to the highest honours of the Hapsburg Crown. There was Marshal Nugent; there were two or three men of my name; there were two or three Maguires, and half a dozen of the other leading families of the North. It is a very interesting subject; although here we are disposed to look entirely upon what took place amongst our French neighbours, and only to take notice of those Irishmen who served under the French flag. As a matter of fact, the Irishmen, few in number, who fought under the Hapsburg flag and under the Spanish flag, played their part in the world's history quite as bravely and quite as famously as any of their kinsmen and countrymen under the golden lilies. I have the greatest pleasure in joining in what is the unanimous feeling of gratitude to Mr. Skrine for his admirable exposition of a most interesting subject.

Captain Eric Dillon: There are three points in regard to this interesting lecture that I should like to refer to. The lecturer makes the statement, first of all, that "Four years later Dillon's was incorporated in Bulkeley's." I think that is incorrect. I think the Dillon regiment always preserved its name until it left the French service in 1771. The next point I should

like to refer to is the fact that the lecturer speaks of a Count Arthur *de* Dillon. None of my family were ever called "de"; they were only called Dillon. There was not a single drop of French blood in any of the heads of my family down to the time they came to England. The younger sons married French women, but there was no French blood in the senior branch, and I only mention that to show how very Irish the brigade did keep. The third point I should like to mention is that Mr. Skrine spoke of the apogee of the Irish Brigade dating from the Battle of Fontenoy. I want to call his attention to a great deal of very good work which they did in the West Indies after that date, when they took various islands, which were given back to Great Britain at the end of the peace. In one instance one of my family was the Governor of one of these islands, and the ordinances which he drew up under the French Government were confirmed when the English took over the island.

Dr. Miller Maguire: I am almost ashamed to trouble this distinguished audience with any remarks of mine, because through a series of accidents I have been representing different causes in this room so often that I am afraid Sir Arthur Leatham, our distinguished Secretary, will think I am imposing myself as a kind of dead weight upon the audience. But I am glad at any rate that my learned and able friend on my right, Mr. Frank Hugh O'Donnell, did not entirely, like Mr. Skrine, forget the Northern portion to which his sept added lustre in the old days, and to which he himself, by his eloquence, both of mouth and with the pen, adds lustre now. The fact is that we belong to the same type of antediluvian races as the Duke of Cumberland helped to obliterate in Scotland—a year after his fight against Saxe—the celebrated French leader at Fontenoy. He was called in history a "butcher," though he did not butcher any of our people. He butchered the admirable and brave clans of Scotland; and a wise statesman, the great Pitt (Lord Chatham), seeing how gallantly the Highlanders fought in their own country, by enlisting them in the British service helped to found the present Empire of Germany under Prussian guidance by aiding Frederick the Great, and more than any other body of men to link the magnificent Dominion of Canada to the British Empire. It is due to us to pay a tribute of admiration to our Scottish brethren, the brave Highlanders who were massacred by the victor, if he were a victor, of Fontenoy, where the Irish Brigade in the French service won so much fame. With regard to another Irishman, not exactly an O'Donnell or an O'Neill, I regret exceedingly—and I am sure I voice the feelings of the audience—that the most famous Irishman of this generation, Lord Roberts, is not able to be here to-day. For after all the exploits of the leading clansmen did not go so far as the exploits of that very distinguished Anglo-Irishman, whose name is equally celebrated in the mountains of Afghanistan, where he closed against the North the Passes used by Alexander and Tamourlane and made the name of Ireland and his own as famous as it became afterwards in the Steppes of South Africa. But he got exactly the same treatment that many an Irishman has got—of the kind Lally Tollendal got. It was usual at one time to try to reward heroic service in proportion to their good works and their permanent character, but it is usual in our time for the miserable creatures called party to reward our distinguished soldiers, whether they are Celts or Saxons, by kicking them out without notice, and that was the fate of Lord Roberts and his staff. It is now ten years since I had the honour of lecturing here before him, March, 1904. Lord Roberts

made a prophet of himself then when he pointed out with extraordinary ability that a new power of a new species was arising—that was immediately after the first victories of Japan over Russia. I think it is due to the living Irish, to the living English, and the great united leading lands of this mighty Empire, to commemorate before his death the merits of such a man as the Irish soldier Lord Roberts. All through history our soldiers have been celebrated, the British of Great Britain, North and South, and the "Exiles of Erin." The Spanish were very glad indeed to make terms with Ireland for bases of operations against the great Queen Elizabeth. Probably you are wondering why Queen Elizabeth was left out of the lecturer's narrative. So was I; and I was particularly astonished because the name of the lecturer is Skrine.

Mr. Skrine: It is pronounced "Skreen."

Dr. Miller Maguire: I am glad to be corrected, because the poet Spenser when he was living in the South of Ireland mentioned the very word "Skrine" in an address to Queen Elizabeth, the Faerie Queene:—

"Mirror of grace and majesty divine,
Great lady of the greatest Isle, whose light
Like Phœlin's lamp throughout the world doth shine,
Lay forth out of thine everlasting 'skrine,'
The antique rolls."

The lecturer mentioned a lot of antique rolls, but he forgot the Maguires—as well as O'Donnells and O'Neills, and so has the British Government—absolutely forgotten them! The greatest distinction that I personally can claim is that on several occasions I was kicked out of public meetings in Wales because I entirely differed in opinion from a gentleman who is now Chancellor of the Exchequer. I have here a book by a celebrated Irishman called O'Callaghan, and he mentions no end of persons of our names who were poor captains and lieutenants at any bloody scene in the Dillon regiment and in other regiments also. And I may tell you that our services were not confined to the French. We became great persons, as Mr. O'Donnell has said, in Austria. About a hundred years ago from now a young man of my name died gallantly. Do you know what he was doing, Mr. Graves? Why not make a poem on his picture? He was leading the attack of the British infantry, and died leading it against the French. I have a picture of him by a famous artist—he died leading the attack right over the breach of San Sebastian in 1813, at the instigation of Lord Wellington, another member of the Anglo-Irish race who was then in command of the illustrious British Army.

The Chairman: I am afraid you are getting away from the subject of the lecture.

Dr. Miller Maguire: But he would have been in the service of France only that wise English statesmen began to enlist clansmen and sept men in large numbers, whose diminution General May so much regretted lately. May I not claim that these particular Irishmen did very well in the service of England against France, and surely a man deserves nearly as much credit in this room, if by any chance he was connected with repelling the assaults of Frenchmen, as if he was connected with beating Englishmen in the service of France. But I will not say another word

about them because, in the words of the Irish poet, men like Mr. Skrine, who study history, and call upon us to remember the past, gentlemen like the poet on my right, and historians, Parliamentary and other, like Mr. O'Donnell, are the very foundation of all wisdom in every age of history, poetry, and eloquence. I will just sit down congratulating Mr. Skrine and asking him to continue his labours, because in the case of myself I must say in the words of Moore that :—

“ Oft, in the stilly night,
Ere slumber's chain has bound me,
Fond memory brings the light
Of other days around me.”

—other days of O'Donnells and O'Neills and brave deeds of “derring do” from the Shannon to the Danube and Belgium to Portugal. I could go on through the whole of this O'Callaghan's book, Sir, but I have already said enough, and I heartily thank the lecturer.

Mr. F. H. Skrine, in reply, said : The Chairman has kindly permitted me to answer criticisms which have been made in the course of discussion. Before I make any remarks I should like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the Council of this distinguished Institution for having elected me an Honorary Life Member. I look upon it as a very distinguished honour, and it was in consequence of the announcement which I received from the Council that I made a proposal to discourse this afternoon on the Irish Brigade. There is not very much to answer. Captain Eric Dillon challenges my assertion that Dillon's Regiment was merged with Bulkeley's. The London Library contains a French work—*Les Guerres sous Louis XV.*, by General Pajol, and an English book entitled *The Last Colonel of the Irish Brigade*, which were my authority for stating that Dillon's disappeared from the Army List in 1773. With regard to his next statement, “de” was certainly not a correct affix to his family name in France; I quite believe that amongst themselves, the Dillons were always Dillons without the “nobiliary particle.” But no Frenchman would omit that badge of rank in addressing them. When the Dillon of that period, having proved his noble filiation dating back to 1400, was allowed to be presented to the King at Versailles and to enter the King's coaches, from that moment he was styled “de Dillon” in French official documents. There was a certain Daniel O'Connell, the last colonel of the Irish Brigade, who succeeded in proving his claim in 1786; he at once became Comte d'O'Connell. I am quite certain that Dillon's fellow victim placed “de” before his name when she addressed him at the foot of the scaffold. Then I understood Captain Dillon to say that I talked of the “apathy” of the Irish Brigade. I never used that word in connection with such a force. I said that there was a certain deterioration in its *personnel* after the Seven Years' War.

Captain Dillon : “Atrophy,” I think, was the word.

Mr. Skrine : There was a certain amount of atrophy because it was no longer exclusively Irish as it had been. In the course of the lecture I gave quite a list of the victories of the Irish Brigade during the War of Independence, and I mentioned the very islands to which Captain Dillon has referred; so that I think his criticism in that respect is hardly justified by what was said in the paper. It is always a treat to hear Dr. Miller

Maguire speak. He touches nothing that he does not adorn; or at any rate he raises a laugh, which is quite a relief in this prosaic century of ours. We have almost forgotten how to laugh, and it is a good thing to have a man like our friend to give us a little amusement. I am very much obliged to him for the note of hilarity he has introduced into this historical subject. He alluded to my own name, which is rather a sore point with me. The Skrines came from Ireland. You will find to this day on the coast of Donegal a barony called Skrine, and there is another one near Wexford. The fact of the matter is, a branch of my family was deprived of its estates by Cromwell, came over to Bath, and have settled there ever since. We spell our name with an "i" and pronounce it as a double "e." So people who hear me speak don't realize that it is the same man who wrote a book, and *vice versa*; this is an awful handicap. It was a very great pleasure to me that Mr. Alfred Perceval Graves, the author of "Father O'Flynn," and such a distinguished Irishman, both as a politician and by reason of his ancient birth, as Mr. Frank Hugh O'Donnell, should have spoken on this occasion, and I am very thankful to them for the kind and eulogistic way in which they have mentioned my humble effort. I hope what I have said to-day will stimulate some Irishman more competent than myself to undertake a modernized history of the Irish Brigade, since we have not had one hitherto.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that all of us, especially those of us who belong to the Irish race, are very grateful to the lecturer for the most interesting lecture he has given us to-day; it was a most eloquent one on a subject which I daresay a great many of us had not studied before. I ask you to give him a very hearty vote of thanks for the trouble he has taken in coming here and giving us this lecture.

The resolution of thanks was carried by acclamation and the meeting terminated.

Mr. F. H. Skrine has sent a monograph by Lieut.-Colonel W. O. Cavenagh, on "The Irish Benedictine Convent at Ypres," which appeared about five years ago in the *Journal of the Irish Society of Antiquaries*. He writes:—"In my lecture on the Irish Brigade, delivered at the Institution on January 28th, I followed O'Callaghan in stating that Clare's Regiment captured two Colours belonging to Churchill's (afterwards 'The Buffs') at Ramillies. There is no record of any British Colours having been lost in that battle; while Captain Knight's history of the Buffs admits that two were captured at Landan after a sanguinary struggle. In all probability it was these flags which the sisters at Ypres preserved for upwards of two centuries."

THE IRISH BENEDICTINE NUNNERY AT YPRES, BELGIUM.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL W. O. CAVENAGH.

(Read April 28th, 1908.)

The Benedictine Convent, formerly for Irish nuns, is situated in the Rue St. Jacques, Ypres, and is close to the old ramparts. The rule of

St. Benedict is very strict; the sisters are never allowed outside the convent walls.

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Lady Mary Percy founded the first nunnery of this order on the Continent for her countrywomen, followed soon by others, so that there were establishments at Ghent, Dunkirk, Poitiers, and Ypres. Of these the latter alone survives, the others having been swept away during the French Revolution.

The Assistant Lady Superior informed me that the Irish sisterhood at Ypres was really founded in 1665 by Lady Butler, who was Abbess of the Benedictines at Ypres, but went over to the English Court, and then on to Dublin, where she set up a nunnery in Ship Street, which James II. endowed with £100 a year, and made free of rates and taxes. When William III. arrived in Dublin, he wrote to Lady Butler to say that her nuns would not be molested. The letters of these two monarchs are still among the archives of the convent. Lady Butler, however, decided to withdraw with her nuns back again to Ypres.

During the French Revolution the nunnery was occupied by the French troops, the sisters hiding themselves away as best they could. On one occasion when the nuns were inspected, two French sisters hid themselves under the clothes of their Irish fellow-nuns, for fear of being seized upon by their countrymen and taken away. A Jesuit who had taken shelter there was hidden away for days in a dark cellar. Eventually their distresses reached the ears of Colonel O'Connell, an officer in the French service, who at once had the soldiers removed, and took the seals off their doors.

The last Irish Abbess died in 1840; there are now no nuns of Irish birth among the sisters, who are all Belgians. The chapel, which is very pleasing and not too ornate, contains memorials to the Irish Abbesses who are buried within its walls, *viz.*, Dame Margaret Arthur, who died 1715; Madame Butler, 1719; Dame Marie Benedicte Dalton, 1783; Dame Marie Scholastique Lynch, 1799; Dame Marie Bernard Lynch, 1830; and Marie Benedicte Byrne, deceased 1840.

There is but little left of the two British Colours spoken of by O'Callaghan in his "History of the Irish Brigades in the service of France," as being captured at the Battle of Ramillies by Lord Clare's Regiment from an English corps (Churchill's Regiment), now the 3rd Buffs, and from a Scotch battalion in the Dutch pay, and deposited in the convent of Ypres. The fragments shown to me consisted of the Irish quarter of the Royal Standard, having the gold harp on its blue ground, and one of the three gold lions of England. The sister who exhibited them informed me that she well remembered one Colour which was then complete, with the red and yellow quarters of the Royal Standard, the staff of which had an inscription on it. It used to hang in the choir of the chapel, till an abbess, who was an Englishwoman, had it taken down and placed in the cloisters; soon afterwards some of the lay sisters cut the Colour up to furnish decorations for a fête; the quarter with the harp was preserved by an Irish nun. The other Colour must have disappeared many years ago, as my informant recollected nothing about it. The Colours were deposited in the convent by Murrough O'Brien, Lieut.-Colonel of the Regiment of Clare. The sister told me that the reason for their being

thus honoured was because Murrough O'Brien's *fiancée* (a Miss Arthur, she believed) had come over from Ireland, and was being sheltered in the nunnery while her lover was away fighting.

N.B.—There is no record to show that any British Colours were taken at Ramillies. On the other hand, the latest Regimental History of the Buffs (by Captain Knight) states that at the battle of Landen, July 19th, 1693, where Sarsfield was mortally wounded, that regiment was brigaded with Ramsay's Scotch Brigade in the Dutch service, and that their three Colours were lost in the fight; two of the ensigns carrying them were killed, and the third wounded and taken prisoner. It seems more probable, therefore, that the Colours deposited at Ypres were captured at Landen, where King James's Royal Regiment of Foot Guards was engaged, than at Ramillies.

THE DIARY OF CHARLES DUDLEY MADDEN,
LIEUTENANT 4TH DRAGOONS,
PENINSULAR WAR, 1809-11.

A JOURNAL OF EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE FROM THE DAY
I MARCHED FROM CHICHESTER TO EMBARK.

(Continued from the March JOURNAL, page 334.)

1810.

OCT. 24.—The left wing, of which my troop was one, got orders to march to a neat, good town called in the map Lubuguiro, three miles nearer Mafra, and one league and a half from that place. We got very well put up, both ourselves and horses.

OCT. 25.—Got orders to turn out at 9 o'clock for the inspection of General Cotton, but was countermanded. Rode down to the sea, which was two miles from the town. The appearance of the shore struck me very forcibly as being one of the boldest I ever saw, the bank was more than 100 feet perpendicular, with scarce an appearance of sand; in some places where the bank forms a curve inwards its appearance is very awful, as there are few projecting rocks, and being quite perpendicular there is nothing to catch the eye; it is considered one of the boldest shores in the world. I cast a longing eye to poor England in the direction I thought it lay. The sea, which I consider part of the British Dominions, brought many cheerful reflections to my recollection.

OCT. 26.—Was inspected by General Cotton; weather very cold.

OCT. 27-28.—Weather very fine, but cold.

OCT. 29.—Took a ride through the country, which is a continuation of ridges of high hills with deep valleys between, running from the sea in a straight direction.

OCT. 30.—Having some business at Enxara, which is about three leagues from Incarnadad, I rode through that place to Pero Negro, the present headquarters of the Army. It is a small, dirty village. Enxara, which is on the high road from Torres Vedras to Lisbon, is a small, dirty place. I passed through a village

called Livaramenta, situated high, having several good houses, a neat, clean appearance. I also passed through a village called Frarea, which was also a neat, good village. My route was in a parallel direction with our lines, and between our advanced and re-re line. I could see two chains of forts, one on my right and the other on my left, which appear to have full command of the country adjacent to them, and is a strong proof of the indefatigable abilities and great judgment of Lord Wellington.

Nov. 1.—Weather fine, but cold and bracing.

Nov. 2.—Had a field day under the inspection of Sir Stapleton Cotton, who returned the regiment thanks for its good appearance and the fine condition of the horses.

Nov. 3.—Weather rainy and cold; took a ride and saw a large fleet passing the Burlings on their way to Lisbon. Such scenes being new afford a pleasing variety and even involuntarily conjure up the pleasing idea that those ships may shortly transport us to the only spot in the world capable of affording a good and secure asylum to all the world that wants a country and home.

Nov. 4.—Rode to see Mafra, situated two leagues from Incarnadad, and seven from Lisbon. Mafra is remarkable for an immense building which covers a great tract of ground, forming a square, the front of which is remarkably grand and ornamented with several very fine statues. There are three domes on the top, the centre of which reaches to a great height. The front of the building is a palace which the Royal Family used frequently to inhabit, the two sides are a nunnery and a friary, the re-re is taken up with stables, &c.; the chapel belonging to the palace is well worth seeing, as also the suite of rooms, which are very large and of a fine proportion. The town is neat but straggling.

Nov. 4 to the 12.—Weather fine, but strong sharp winds.

Nov. 13.—Rode to Ereuara, a neat, good town two leagues from Incarnadad and one from Mafra. Ereuara is close by the sea and being so near Lisbon was the fashionable resort for bathing; the sea flows close against the town, but the banks are an immense height, almost perpendicular. Ereuara is one of the neatest towns I have seen in Portugal.

Nov. 15.—Got orders to hold ourselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice.

Nov. 16.—Marched at 4 a.m. by Frarea through Sobral, and were quartered in some quintas near a large town called Alemquer, which we found full of troops; this was an unusual long march, being nine leagues, with the roads very bad and constant torrents of rain; our move was in consequence of the French having fallen back. We could see near Sobral their camp, which they had left a few hours before, and their camps and positions on each

side of the road as we marched along; the roads were offensive with the stench of dead horses and beasts of burthen. I think on a moderate calculation we did not march 500 yards without seeing one lying on the road, and as they had mostly died when the French first marched towards Lisbon, which was near a month ago, they were quite putrid. We saw several dead bodies of the French lying in houses and on the road, who had been removed when sick, and died on the march. There were also two bodies of Portuguese, who had been murdered by the French and had lain on the road just as they fell. The houses the French occupied were left in a most filthy state.

Nov. 17.—Marched at 4 a.m. through Villa Nova and Azambuja, and was cantoned in some small villages and quintas near Cartaxo. Our line of march was about three leagues and a half. Villa Nova is situated close by the Tagus, as is also Azambuja; they are both good towns, and on the high road from Abrantes to Lisbon. It was about 20 months since we passed through Azambuja before, which was on our first marching up the country.

Nov. 18.—Marched at 4 a.m. for Santarem, which was about two leagues from us; when we got within two miles of the town we halted, it being discovered that the French were in Santarem, and had fortified the road leading to it. The town is situated on the top of a very steep hill; the road to it is particularly favourable and easy defended, as there is a marsh round the hill, and can only be passed by cavalry or artillery by a long causeway. The French had blockaded the centre with trees, and, as some suppose, had either a concealed battery or a mine to blow it up, where was a picquet of the French. At the end of the causeway was a house, which the French had converted into a battery, and on a small hill which rises above the house was a line of infantry with several guns; there ran through the flat a small river, which, owing to the great rains, was much swelled, and divided our lines from the French and strengthened their position so far as to make it impossible to attack them, but under great disadvantage. They had also broke up the road which winds round the hill to the town. At the end of the causeway next our lines rose a very steep hill, which quite overlooked the causeway and the first French line; from this place Lord Wellington was able to reconnoitre, and discovered several masked batteries. We remained drawn up till night, and then retired to some quintas a short distance from our position.

Nov. 19.—Turned out at 4 o'clock a.m. and marched to the same ground we had formed up on the day before; as soon as light came on we could see the French drawn up. About 10 o'clock a.m. General Spencer's division joined the army, consisting of about 10,000 men in which was a Brigade of

Guards, 24th, 50th, 42nd, 79th, 92nd and 71st, and a large Brigade of Germans; with this addition, our army numbered about 15,000 British infantry, several brigades of Portuguese infantry, seven regiments of British cavalry, two troops of Horse Artillery, and a large train of English and Portuguese foot artillery. It was generally expected in the Army that the attack would commence on the arrival of General Spencer's division and every step was taken for that purpose, but on Lord Wellington's close inspection of the French position he deferred the attack till he got accounts from General Hill, who had gone across the Tagus with the intention of crossing the river again at the bridge of Abrantes and getting in the rear of the French Army. He had with him about 10,000 infantry, and a large body of cavalry. Abrantes still remained untaken by the enemy, being very strong and well fortified. We remained on our ground till dark and then retired to the same cantonments we had occupied the night before. My troop was with two other troops in a range of offices which formed three sides of a square and were built for cattle to feed in, having a manger running quite through the centre, at either side of which horses could stand. One side was full of Indian corn, and without the offices was three large ricks of straw. This place is situated in a large plain which runs quite level along the Tagus to an immense extent. The turf was quite smooth and green, and on the whole, both for supplies and situation, admirably suited for cavalry. There was in the sheds immense stores of plows, and other implements of farming. The premises and plain belong as far as I could understand to the Marquis of Niza.

Nov. 21.—Turned out and marched at 4 a.m. to the same ground we had occupied before; the day was very wet, and the river swelled to a great height; there was during the day some sharp skirmishing between some of our Light Brigade and cavalry with a body of French rifle men, and chasseurs à cheval. In the course of the day I was ordered to go to General Cotton for orders, who was on the height which looks over the causeway and the French lines. The French had a picquet on the centre of the causeway and another close under the hill; when I was standing on the banks of the river, our picquet was at the end of the causeway and our vedettes and those of the French were about 60 yards from one another. I saw some of the French soldiers from the picquet picking sticks for a fire within 20 yards of our sentries, but it seems a custom in war for picquets never to molest one another unless one encroaches unfair on the other's post. We have had vedettes this campaign frequently so near those of the enemy as to be able to talk to each other. The English respect the French as soldiers and the French have a similar respect for us. The skirmishing

being on the flat under the hill, I could see everything as plain as possible. I could with my glass describe the figure or dress of every individual of those who appeared in the line drawn up on the hill in the rear of the advanced post of the enemy, and considered it one of the most singular sights I ever looked at in my life: to see two large armies within half a mile of each other, and except the skirmishing on our right, everything appeared as if they were one and the same army.

Nov. 22.—Got orders to hold ourselves in readiness to turn out before daylight, but were not ordered out. Weather very wet. At 4 p.m. the baggage was ordered to turn out immediately and parade at the bridge which is near the quinta where General Cotton's quarters were. On their halting there some time got orders to return to their quarters.

Nov. 23.—Turned out with our baggage at 6 a.m. and marched about five miles to some large quintas, situated in the rear of the left flank of our line and a mile from Cartaxo.

Nov. 24.—Was mustered at 10 o'clock. Weather still cloudy and wet.

Nov. 25.—Rode to Azambuja, three leagues, where I was able to purchase some groceries, etc., which I was much in want of; found the town quite full of troops, having all General Cole's division in it, they appeared scarce habitable, through filth, but by constant fatigue parties of several hundreds daily, the houses and streets were soon cleansed.

Nov. 26.—Rode with a friend to Azambuja who wished to purchase some groceries, etc.

Nov. 27.—Weather very cloudy and cold; rode to Cartaxo.

Nov. 28.—Took a long circuit through the country, including the several quarters of the regiment.

Nov. 29.—Got orders to hold ourselves in readiness to march.

Nov. 30.—Turned out at a quarter before 3 o'clock and marched to Cartaxo, where three squadrons of the 4th took up their cantonments. My squadron cantoned in two large quintas near the town.

DEC. 1 to 10.—Remained cantoned in Cartaxo and the neighbourhood. Was reviewed on the 9th by General Cotton.

DEC. 10.—Relieved the 3rd Dragoon Guards on the advanced lines. The troops were cantoned in different quintas along the lines. My troop was in a quinta on a ridge above the small rivulet that divided the French lines from ours. I could see with my naked eye the different picquets of the enemy on the other side of the water, and could plainly trace all their breast works and encampments round the hill of Santarem. When my troop went to the river to water they could easily converse with the French Dragoons watering on the other side, and could plainly see each picquet in front of us relieving their vedettes. I could see the soldiers in the

windows of the town with my glass and those standing around the fires outside the town. On the whole I considered it a sight that must afford a man not much accustomed to such sights a great deal of pleasure, and must be flattering to the feelings of an Englishman when he considers that a people occupying so small a spot of Europe, as the British Islands, should be able to make such a stand against the collected force of the greatest part of Europe.

DEC. 11.—Rode to the causeway on which was a double vedette of ours placed at one end and the same of the French at the other. One of our cavalry vedettes was on our right side of the bridge with an infantry vedette of the enemy a short distance from us, and the enemy had a cavalry vedette on our left side. With my glass I could plainly discern the facings of the different regiments in the camp at the end of the causeway, and could discern the figures and descriptions of every person on the hill.

DEC. 12.—Rode some distance down the banks of the rivulet, and could see the different picquets and vedettes of the enemy on the other side. The vedettes, though within a hundred yards of us, in some instances allowed us to stop in front of them, and examine them with their arms carried and standing steady on their posts as if one of their own officers was looking at them.

DEC. 13.—Continued on the alert till after 8 o'clock in the morning.

DEC. 14.—Went on picquet and had the pleasure of a close peep at our neighbouring vedette, when I went to visit my vedette. In the early part of the morning the enemy's cavalry vedette, which was placed on our left side of the causeway, deserted to the vedette of my picquet, who was on the right. His only means of coming to our vedette was either crossing the river, or swimming his horse under one of the arches of the bridge, which he did, and was brought to the picquet in a wretched cold situation, it being an unusual hard frost. He was a German, and informed me that the French were quite destitute of bread and many necessities; all his appointments, as well as his horse, were much inferior to ours.

DEC. 15.—Rode along the waterside for some distance, which divides our lines from the French. They had a regular chain of picquets to a great distance. Their vedettes frequently called to me and I to them.

DEC. 16.—Remained as usual in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice till 8 o'clock; the weather, except in the middle of the day, very cold.

DEC. 17.—Rode to the flat where we had been quartered some short time before, where were several good races ran between horses belonging to officers of the army; among the number I had one.

DEC. 18.—Went on picquet where I had been before, was kindly entertained by some officers of the 52nd, who were quartered near my picquet.

DEC. 19.—Went with the troops a foraging, being orderly officer. We were obliged to go more than eight miles for straw.

DEC. 20 to 24.—Remained at the outposts.

DEC. 24.—Was relieved by the 3rd Dragoon Guards and took up our cantonment in Cartaxo. The best place I could get into for a quarter was a large house without either a door or window-shutter, the French and our soldiers having destroyed every bit of wood they could get hold of for fire.

1811.

To JAN. 14.—Remained at Cartaxo.

JAN. 14.—Relieved the 3rd on the advanced posts and took up my former cabin for quarters; found the river which divided the French from us much swelled with the heavy rains which had fallen during the last three weeks, the weather was very cold.

N.B.—There was excellent shooting and coursing, as the country about here abounds with game.

JAN. 19.—Got orders at 7 o'clock in the evening to hold ourselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice.

JAN. 20.—The baggage marched at 5 in the morning one league to the rere and the regiment turned out. I went on picquet; in the course of a few hours the regiment got orders to turn in and the foraging parties to go for straw. The alarm was in consequence of the French having appeared in great force on our left and taking Rio Mayor, a town situated near our lines; however, they evacuated it in a few hours.

To FEB. 4.—Remained at Povo.

FEB. 4.—Marched to Cartaxo, where I remained to the 25th; weather rainy and cold.

FEB. 25.—Marched to Altalaza, a small village situated about a league from Povo, to the left of our lines; it was able to contain but the one troop.

To MARCH 6.—Remained at Altalaza.

MARCH 6.—Got orders at 3 a.m. to hold ourselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice. At 4 a.m. got orders to cross the river which divided our lines and march to Santarem, which had been evacuated by the French; about six hours; we found the town in a very ruined, filthy state. We halted near a small town called Pernes, four leagues, and took up the same ground that the French had done; their fires were still lighted.

MARCH 7.—Marched to Tores Novas, four leagues, a large town; the French had left it about two hours; encamped

near the town, the ground quite wet, and the night very cold.

MARCH 8.—Marched at 5 a.m. to Thomar and encamped near the town. We found the town full of our troops; the evening turned very wet. We were completely exposed to it, having not the slightest shelter but trees; three leagues.

MARCH 9.—Halted, and was billeted in an immense convent situated on a very high hill above the town; it was once very well worth going to see, having a large library, with some fine pictures and other curiosities. The building on an immense scale and commands an extensive prospect. We found a great number of native inhabitants in the town, being surprised by the French when they marched down.

MARCH 10.—Marched at 4 a.m., three leagues, and encamped near a few small houses called Cacharies; the evening became very wet, and we were all wet for several hours; still, the men slept round the fires with the rain pouring on them.

MARCH 11.—Marched at 4 a.m., and about 9 came up with the rear guard of the French; a very severe skirmishing took place, and they occupied the town of Pombal; they lined the heights and kept possession of it for some time. We were able to bring some artillery to bear on them with great effect. They took up a strong position a small distance from the town and maintained it during the day, as but a small portion of our infantry came up till late in the day. We encamped near the road. The town remained in flames the whole of the day; four leagues.

MARCH 12.—Marched at 4 a.m. and passed through Pombal; there were several dead bodies of the enemy lying in the streets and road. The skirmishing commenced immediately and the enemy being hard pressed on their march, halted, when an immense firing commenced. On our march we saw numbers of dead bodies of the enemy, many of whom had their brains blown out, as the French murdered all the sick who could not get on. In the hospital of Thomar were numbers of dead lying in their beds as they had died by the hands of their own people; in no instance do they bury their dead on a march. An English soldier who had been taken prisoner by them and was not able to move, informed me they had orders to shoot him, but were prevented by our pressing them so hard. About 11 a.m. the French retired from a large fir wood they occupied, which ran on each side of the great road for some distance, and drew up in great strength on a fine plain about a mile and a half long and there waited our approach. The British Army was drawn up in three lines. In the rear, about the centre of the first line, was drawn up a brigade of guns, the Royals, 3rd, 4th, and 14th Light Dragoons; at one

time the whole was put in motion, consisting of about 40,000. We moved on in slow time, as if at a review, as our lines were at too great a distance to commence fire, except with artillery. The French had two 4-pounders and a howitzer on two small hills, at the further extent of the plain. Some part of the time their fire was directed at the heavy brigade, being exposed, and being in line. We had only two horses killed and a sergeant's leg broke. A finer sight was scarce ever witnessed than the formation and motion of our Army on the plain; there was not a shrub or object to break the sight, and the whole could be seen at one view. The day was very clear, and the sight of the lines with the Colours of each regiment flying, was grand to an extreme. On the close approach of our first line, the French began to fall back, when an immense firing commenced which continued for about an hour, after which a sharp skirmishing continued till night, about 4 p.m. We marched to our camp ground; the night was fine. We took three officers and about one hundred men. The ground in many places was covered with dead bodies.

MARCH 13.—Marched at 5 a.m.; our march was very much retarded by the infantry, who were on the same line of march. About 12 a.m. we halted about three miles from Condeixa, in consequence of the French having occupied the heights above the town, and appeared in great force; at 4 p.m. advanced within a mile of the town, and encamped in a grove of olives; the night fine; four leagues.

MARCH 14.—Had orders to halt; the skirmishing commenced shortly after daylight, and continued very severe till night. The troops engaged of our Army was principally the Light Division, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, 95th British and three regiments of Portuguese Cacadores. The country being very hilly and thickly enclosed with walls about 4 feet high, the enemy, to retard our advance, lined every wall and height, and at times poured large volleys on our light troops, when at extended order, by which means they had an opportunity of picking out the officers; our loss was considerable, having eight officers killed and wounded in the three British regiments, which is unusual in skirmishing.

MARCH 15.—The Heavy Brigade got orders to march for the Alemtejo to join an army under the command of General Beresford, who was on his march to Badajos, which was besieged by General Mortier. The Alemtejo is a country better suited for heavy cavalry, being flat and even; on the contrary the line of country through which Lord Wellington's Army had to pass, was very hilly and totally unfit for cavalry. The French first endeavoured to cross the Mondego at Coimbra, but found the bridge blown up by General Trant, who marched from Oporto with a large body of Portuguese militia. They then attempted to repair the

bridge, but failed in consequence of a very heavy fire of small arms and some pieces of artillery which we opened on them from the town. They then took the road for Guarda, by Miranda de Corvo and Ponte de Murcella. We halted in our former camp ground near Pombal. Met on our march numbers of the poor refugees returning to their homes.

MARCH 16.—Marched at 6 a.m. and took up our former encampment.

MARCH 17.—Marched at 6 to Thomar.

MARCH 18.—Marched at 4 a.m. to Tamos, three leagues; crossed the Tagus by a bridge of boats and halted in a neat, good village (one league from Tamos on the other side of the river). The town was full of inhabitants, and plenty of groceries, etc., were to be sold. The houses well furnished and everything shewed for contrast between a country ravaged by a merciless enemy and one enjoying the blessings of peace.

MARCH 19.—Halted, weather very warm.

MARCH 20.—Marched to Ponte de Sor, seven leagues, over one of the largest and evenest flats I ever crossed. A neat, small village.

MARCH 21.—Marched to Crato, a good large town, six leagues; roads hilly and narrow.

MARCH 22.—Marched at 6 to Portalegre, three leagues, found the town full of troops. In the course of the evening General Cole's division marched in, consisting of about 7,000 men; the 13th Light Dragoons marched out on our coming in.

MARCH 23.—Marched at 7 to a neat, small village, Ashumos, three leagues from Portalegre and five from Campo Major, which is in the hands of the French, having surrendered by capitulation after 12 days' investment and five bombardment. The town being situated low, with commanding heights overlooking the walls, suffered very severely. It was deserted by its garrison, on the approach of the enemy, it being composed of Spaniards, on which a lieutenant-colonel of Portuguese militia collected a few ordenanza and bravely defended it till the last effort could be made.

MARCH 24.—Marched at 5 a.m. two leagues on the road from Ashumos to Elvas, being on the right of the road from Arronches to Campo Major, on which a column of infantry was advancing; when we came near a good town, Santa Olaia, we took the road for Campo Major and encamped about a league and a half from it, where was also encamped most of the Army.

MARCH 25.—Got orders to turn out at 8 a.m., but did not march till 10. On our march we passed the whole of our Army on its march. When we got within a mile of the town the

skirmishing commenced between our Light Dragoons and the skirmishers of the enemy's cavalry; on coming close to the town we found the enemy had evacuated it and retired to a small hill about half a mile from it near the road from Campo Major to Badajos; on the near approach of our cavalry they began to retire, on which the cavalry, consisting of the 3rd, 4th, 13th, and a brigade of Portuguese, had orders to form a half moon so as to annoy their rear and only flank them; after trotting pretty constant for near an hour we got close upon them, and pressed them very sharp. The Light Dragoons charged their flank cavalry several times, and on seeing our intention was to charge the column if we could get them open, they halted several times, put their cavalry in the rear, and formed a solid square, at which time three six pounders played on them as quick as they could fire. We continued close pressing them till within a league of Badajos, when a column appeared marching to their support, and as our infantry was not come up, we were ordered to halt. The enemy left in the road seven tumbrils, two forge carts, one howitzer, and all the plunder from Campo Major which they could not get off quick enough, such as sacks of corn, bread, pork, cloaths of all kinds, besides a great deal of camp equipage and personal baggage. There were in the charges made against the enemy, as well in the rear of their column, number of horses and mules taken. When we were ordered to halt we were about 200 yards from their column, but sustained little injury as they reserved all their fire for our charge. In the evening we returned to our camp ground near Campo Major. It was both a distressing and singular sight to see the different objects which presented themselves to us on the road back to the town, both friends and foes lying alongside of each other as they fell. In one group lay six Frenchmen who had been killed at the same instant by a shell, and some of the most dreadful gashes that could be inflicted on the human body by a sword. The brutality of the scene was heightened greatly by the Portuguese, who cut and mangled all the unfortunate wretches who came within their reach. I had the satisfaction of preventing a Portuguese Dragoon from destroying a wounded Frenchman with his carbine as he lay on his back in some bushes with his hands stretched out imploring to be spared.

MARCH 26.—Went out with a squadron of the 4th to reconnoitre a league and half on the road to Badajos. We advanced till we came in view of the enemy's vedettes. On our return I halted a little in the rear to choose a set of poles for my tent, cut a number which lay in the road, in doing which, my party got out of sight. I had two peasants assisting me; in the midst of our business we heard the voices of two people approaching us from the back of a small ascent in the road,

and in a little time two tall fur caps made their appearance, and shortly after two French Dragoons, on which I commenced my retreat till I got to a small height two or three hundred yards from them, on which I halted. I was much surprised to find they did not quicken their pace on seeing me, or fire at me. On their near approach I took up another position about an equal distance from them, and drew my sword, on seeing which one of them sounded a trumpet which proved them a flag of truce. I rode up to the officer, who very civilly saluted me and informed me he came with a letter for General Beresford. As he spoke Spanish very well, and Portuguese tolerably, we were able to keep up a pretty good conversation. He informed me he came to inquire after his brother, who was Colonel of the same regiment (the 26th Dragoons), and was seen to fall off his horse in a charge. On our coming towards the place where the charge was made the trumpeter pointed the place out, and shortly after we discovered a body lying quite naked on its face, which they both recognised to be he. The Colonel's brother got off his horse and wept over the body for a considerable time. As it would be improper to allow the flag of truce to approach our lines, so as to be able to make any observations, I requested them to halt till I went forward with information of their being at hand, which I brought to General Cole, commanding in Campo Major, on which two of his staff accompanied me back again. As I understood my regiment had marched, I took off my hat to wish the French officer good day, on which he came up to me, and giving me his hand, requested me if by any chance I became a prisoner in General Mortier's Army, I should consider I had a friend in the Lt.-Col. of the 26th Dragoons. I did not get to the quarters of my regiment till between eight and nine, as they had marched about two leagues from Campo Major, and were cantoned in some small villages and quintas, the principal of which was Aldea de St. Vincente, the quarters of my troop and two others. I was wet for about four hours this day, and was scarcely dry when I got into quarters.

MARCH 27.—Rode to Elvas (one league and a half), where was all kinds of sutlery and other things to be sold. It is almost the only town in Portugal which had not been deserted by its inhabitants. On the contrary, was an asylum to refugees from all parts, being so strongly fortified as to be considered one of the strongest places in Europe. The fortifications were planned by a French count of the name of De Lip and are considered a complete masterpiece. There is a fort which commands the town, and from its strength of situation adds to the town security, commanding the leading passes to the town, and also rendering it impossible for an enemy to retain the town if taken. This fort is called after the maker,

De Lip. It has two walls, and a deep fosse with redoubts, besides the Governor's house which stands insulated from the rest. There is abundance of good water in the fort, with a large store of provisions and ammunition; the ascent to this fort on all sides is very steep. On the road from St. Vincente to Elvas you can see Campo Major, Badajos and Elvas from the same spot very plain.

MARCH 28, 29, 30, 31.—Halted in Aldea de St. Vincente; was attacked by a fever.

APRIL 1.—Marched to Villa Vicosia, four leagues; still ill.

APRIL 2, 3.—Halted; getting better.

APRIL 4.—Turned out to march at 5, but did not move off till 7, during which time I had an opportunity of seeing the town palace belonging to the Prince; has a fine front of great extent; the town has several good streets, and kept unusually neat. Marched to Jerumenha, a small village situated on a height, having a fort which overlooks the river Guadiana, under which was constructed the bridge for transporting our Army into Spain, so as to besiege Badajos. We encamped.

APRIL 5.—Halted in consequence of the river having rose, which obliged floats to be constructed, which was a very dilatory method of transporting troops.

APRIL 6.—Halted; weather cold and rainy.

APRIL 7.—The regiment crossed the river in small floats and encamped on a flat without a tree to tie our horses to, being obliged to drive our swords into the ground to tie the breast ropes to; the night unusually cold.

APRIL 8.—Halted on the flat; about 11 o'clock a.m. it began to rain and sleet, with the coldest wind I ever remember, which continued with little interval till near daylight; not a man had a dry shelter.

APRIL 9.—Marched at 5 a.m. towards Olivenza, one league. When we got near the town we were saluted by some artillery from the ramparts, as the French had left some garrison in the town, but from what we could discover, they were but few. The town was once a frontier town of Portugal, but was ceded to the Spaniards at the Peace of Amiens. It is regularly fortified and stands uncommanded by any height, as the ascent grows gradual up to the town. In the course of the day our Army took up positions round the town, and the garrison was summoned to surrender, which it refused. The day was unusually cold, with sleet and rain. We encamped at night about a mile and a half from the town. During the morning the French fired at every object that presented itself.

APRIL 10.—Marched at 2 p.m. and encamped near a small village called Valverde, one league and a half from Olivenza and four from Badajos. From the reports in the Army

Soult had drawn most of his troops from Badajos, leaving but a small garrison in the town, and marched by the road for Seville to attack General Graham, who was marching from Cadiz towards Badajos, in consequence of which Marshal Beresford left the siege of Olivenza to General Castanos, commanding an army of about 2,000 Spaniards, the relic of the Marquis of Romana's Army, and marched with the intention of attacking Soult in the rear. It was supposed that Castanos would be able to make a breach in the walls of Olivenza in one day, as eight pieces of artillery of 24 each were expected from Elvas. The appearance of the people in Valverde, with the construction of the houses, instantly bespoke our transition once more into Spain.

APRIL 11.—Marched at 11 a.m. near Albuera, a small village (three leagues). We found the village completely destitute of inhabitants, and the houses nearly pulled to the ground, scarce a roof was left standing. Near the town was the remains of a large cavalry encampment of the French, which had been occupied the day before; the huts were small but built with a great deal of trouble and ingenuity. As my squadron was first for duty we were ordered out before we got to our camp ground to reconnoitre a league and a half on the road to Seville, towards a town called Santa Marta. We got information a small party of French cavalry had passed that road a few hours before, but met no body of the enemy.

APRIL 12.—Was ordered to turn out at 5 a.m. with my squadron to patrol to Santa Marta, three leagues. On arriving there the whole town came out to meet us, bringing us bread, olives, and other articles to eat; they informed us a picquet of the enemy had left that town about 2 that morning, and that one major, one lieutenant, 53 privates, 65 horses belonging to the 13th Light Dragoons, who had been surprised and taken prisoners the day after our army crossed the Guadiana, had been marched through that town two days before. The inhabitants informed us the prisoners were very severely cut about the head. We returned to our camp ground about 3 p.m.

APRIL 13.—Marched to Santa Marta, and were put up in quarters in the town till evening, when we marched a small distance from the town and encamped. This order for us to move out of the town was in consequence of the brigade being three leagues in advance of our army, and the enemy having a large force of cavalry a short distance from us.

APRIL 14.—Remained in camp.

APRIL 15.—Marched into the town at 7 o'clock and went out to camp at half-past 5 in the evening. The town was occupied by Marshal Beresford, his staff, and the general officers of General Stewart's division.

APRIL 16.—Marched at 2 in the morning with the division of cavalry and a division of infantry for Zafra, five leagues, when we came near a town called Los Santos, half a league from Zafra. We got information that two regiments of French cavalry were near the town, the 2nd and 10th Hussars; that they had ordered 1,000 rations of bread, meat, and wine, and were waiting for the bread to be baked. The cavalry instantly advanced at a quick trot, and on our passing the town a small distance we saw them drawn up in column ready to receive us; the 13th was in the centre, and the heavy brigade on the right flanks. The French charged the right squadron of the 13th on our advancing near them, which was returned. We then went up to charge them on the flanks, on which they went about and galloped off as fast as they could. We pursued them for about two leagues, most part of which time the French were completely dispersed, and as their horses brushed up we picked them up. We took on the whole 107 prisoners, two officers, and about 200 horses. We should have destroyed most part of them had we not come off a march of five leagues, without corn, and the French having in the head of their column a considerable start of us. On our return to the town I went on picquet and remained in the road leading to Villa Franca, standing to our horses' heads till daylight. We were relieved at 10 in the morning; we had gone nine leagues the day before, being 17 hours on our horses, and the day scorching hot.

APRIL 17.—Came into the town of Los Santos, got the account of the surrender of Olivenza with 400 prisoners.

APRIL 18.—Halted.

APRIL 19.—Halted; weather very rainy and cold.

APRIL 20.—Marched to Villa Franca, two leagues from Los Santos, 10 from Badajos, and six from Merida—Villa Franca a large town full of inhabitants. The French had been quartered in it for a considerable time and seem to have done little injury to the inhabitants.

APRIL 25.—Rode to Zafra, once a town much resorted to by the upper class of people from Seville. The town seems much improved by its communication with Seville, both in the appearance and manners of the people, as also in the shops, which abound with everything.

MAY 11.—An account came in that the French were advancing and had drove in the Conde de Penne who commanded 800 Spanish cavalry at Llerena as an advanced guard to our army. They fell back three leagues to Usagre, a small town where the right wing of the 4th had been stationed as their support.

MAY 12.—The whole of that division of Spanish cavalry with our right wing was drove from Usagre to Villa Franca, four leagues; went on picquet.

MAY 13.—Got information when on picquet that the French were advancing both on the road my picquet was stationed on, as also on the high road from Seville, through Los Santos; was called in at 12 a.m. and found the brigade and all the troops had marched from Villa Franca. The French were entering the town at one end as I went out at the other. I came up with my brigade near a large town called Almedralejo, three leagues, halted for several hours, and continued our march to Santa Marta, two leagues, and encamped.

MAY 14.—Halted at Santa Marta; went on picquet with my squadron.

MAY 15.—The French made their appearance on the heights above the town in the early part of the day. We retired to Albuera and encamped on the heights near the town with a small river in our front. In the course of the day the advanced guard of the enemy came in sight and continued to multiply in every part of the wood near our lines. In course of the evening our lines were formed on our position which was some high ground which formed near a crescent with the river in our front which was only fordable in a few places; the town was on the left of our lines, near which was a bridge over the river. In the front line was drawn up, on the left some Portuguese, in the centre a part of General Blake's Walloon infantry, next them the 1st Division of British infantry commanded by General Stewart, the next them General Cole's division of British infantry. The second line was formed of the remainder of General Blake's, General Ballesteros and the Portuguese. Our Army consisted of 10,000 British, 8,000 Portuguese, and 10,000 Spanish. We had three regiments of British cavalry, two of Portuguese, and about 900 Spanish cavalry. We had about 35 pieces of artillery. The French proved to have 21,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 52 pieces of artillery. Their Army was commanded by Marshal Soult, next to him in command was Mortier. Their infantry kept themselves concealed under cover of a large high wood.

MAY 16.—Early in the morning the enemy was discovered placing their Army in order of battle, and shewing every appearance of an intention of attacking us, particularly as they were seen bringing their artillery in front; at 8 o'clock a.m. they moved the whole of their Army in front of our lines on the other side of the river and commenced their attack by attempting to pass a large column of cavalry across a ford near the centre of our lines; as the ford was narrow they could only pass over it with a small front. The 3rd Dragoon Guards were drawn up in front of the ford, and charged the head of the column, on which the enemy retired across the river; this attack seems to have been intended as a feint, as their serious attack was aimed at our right.

They advanced against that point in three immense columns, with about 3,000 cavalry on their left flank, so as to turn our right; they came on with such rapidity that they had gained the height our first division was to have been formed upon, before it had been compleatly formed, and began to pour down on us like an immense torrent; at this instance nothing but British steadiness and bravery could stand; the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division, consisting of the 3rd, 48th and 66th, formed up, and after several tremendous volleys on both sides the British charged them at the point of the bayonet. The French being strongly supported stood firm, and a more awful scene was never witnessed; it was a perfect carnage on both sides, bayonet against bayonet for near half an hour; as the brigade which at that time was principally engaged had pushed rapidly forward, they were a considerable distance in front of their support, which the enemy seeing, they moved a large column down on either flank, and surrounded them, at the same time a large body of cavalry commenced a charge on them, as they began to retire, and cut them down in all directions, the whole brigade, 3rd, 48th and 66th, became prisoners, when the right wing of the 4th Dragoons got orders to charge their cavalry, which they obliged to retire leaving a great number of their prisoners. The enemy continued to push forward their columns through the interval where the brigade stood. When a part of General Cole's division came up a tremendous cannonade, and fire of small arms, continued for several hours, in some instances at ten paces asunder; each party charged with the greatest bravery, and the day was for a length of time bearing an awful unfavourable appearance. Had their cavalry, which was three to one of ours, charged round our right flank, which they might have done, and so came in our rear, the day was lost. They attempted it, but was checked by a brigade of Horse Artillery, which mowed them down in six and ten at a time; however, had they pushed forward we could have shown them no opposition. After a determined contest for about four hours, in which all our infantry was engaged, with most of the Spanish and Portuguese, the enemy began to give way, when an immense cannonade was opened on them as they descended the hill, and they retired in considerable confusion. Had we a sufficient body of cavalry to charge them as they fell back, they must have been entirely cut up, but as the attack still continued on our left, we were obliged to keep a large portion of our cavalry to keep in check a column which menaced that part, and seemed determined to force the bridge. I was stationed near the bridge with the left wing of my regiment, and a squadron and a half of the 13th, to cover some guns and defend the ford against a column of cavalry in our front. We had a brigade of

Portuguese cavalry in our rear as our support. The enemy moved forward with the intention of attacking us, on which we advanced near the ford, when an immense fire of artillery was opened on us, every shot told; however, our advances had the effect of checking their cavalry. We remained for five hours exposed to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. We had nine guns playing from the church over the bridge, which did great execution. We had also near us a brigade of German rifle men. The uproar and confusion was dreadful, each party cheered when they came to the charge, and every inch that was gained could easily be discovered on which side it went by the immense shout of the parties engaged. They were like an immense body of water ebbing and flowing. Had a man time to reflect, one's situation must have been dreadful, but each man had his point to watch, which took up his whole attention. Wretched objects in all shapes and descriptions were to be seen in every direction, some creeping on their hands and knees, with both their legs shot off, and others in equally a distressing situation. What made our situation more critical, three-fourths of our Army were composed of Spaniards and Portuguese, the former of whom were greatly deficient of discipline, and from frequent defeats by the French had an utter dread of them. However, Providence inspired all our united force with steadiness and courage; and both the Portuguese and Spaniards endeavoured to follow the glorious example of the British troops. Our loss was dreadful. In one division, which consisted of 4,000 men, we had killed, wounded, and prisoners 2,990, the two first in command killed, and an equal proportion of officers; our whole loss out of about 8,000 or 9,000 British amounted to 4,000, with 2,000 Spanish and Portuguese. The French were supposed to have lost between 7,000 and 8,000 men, with two generals killed and three wounded. We had in the charge of the right wing of the 4th two captains and one lieutenant taken, and one captain and one lieutenant severely wounded, with a great proportion of men and horses killed and wounded. In the left wing three men dangerously wounded, one having his thigh shot off, with eight or nine horses killed. The charge of our right wing was made against a brigade of Polish cavalry, very large men, well-mounted; the front rank armed with long spears, with flags on them, which they flourish about, so as to frighten our horses, and thence either pulled our men off their horses or ran them through. They were perfect barbarians, and gave no quarter when they could possibly avoid. However, they confess to have lost 300 men. A sharp skirmish continued till night. The whole Army kept in their lines close by their arms. A more dismal sight was never witnessed; the baggage of the whole Army was leagues in the

re and not a man had a dry stitch on him, as it rained with a cold wind and sleet most part of the day. The hill we lay on had not a twig to make a fire with; and the ground was ankle deep in mud. The dead and wounded lay in heaps through our lines, as all lay exactly on the spot we fought on; and the groans and screeches of the wretched, few of whom had been removed, made it an awful scene, together with a prospect of the engagement being renewed at daylight, or an attack under cover of the night. Much was to be dreaded, as we had a most experienced general (Soult) to guard against, who had an utter contempt of the Spaniards, who formed one-third of our Army.

MAY 17.—The morning for several hours was very foggy and dark, so that we could not discover the enemy's intentions; this was an interesting time, the whole Army stood to their arms, every moment expecting a renewal of the engagement, and the morning was so cold, with sleet and rain, we could scarcely sit on our horses. However, as it cleared up we could discover a column of the enemy moving towards our left, as if either inclined to attack that point, or move off. The cavalry, consisting of about 4,000, continued drawn up in the course of the day; deserters came in, who gave information that the enemy had commenced their retreat towards Seville. I rode over the field of battle, where lay between 5 and 6,000 dead and wounded, most of whom were completely naked; in some places they lay so thick a person could have supposed they had been collected for the purpose of being buried. The wounded met one's eyes entreating assistance, many of whom lay covered with mud and wet for ten hours without their wounds being dressed. British officers lay mortally wounded, in many instances stripped of their cloaths for hours before they were dead. This piece of inhumanity was to be attributed to the Spaniards who plundered the whole of the night after the battle, without respect to rank or persons. The different attitudes of the dead could not fail striking a man's eyes. The British universally lay with their arms in the position of charging, and the countenances of both parties, even in death, bespoke a fixed determination to conquer or fall. On an average, two-thirds of the British officers were either killed, wounded, or prisoners. The Buffs, which went in 600 strong, could only muster 40. The 48th and 66th about the same. The two latter lost their Colours. The enemy failed in raising the siege of Badajos.

MAY 18.—The cavalry of the enemy appeared in front of their lines forming in column, and moving off alternately, on which the Spanish cavalry crossed the ford and commenced skirmishing. They returned by slow degrees, frequently driving the Spaniards back as they approached too near. As General Lumley, who commanded the cavalry, had

instructions on no account to get his cavalry engaged with the enemy, as they were three to one our number, we moved on with a troop of Horse Artillery, keeping some distance in the rear of the Spaniards, who continued skirmishing with them the whole of the day. We halted and encamped about a league from Albuera.

MAY 19.—Marched at 3 a.m.; made but small progress, as the enemy were able to move on but slow, on account of their immense number of wounded.

MAY 20.—Encamped a short distance from the ground we occupied the night before. The Spaniards met with a pretty sharp rebuke for their rashness in getting too close to the enemy; they charged amongst the Spaniards, who fled off in every direction; they did not collect till night.

MAY 21.—Advanced to Solana, two leagues; the Spaniards and Portuguese continued to skirmish close in our front. We fell back for the night, two miles.

MAY 22.—Marched at 7 and encamped near Almendralejo.

MAY 23.—Marched at 3 a.m. and encamped near Villa Franca; the French had just gone out.

MAY 24.—Marched at 3 a.m. through a large village (Ribera) six miles from Villa Franca and continued our march to Usagre, four leagues. When we came near the town we found it occupied by a large body of French cavalry; we advanced to the heights near the town, and pushed a body through it; the enemy fell back three miles to a small village called Villa Garsea, between Usagre and Llerena. We remained in front of the town till dark, and then retired across a defile near the town and encamped.

MAY 25.—At 3 a.m. took up our positions in rear of the town, having a small river in our front; its banks being steep and craggy formed a ravine only passable for artillery by the bridge leading into the town and for cavalry in another place. At 6 a.m. the enemy appeared in strong force of about 2 or 3,000 cavalry with five guns and drove in our picquet and advanced posts in front of the town. Their army occupied the heights on their side, and our cannon on our part, having a distance of about 8 or 900 yards between. The first movement of the enemy was an attempt to push a large body on our left flank, so as to turn it, to prevent which was sent two 6-pounders which was concealed behind some high ground till their column came within reach, when a fire was opened on them, with such effect that they were obliged to retire, leaving a number of men and horses on the field. They then advanced a column in rear of the town, and as our troops advanced to meet them, the cannonade opened so warm on us of shot and shell which did some execution, we retired a few hundred yards, and the 3rd and 4th formed up in line, in front

of the bridge. The enemy advanced across and formed up, with a wall in their rear; the column was composed of three regiments, the 4th, 20th and 26th. The 4th and 26th were horse grenadiers with tall fur caps, the 20th with brass casques; they made in all about 600; they advanced against the 3rd and 4th. We charged them with great rapidity, having a good descent in our favour; we broke them with the shock and they retired in the greatest confusion. Those in front of the 3rd endeavoured to get over the wall, and were nearly to a man cut down or taken prisoners; the 4th cut them down in the lane leading to the bridge, till it was blocked up with men and horses. Numbers made their escape by leaping off their horses and getting over a high wall into an olive grove. We took in all one colonel, one major, three lieutenants and 95 men with 75 horses, and killed about 250. The remains of the column retired through the town, leaving some skirmishers in the streets. Immediately after the action I was ordered to take a dispatch of the affair to General Beresford to Almendralejo, seven leagues. The weather was intensely hot, without a breath of air. My horse cast a shoe on the road, which obliged me to take one of the French horses. I got a fresh horse at Villa Franca and returned to it from Almendralejo by 4 p.m. As the weather was intensely hot, and I had rode fast, I gave orders to the man at Villa Franca not to water my horse, but he misunderstood me, and when I got on his back to return to Usagre I found him unwell; he knocked up in about half an hour, and I was obliged to leave him in the road, taking my saddle bags and appointments on my back. The night was quite dark and I continued to walk out as quick as I could till my unlucky stars brought me to some of the baggage belonging to the 13th Dragoons who were ordered to join their regiment. We all set out together, but took the wrong road out of the camp; we wandered about for several hours and returned to the camp some leagues in the rear of their regiment. As my dispatch from General Beresford was the orders for the ensuing day, it was of the greatest consequence I should deliver them before daylight. I set out on the right road and reached our lines just as they were turning out at 3 a.m., with my feet all blistered and quite knocked up; however, my dispatch was just in time as the orders were giving out. The regiment we chastized was the 4th Grenadiers.

MAY 26.—As General Beresford did not wish a general engagement with the cavalry, and as they brought up seven fresh pieces of artillery, 12-pounders, we fell back some distance from the town and late in the evening retired to Ribera; it appears to be the intention of the enemy to occupy Llerena with their infantry and retain Usagre as an advanced post for their cavalry. Ribera, four leagues from Usagre.

MAY 27.—Marched to Villa Franca and encamped near the town in an olive grove, which was the only instance we had a camp with either wood or water since we left it, not having a twig to fasten our horses to. Those who did not link their horses in line, were obliged to fasten them to their swivels.

MAY 28.—Came into the town; found it much racked by the French.

FROM MAY 28 TO JUNE 13.—Remained at Villa Franca, during which time we turned out with our baggage on the alarm post every morning at quarter before 3 o'clock, having the main body of the enemy's cavalry at Usagre and their picquets advanced some distance near us. In the course of the time we remained there we had several turns out in consequence of alarms from the different movements of the enemy; the officers had orders to be constantly at hand and the horses saddled day and night. The duty of picquet came to my turn about every third day; the weather intensely hot.

JUNE 13.—About 10 o'clock a.m. we got orders to repair to the alarm post with all expedition in consequence of the enemy having drove in our advanced posts on our right, by entering Zafra and Los Santos, which had been occupied by Spanish and Portuguese cavalry. As their advance had been expected for some time, for the purpose of co-operating with a corps under the command of Drouet, which we had information was coming from Massena's Army to re-inforce Soult, by the road of Merida, our cavalry had instructions to fall back. We retired on the Almendralejo road and halted a league from Villa Franca to support some patrols we had sent out to observe the motions of the enemy, and also to withdraw our picquets. A patrol of an officer and 30 men was sent from the 2nd German Hussars, who had joined us a few days before with about 250 men; a corporal and four from a picquet of the heavy brigade joined the patrol, who were also ordered to patrol towards Los Santos; a short distance from Villa Franca they fell in with 60 of the French cavalry who were also patrolling; each party drew up with a determination to dispute the road, and charged with great impetuosity. Our superiority soon became manifest. The French were broken and fled; they had six men and nine horses taken and many killed. The Germans had the officer and four men wounded, one of whom had his hand cut off at a stroke, and one prisoner taken by his horse running away with him; the corporal and one private of the 3rd wounded. It was a gallant affair. We remained in all the heat of the day exposed to the sun on the road to Almendralejo and retired at night near to a small village called Azeuchal, three leagues from Villa Franca, where was also encamped the whole of the allied cavalry.

JUNE 14.—Retired near a small village called Solana, two leagues from Azeuchal; weather intensely hot.

JUNE 15.—Fell back a league on the road to Albuera, near Corte De Peleas; went on picquet on the road to Santa Marta; the weather intensely hot, without a breath of air.

JUNE 16.—Turned out at 3 a.m. and marched to Albuera, two leagues, and encamped during the early part of the day in the same part of the wood which had been occupied by the French cavalry; their huts were standing. I had a great wish before our move to ride over the field of battle, but as the regiment was under orders to march, it was not in my power. At 3 p.m. we marched from the wood, crossed the river, and encamped near the village, on the road to Badajos; the ground was covered with the remains of the bodies which had been burned by the peasantry, who were sent from all parts for that purpose. I went within a few hundred yards of the ground where I was stationed on the 16th. I also rode over the spot where the French guns were stationed, which saluted us the whole of the day; they had two 9-pounders and two 6-pounders and a howitzer which threw 24-pound shells. The effects of our guns which played on them was manifest; two mules and three horses and several human bodies lay on the spot. That spot occupied my particular attention on the 16th, as I could see every shot that was directed at us, and their ammunition waggons arriving several times in the course of the day with fresh supplies; bodies lay in every direction, half roasted, and the trees were crowded with eagles and birds of prey. Our position appeared a formidable one from the French side, but I must agree with the general opinion of the Army that the greatest blame is to be attributed to General Beresford for not occupying sooner his position, which enabled the enemy to get possession of the strongest heights in it, and obliged us to be the assailants; this caused the almost destruction of that brigade, composed of the 3rd, 31st and 48th, who were obliged to push forward with such rapidity that they left their support behind and so got surrounded; they lost five Colours and had 716 taken prisoners, with a great proportion killed and wounded. Our loss, had our position been occupied, would have been inconsiderable, and that of the enemy still greater; to this great loss of the British is to be attributed this present retreat. Lord Wellington is supposed to be highly indignant at it.

JUNE 17.—The whole of the allied army crossed the Guadiana nearly opposite to Elvas, and so gave up the whole of Spain without having raised the blockade of Badajos. We had withdrawn our guns several days before, as it was found we could not storm the town, even though we had effected two large breaches, in consequence of the enemy having dug large

trenches within the breaches and fortified them with strong batteries. We made during the siege two unsuccessful assaults on Fort St. Juan Christobal, a strong place on the Portuguese side of the bridge, over the Guadiana; the fort was in a commanding situation, and if taken by us, would have enabled us to destroy the town; by its batteries we lost in the whole about 700 English and 500 or 600 Spanish in the siege. Great praise is due to the gallant conduct of the Governor and garrison. They made several sallies with good effect, and took many prisoners. We encamped in an olive grove near Elvas on the 16th; the advanced guard of the enemy's reinforcements from the same direction arrived at Campo Major, also two squadrons of the 11th Dragoons, which had lately disembarked at Lisbon, arrived at Elvas, the other two was to arrive the subsequent day. The early part of this day was more intensely hot than ever I recollect, without a breath of air. The sun was so strong that it was with pain a man could take hold of the scabbard of his sword, being so hot. In the course of the evening the sky began to lower, and in a little time an unusual heavy thunderstorm with torrents of rain came on, which continued for several hours; about 10 at night the storm commenced again, with stronger lightning and thunder than ever I witnessed; the rain poured down as if out of a spout, and continued all night, there was scarce a dry thing in the camp; the rain beat through the officers' tents and everything in the morning wore a dismal, drowned appearance; the weather had been very close and lowering for several days.

JUNE 18.—Halted at Elvas.

JUNE 19.—Marched at 5 a.m. two leagues towards Campo Major and encamped in a wood.

JUNE 20.—An order came from Lord Wellington to reduce all the cavalry regiments that had been out in this country from the first commencement, from four squadrons to three, breaking up two troops to strengthen the other six, and ordered the two captains and junior lieutenants to England, leaving two lieutenants and a cornet per troop.

JUNE 21.—I was put in orders among the number to go to England, being the junior lieutenant in the regiment but one.

JUNE 22.—An alarm came about 10 o'clock, with an order to turn out; shortly after we heard some sharp firing; we marched towards Campo Major, near which was drawn up about 3,000 French cavalry. They had detached eight strong squadrons towards our direction, which the heavy brigade got orders to keep in check, and if they advanced to charge them; they continued to extend towards us, till we drew our swords and advanced to meet them, on which they filed off towards the road to Badajos; we should have followed them and pressed them to the main body had they

not been protected by eight pieces of artillery. In the course of the evening the whole began to file off towards the right flank of our Army, and I being the first officer for duty was ordered out with four privates of the heavy brigade, four Portuguese, and a Portuguese officer to reconnoitre their movements, and find out where the head of the column halted, which I ascertained about dark. I did not return to camp till half-past 12 at night. I was obliged during the day to make my party keep up a sharp skirmish at intervals, so as to drive in the different straggling parties of the enemy who left the main body in quest of plunder and who would have surrounded me had I allowed them to get on my flanks; they generally consisted of 15 or 20.

JUNE 23.—Marched to our alarm post and remained till a patrol from the front brought in word all was quiet. Had an auction and disposed of all my heavy baggage and articles I had no further occasion for.

N.B.—On the 22nd a picquet of the 11th Dragoons, consisting of a captain, two subalterns, and 40 men were surrounded by the enemy and taken; we also lost 40 or 50 of the German Hussars, killed and wounded, being attacked by a very large body of cavalry. The captain of the 11th was Lutchins, a very good officer and lately married to a woman of large fortune, this was the first picquet he had mounted. We took about 30 of the French cavalry, and killed and wounded several.

JUNE 24.—Turned out at 4 a.m. and remained in front of our camp ground till the patrol returned with report that all was well. Was mustered late in the evening; an order came for the officers and men destined to go to England to march next morning.

JUNE 25.—Took leave of my regiment, with a considerable deal of regret, as leaving what had been my home for near three years, but the prospect of seeing England so soon, over-balanced every reflection. Marched with one lieutenant and the non-commissioned officers belonging to the troops broken, with several other non-commissioned officers and privates. We were to take up a captain and one lieutenant at Lisbon. Halted at a large post house, called Alcarravissas, three leagues.

JUNE 26.—Marched to Estremoz, two leagues.—27th, Halted. Estremoz, a neat, large town situated on a high hill; it was once fortified, but being commanded by a height near the town, the guns have been removed. It is very well supplied with water, having a large basin of clear spring water in the middle of the town deep enough to swim a horse; there is a flagged walk round it, for the purpose of swimming horses, which is a usual custom in Portugal, being a great preventative against fever cases. There is also a large fountain, and a basin flagged for washing.

- JUNE 28.—Marched to a small village, two leagues.
- JUNE 29.—Marched to a good neat town, Arraioilos, three leagues; roads good and the weather cool.
- JUNE 30.—Marched to Montemor Novo, a large town (three leagues and half), the streets cleaner than the generality of Portuguese towns. There was an immense number of cars loaded with provisions for the Army constantly going through the town, frequently one hundred in a string.
- JULY 1.—Halted. 2nd, marched to Vendas Novas, a small village, three leagues. 3rd, marched to Pegoes, two leagues; a few houses; in the evening marched to Aldea Gailega, six leagues, and got into quarters by 11 at night.
- JULY 4.—Went by water to Belem, three leagues, got a billet in a large convent.
- JULY 7.—Embarked on board a large ship, the Hornby 187, with seven horses, four officers belonging to the 4th, and 15 men.
- JULY 8.—Weighed anchor and sailed; crossed the bar at 11 a.m., with a brisk north wind being quite against us. We sailed for six days without changing our tack; on the seventh day the wind changed rather more in our favour. We had a succession of cross winds and frequent calms, till the morning of the 1st of August, when the wind came quite in our favour with a fresh breeze. We fell in with, on our voyage, a fleet of merchant men bound for the Mediterranean; and on the morning of the 1st with a large fleet of transports; at 10 p.m. we made the Leg and lights.
- AUG. 2.—Was off Eddystone Lighthouse by 9 a.m., at 11 cast anchor in Cawsand Bay; the whole of our voyage which was 27 days' sail, we were without any fresh meat, it being Sunday, when we embarked and the shops were shut. The weather was fine, the ship was large and clean, with a commodious cabin and very civil people.
- AUG. 3.—Rode at anchor in Cawsand Bay; was very well supplied with fresh provisions of every sort; the town a small dirty place close by the water edge. Cawsand Bay forms a part of Plymouth Harbour, six or seven miles from Plymouth. It is an excellent road for ships, being a deep basin, and good anchorage.
- AUG. 4.—Weighed anchor at 5 a.m. with a strong S.W. wind, and sailed for Portsmouth, 45 leagues. We sailed for 14 hours at seven knots an hour, having all our sails set, and made Portland lights by 8 p.m., where we got orders to lay to, to avoid over running the port. The sea was very high with strong gales and squalls of rain, which rocked us severely.
- AUG. 5.—At first light we made sail, and cast anchor in Spithead, at 9 a.m., making two years four months and five days since we embarked.

NAVAL NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

THE NAVY ESTIMATES, 1914-15.—The Navy Estimates for 1914-15 were presented to Parliament on March 12th, and issued as a Parliamentary paper (No. 134). In his explanatory statement accompanying the Estimates, which was also issued as a Parliamentary paper (Cd. 7302), the First Lord of the Admiralty said:—

The Estimates for 1914-15 amount to £51,550,000, as compared with the original and Supplementary Estimates of 1913-14 of £46,309,300 and £2,500,000 respectively, making a total of £48,809,300. I append an abstract of the Estimates, compared with the grants for 1913-14, revised to include the Supplementary Estimate lately authorized by the House of Commons. From this abstract it will be seen that the increase upon the estimated expenditure of the current year is £2,740,700. This increase may be accounted for under the following general heads:—1. £450,000 for the pay and victualling of a larger number of officers and men (£420,000), and automatic increases of the non-effective votes (£30,000). 2. £400,000 for fuel and fuel services, due to the increased horse-power of the fleet and the continued building up of the oil fuel reserve, including tank vessels and storage. 3. £300,000 for the development of the air service. 4. £750,000 for increased earnings by contractors under existing contracts upon new construction (Vote 8). 5. £800,000 for guns, torpedoes, and ammunition, partly through the acceleration of the three 1913-14 battleships (£300,000), partly to provide for larger earnings by the contractors in the execution of existing contracts (£200,000), and for the service of the fleet, whose guns are increasing in number and size as new ships join, and other charges (£300,000). 6. £40,700 for miscellaneous minor services. Provision has been made for the number of officers and men to be increased during the year by 5,000 to man the ships now under construction, and to enable the new organization of the fleet to be completed step by step with the increasing establishments of foreign Powers, also for the needs of the air service. The new programme is composed as follows:—4 battleships, 4 light cruisers, and 12 destroyers, together with a number of submarines and subsidiary craft. The total cost of the new programme under Votes 8 and 9 is estimated at £14,817,000, excluding the air service, as compared with £18,824,700, for the programme approved by Parliament in 1913-14, and £1,950,000 is taken for the first instalment. The 1914-15 Estimates, like those of the current year, are heavily burdened by arrears of shipbuilding. The state of the shipyards, the prospects of trade, and the progress of the vessels make it necessary to allow for heavy earnings by the contractors and the consequent overtaking of arrears. The total amount provided for new construction, excluding the air service, under all the programmes in Votes 8 and 9 is £18,373,000, as compared with £16,033,000 originally presented in 1913-14, and increased by a Supplementary Estimate to £17,360,000. The new programme commitment being, as stated, £14,817,000, the net reduction of the outstanding liabilities of the navy on these heads during the year should be

£3,556,000. I attach the usual record of the work done by the department in 1913-14.

ABSTRACT OF THE ESTIMATES.—In the following abstract of the Estimates, the figures for 1914-15 are shown in the first column; the original Estimates for 1913-14 in the second column; the Estimates of 1913-14, as amended by the supplementary vote of February 20th, 1914, in the third column; and the differences between the 1914-15 Estimates and the revised Estimates of 1913-14 in the fourth column.

Votes.		Net Estimates.			
		1914-1915.	1913-1914.	1913-1914. (Revised).	Differ- ences.
	I.—NUMBERS.	Total Numbers.	Total Numbers.	Total Numbers.	Numbers.
A.	Total Number of Officers, Seamen, Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines	151,000	146,000	146,000	5,000
	II.—EFFECTIVE SERVICES.	£	£	£	£
1	Wages, etc., of Officers, Sea- men, and Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines	8,800,000	8,399,200	8,362,200	437,800
2	Victualling and Clothing for the Navy	3,092,000	2,930,000	3,018,000	74,000
3	Medical Establishments and Services	292,100	272,200	272,200	19,900
4	Civilians Employed on Fleet Services	115,300	99,500	99,500	15,800
5	Educational Services	175,000	159,700	159,700	15,300
6	Scientific Services	64,700	66,200	66,200	1,500 ¹
7	Royal Naval Reserves... ..	489,900	476,000	476,000	13,900
8	Shipbuilding, Repairs, Main- tenance, etc. :—				
	Section I.—Personnel	3,989,800	4,063,100	4,151,100	161,300 ¹
	Section II.—Matériel	7,087,400	5,851,600	6,584,600	502,800
	Section III.—Contract Work	14,287,800	12,226,300	13,351,300	936,500
9	Naval Armaments	5,544,300	4,396,000	4,716,000	828,300
10	Works, Buildings, and Repairs at Home and Abroad	3,595,500	3,448,000	3,508,000	87,500
11	Miscellaneous Effective Services	523,700	494,600	617,600	93,900 ¹
12	Admiralty Office	483,500	450,000	450,000	33,500
	TOTAL Effective Services	48,541,000	43,332,400	45,832,400	—
	III.—NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES.				
13	Half Pay and Retired Pay	1,003,700	1,005,800	1,005,800	2,100 ¹
14	Naval and Marine Pensions, Gratuities and Compassionate Allowances	1,605,900	1,562,100	1,562,100	43,800
15	Civil Superannuation, Compen- sation Allowances and Gra- tuities	399,400	409,000	409,000	9,600 ¹
	TOTAL Non-Effective Services	3,009,000	2,976,900	2,976,900	—
	GRAND TOTAL	51,550,000	46,309,300	48,809,300	2,740,700 (Net Increase)

¹ Signifies decrease; the other sums refer to increases.

FIRST LORD'S SPEECH.—The Estimates were introduced in Committee of Supply on March 17th, when the First Lord made his speech, the more important points of which are summarized as follows:—

COST OF MAINTENANCE.—In three years there has been an increase of £6,250,000 in the cost of maintenance, apart from new construction. A sum of £2,120,000 is accounted for by pay, wages, and victuals, and the fact that there are more men. A second cause amounts to £1,500,000 for oil reserves, that is, capital expenditure and an increase this year over 1911 for oil reserves. Thirdly, the air service, practically non-existent three years ago, requires £900,000 in the new Estimates. Allowing this total of £4,520,000 under the three heads, only £1,750,000 is left for all the needs of a larger Fleet, more costly ships, and the whole scientific development of the naval service. The increased cost of maintenance is either automatic or else it is proportionate to the larger and more powerful Fleet we are forced to keep in being.

OIL FUEL.—The chairman of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines (Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone), in a memorandum submitted to the First Lord with the unanimous assent of the whole of the Commission, states that the radius of action when using oil in place of coal is increased at least 40 per cent. for the same weight of fuel. The use of oil enables a fleet to refuel at sea with great facility. The British Fleet is not forced to leave its fighting position to refuel; its strength is thereby increased by at least 25 per cent. Oil bunkers can be replenished with great rapidity, and without interfering with the fighting efficiency of the ship, and a few men suffice for the work. A reduction of some 55 per cent. of stokehold labour can be made, by the saving of labour involved in coal-trimming, stoking, removing ashes, clinkers, and soot. Oil admits of a very rapid increase of steam production and of eliminating variations of steam pressure. It can be stowed in places aboard ship from which it would be impracticable to bring coal to the furnaces.

OIL RESERVES AND SUPPLIES.—The immense burden of building up the oil reserve out of income has been borne. Oil in great quantities has been purchased and is in this country. Oil is a marketable commercial asset, which it is no exaggeration to say could be realized in a reasonable period of time for what it has cost us. We have to build up in these few years out of income the whole of the storage. Those great tanks and pipe lines, which connect them and deliver the oil at the jetty to ships of all kinds, are a capital charge which will not recur upon the Estimates. There are 14 oil-tank vessels built and building at a cost of approximately £1,400,000. Four are at present delivered, one of which has already, during the high freights which have prevailed during the last two years, earned the greater part of its original cost.

INCREASED PERSONNEL.—Recruiting this year has been in every way satisfactory. Not only have we got the full numbers authorized, but we have got the proper proportion of almost every rank and rating. We have had to raise the standard so as not to overshoot the numbers authorized by Parliament. We can, at this moment, man fully our whole Fleet on mobilization. Increased complements are needed for our ships on account of the large batteries of 6-in. guns now provided, of the range of the torpedo, and of the scientific development of fire-control. There is also the increase due to the Air Service. In 1920, under the

German Navy Law, Germany will have 108,000 men in the Navy, and that figure is being reached by increments of about 6,000 a year. While this process continues it is obvious that large increases will be required from us.

SUPPLY OF OFFICERS.—The expansion of the Fleet having taken place more rapidly than it is possible to train officers, special measures for increasing the number have been adopted. The War Fleet in 1920 has been kept in view, as officers take so long to train. It is significant that 440 cadets are received this year into the German naval colleges, as against about 220 received into Osborne for the British Navy. From the Royal Naval Reserve, 60 supplementary lieutenants have been engaged, and before the end of 1914 that number will have reached 100. Forty-one special entry cadets of 18 or 19 years of age are now training on board the "Highflyer." At least 200 lieutenants are anticipated from this source by 1920. From the lower deck, 13 mates promoted are now at sea. With 31 undergoing instruction, 22 more qualifying, and 35 more to be qualified by March 31st, 1915, there will be a total of 101 promotions from the lower deck within a period of three years. In the engineering branch 50 mates (E) will be promoted by March, 1918. The direct entry of marine lieutenants has produced 44 of these officers, and two have been promoted from the ranks. From all these additional sources, apart from the supply yielded from the colleges, it is expected to receive by 1920 between 800 and 900 additional lieutenants.

ACCELERATED RETIREMENT.—It is proposed to introduce forthwith a series of regulations for the accelerated retirement of senior officers, by reducing the periods of non-service leading to retirement to three years for admirals and vice-admirals, two and a half years for rear-admirals, and two years for captains and commanders. No officer unemployed for any of the periods stated has a chance of being further employed, but if an exceptional case were to arise it could be dealt with by special Order in Council. A further new regulation is that rear-admirals who have not hoisted their flags at sea shall be retired on promotion to vice-admirals. This will ensure that all vice-admirals shall have commanded at sea. In order to give a greater selection on the rear-admirals' list, it is proposed to retire captains on promotion to rear-admirals, if the Board of Admiralty decide not to employ them further, whether for professional reasons or for ill-health. The decision in each case will be arrived at after full consideration by the Board of Admiralty on the merits of the officer and the reports of flag officers under whom he has served.

NEW RANK: "LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER."—The Admiralty are instituting a new rank of "lieutenant-commander." At present there is no new rank at all between the young sub-lieutenant who gets his commission as a lieutenant at 21 and the lieutenant who is promoted to commander, perhaps 10 or 12 years later. Such a great gap as that ought not to be unbroken by a definite change in title. The present arrangement is that at eight years an extra half-stripe is mounted by the lieutenant, and he then ranks with a major in the Army. The Admiralty think this should be further consolidated by the institution of a definite substantive title, and propose, therefore, that every lieutenant of eight years' standing shall be called "lieutenant-commander." Lieutenants under eight years' service in command of vessels, torpedo-boats, or destroyers will be called "lieutenants in command," and not by the name of "lieutenant and commander," as is the present practice.

NEW BATTLESHIPS.—Three of the four new battleships will be in principle "Royal Sovereigns," completing, with the five now under construction another homogeneous squadron of eight vessels. The fourth battleship will be a faster vessel of the "Queen Elizabeth" type, and will burn oil only. All will be armed with 15-inch guns and a heavy and numerous anti-torpedo-boat armament, and the new anti-aircraft weapons will be carried in all of them. They involve no striking departure from the conclusions reached two years ago, and no new steps towards the gigantic. Two of the four will be began at the earliest possible moment, so as to be ready in the third quarter of 1916. Orders to this effect will be given as soon as the House has approved of the Estimates, tenders being ready, and the money, about half a million, included in the Estimates.

THE 15-INCH GUN.—One of the most important decisions for many years was the advance from the 13.5-inch to the 15-inch gun. In the "Queen Elizabeth" type, the Admiralty wished to have exceptional speed without any loss of gun-power or protection or undue increase in displacement. One of the five turrets had to be given up to find room for the extra boiler power, and in order to maintain gun-power it was necessary to increase the calibre of the guns. The whole of the 15-inch guns for the 1912-13 programme were ordered without ever a trial gun being made. When the first 15-inch gun was tried a year ago, it yielded ballistic results which vindicated the minutest calculations of the designer. It is the best and most accurate gun at all ranges we have ever had; it reproduces all the virtues of the 13.5-inch gun on a larger scale. It discharges a projectile of nearly a ton in weight, and can hurl this immense mass of metal 10 or 12 miles. The high explosive charge which the 15-inch gun can carry through and get inside the thickest armour afloat is very nearly half as large again as the charge in the 13.5-inch gun. Owing to the trust which we were able to place in our artillery science, we shall have ten ships armed with this 15-inch weapon by the time any other naval Power has two.

SUBMARINES.—The submarine programme of the year is large enough in view of our effective lead in this type of vessel, but further effort will be required in the near future on account of what is going on elsewhere. We are increasingly convinced of the power of the submarine and the decisive part which this weapon, aided perhaps in some respects by the seaplane, may play in the naval warfare of the future. The personal element counts for much in this service, and we are lucky. Frequently in all weathers, in deep water, far out at sea with no attendant vessel, submarine flotillas exercise with audacity against a swiftly moving fleet or squadron. A certain amount of risk is unavoidable if the captains are to acquire the necessary practical experience. The peace risks of submarine service approximate more nearly to war risks than in any other branch. We have at present 268 officers and 3,000 men, all thoroughly trained in the submarine service.

DESTROYERS.—The destroyer flotillas are at present maintained upon an establishment of 80 destroyers in the First Fleet, which will be reached before the end of the year, and an equal number in the Patrol Flotillas. The latter are manned with active service ratings in time of war. They could not keep the sea for a long time with their reduced complements, but they can perfectly well discharge their functions for a few days before taking on their balance crews—they are instantly ready for sea. The steady

influx of new boats makes it necessary to de-grade older vessels continually. We are considering a scheme for establishing reserve flotillas to correspond with the Third Fleet, to be filled in part with reservists who have reason to serve in the flotillas when mobilized. We are using them in order to reduce to the narrowest limits compatible with efficiency the oil consumption of the flotillas while we are building up a reserve, and an intricate system has been devised by the flotilla officers with the approval of the Board which has effected a considerable saving.

PRIZE MONEY.—The Board of Admiralty have decided to recommend to the Government the abolition of prize-money. There is a strong feeling among naval officers that the private enrichment of individuals by acts arising out of warfare is not compatible with the highest conception of the naval or military profession. It has been abolished in connection with the Army, and I believe it is in accordance with the best naval opinion that a similar step should be taken in regard to the Navy. The question of issuing some grant or bounty to the sailors during the course of a war in consideration of the change which has been made is one which should receive the attention of the Treasury.

STANDARDS OF STRENGTH.—The two-Power standard having become meaningless, the 60 per cent. standard of superiority in vessels of the Dreadnought type over the German Navy, on the basis of the Fleet Law before its latest amendment, with two keels to one for every ship added to that Law by the last or subsequent amendments, was adopted by the Admiralty in 1908-09. That is the standard now being followed. It is not, of course, eternal, and still less could it be made a binding international instrument. There have been various disputes about what ships should come into it. The Admiralty have no need or intention to enter into such a controversy. Programmes supersede standards and actual figures are better than percentages. We have now reached the third of the six programmes in the series outlined two years ago (4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, as against the German construction of 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2), and after a full survey of the whole situation we consider that four ships are enough for the programme of this year.

MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION.—In July, 1912, the Cabinet, having made a new and searching examination into the Mediterranean problem, decided that a British battle squadron should be maintained in that sea, and that we could not afford to leave our interests there indefinitely to the care of powerful cruiser squadrons and flotillas. Accordingly, it is proposed to place in the Mediterranean, by the end of 1915, a battle squadron based on Malta of eight battleships, six at least of which will be Dreadnoughts or Lord Nelsons, and to substitute this force for the four battle-cruisers that are now stationed there. This will make our force in the Mediterranean, by the end of 1915, consist of eight battleships, four large armoured cruisers, four light cruisers of the "Town" class, and 16 destroyers of the "Beagle" type. That we consider to be an adequate representation of our strength for all purposes in the Mediterranean during that year.

CANADIAN ASSISTANCE.—The failure of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill obliged the Admiralty to begin three ships of the 1913-14 programme eight or nine months earlier than was originally proposed. Owing to the adverse majority in the Canadian Senate, the Canadian Government will be unable to renew the Naval Aid Bill in the present Session. It is, therefore, necessary for us to repeat, though on a smaller scale, last year's

course, and to begin two ships of the 1914-15 programme at the earliest possible moment. There are good prospects that the unfortunate deadlock which has arisen in Canada upon this Navy question will be relieved. After all, Canada ought to make some provision for her own naval defence. If she were annexed to the United States of America she would, no doubt, contribute taxation to the upkeep of the United States Navy. If she were independent, she would, no doubt, have to make provision at least equal to that which is made by the most powerful South American States. Canadians of every party feel that it is not in accordance with the dignity and status of the Dominion to depend entirely upon the exertions of the British taxpayers, many of whom are much less well off than the average Canadian.

PACIFIC SITUATION.—The safety of Australia and New Zealand is secured by the naval power of Great Britain. No European State would or could invade or conquer them unless the British Navy had been destroyed. The same naval power of Great Britain in European waters also protects New Zealand and Australia from any present danger from Japan. If the power of Great Britain were shattered on the sea, the only course open to the five millions of white men in the Pacific would be to seek the protection of the United States. The situation in the Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decisions in European waters. Two or three Australian and New Zealand Dreadnoughts, if brought into line in the decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not merely certain but complete. The same two or three Dreadnoughts in Australian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in home waters. The Dominions want to have something they can see, with feelings of ownership and control. Those feelings, although unrecognized by military rules, are natural, they are real facts which will govern events. The Admiralty have, therefore, co-operated largely to the best of their ability in the divertment of the Australian Fleet unit.

RECORD OF WORK AND PROGRAMME OF SHIPBUILDING.—The statement of work done by the department last year, although interesting as a record, contains little that is new and has no revelations of policy. Most of the events referred to will be found dealt with in past issues of the JOURNAL. Under construction, it is announced that instead of three destroyers authorized last year, two large boats for use as flotilla leaders are being built, and it is stated officially that they will be called the "Lightfoot" and "Marksman." Under works, reference is made to negotiations for land at Cromarty on which to erect accommodation for marines, who will be employed in the defence works there. Under personnel, it is stated that a committee, with Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade as president, has reported upon the training of the Royal Naval War College, in the light of present service requirements, and of the recent establishment of the War Staff. Under Royal Marines, the concession of the Army Council in considering major-generals of marines for appointment in army commands, in connection with which the first appointment has been made, is noted in appreciative terms. In the programme of shipbuilding, the particulars given of the "Iron Duke" class show them to be of 25,000 tons, 21 knots, and to have a secondary or anti-torpedo defence armament of twelve 6-inch guns. The dimensions of the "Tiger," of the same programme, are not given. No less than seven types of submarine are under construction, five distinguished

by letters—E, F, S, V, and W—and two by the names of "Nautilus" and "Swordfish," this being the first time that names have been given to British submarines. "Air Craft" also figure for the first time in the list of new shipbuilding, and a sum of £80,972 is also taken for a "ship for carrying seaplanes."

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS AND RETIREMENTS.—The following were the chief of these events during March :—

Appointments.—Captains W. A. H. Kelly to "Gloucester"; A. T. Hunt to "Neptune"; H. M. Doughty to "Vivid," for Devonport Gunnery School; J. D. Kelly to "Hermione"; C. T. M. Fuller to "Cumberland"; C. R. de C. Foot to "Pembroke," for Chatham Gunnery School; V. G. Gurner to "Vivid," as Assistant to Captain of Devonport Dockyard and Assistant King's Harbour Master of the Hamoaze; F. C. Brown to "Skirmisher," and in command of Seventh Destroyer Flotilla; J. R. P. Hawksley to "Active," and in command of Second Destroyer Flotilla; C. H. Fox to "Amphion," and in command of Third Destroyer Flotilla; E. S. Carey to "Cressy," and for command of Third Fleet group; T. D. L. Sheppard to "Vivid," for Devonport Royal Naval Barracks as Commodore, Second Class; J. R. Bridson to "Victory," as Captain-in-Charge and King's Harbour Master, Portland; G. R. A. Gaunt to "President," for temporary service in Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division; F. O. Lewis to "Victory," as Superintendent of Physical Training; J. A. Ferguson to "Benbow"; T. D. Pratt to "Forward"; C. Maxwell-Lefroy to "Swiftsure" as Flag-Captain to Rear-Admiral R. H. Peirse.

Promotion.—Captain A. D. Ricardo to be Rear-Admiral (March 7th).

Retirements.—Rear-Admiral J. P. Rolleston (March 7th); Captain the Hon. H. E. H. A'Court (March 13th); Lieutenants H. Downes (March 10th), W. Gray (March 11th), W. H. Jackson (March 22nd).

BRAZIL.

THE NEW RIVER MONITORS.—Statements have been made in the Brazilian Press that the Government has decided to sell the armoured river monitors, "Javary," "Madeira," and "Solimoes," under construction by Messrs. Vickers, Ltd., at Barrow, on account of their unsuitability for river navigation. Two of the vessels have completed their trials satisfactorily, and the third is ready to undergo trials. It had been reported in January that all three were to leave together for Brazil. Particulars of their design were given in the issue of the JOURNAL for July last.

FRANCE.

NEW MINISTER OF MARINE.—In order that he might be able to give evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into the Rochette scandal, M. Monis resigned the Portfolio of Minister of Marine on March 19th, and it was accepted next day by M. Armand Gauthier, Senator of the Aude. M. Gauthier is a distinguished medical man, 64 years of age, and was Minister of Public Works in the Rouvier Cabinet of 1905. M. Monis had only been responsible for the Navy since December last, when he succeeded M. Baudin on the formation of the Doumergue Cabinet.

"FRANCE" AND "PARIS."—The two battleships, "France" and "Paris," which were laid down in November, 1911, have received their armament, and are to be placed in commission this month (April) for their

preliminary trials. Four months or more will elapse, however, before they are ready for active duty with the Fleet. They are of similar type to the "Jean Bart" and "Courbet" of the previous year's programme, which were completed within three years, as the newer vessels will be if they join the Fleet before November. France will then have four "Dreadnoughts" complete, besides the "Dantons."

GERMANY.

NEW LIGHT CRUISERS.—The light cruisers, "Karlsruhe" and "Rostock," have now been completed. They belonged to the 1911 programme, and were launched in November, 1912. Compared with the two cruisers of the 1910 programme, the "Stralsund" and "Strassburg," which were completed in 1912, they have a displacement of 4,820 instead of 4,480 tons, but the armament of the two pairs is identical, viz., twelve 4.1-in. guns. There remain in hand four light cruisers of the 1912 and 1913 programmes, of which one, the "Graudenz," was launched last year. Two more, to replace the "Gazelle" and "Niobe," are in the 1914 programme.

PATROL GUNBOAT.—Particulars of the new gunboat "C," building at Danzig, were sent to the *Naval and Military Record* recently by its Berlin correspondent. The vessel, to be completed next year, for patrol duties on the African coast, is of 1,150 tons displacement, with a length of 220ft., beam of 33-ft., and draught of 10-ft. Engines of the triple expansion type developing 1,550 horse-power will give her a speed of 14 knots, and the armament will comprise four 4.1-in. and four 3.4-in. quick-firing guns. The vessel will also be equipped for surveying work.

GREECE.

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME.—A further announcement regarding the Greek naval programme was made by the Minister of Marine on March 19th in reply to a question in the Chamber of Deputies. He said that the programme adopted in conformity with the needs and resources of aggrandized Greece included two "Dreadnoughts," in addition to the "Salamis," now building; three light cruisers; and a proportionate number of small craft. A message to the *Daily Telegraph* from its Athens correspondent says that an order was recently placed in England for a light cruiser and four scout-destroyers.

ITALY.

"SAN GIORGIO" COURT-MARTIAL.—On March 14th, the court-martial arising out of the stranding of the "San Giorgio" on November 20th found Captain Cacace, the commanding officer, guilty of negligence, and ordered him to be suspended from duty for six months. Lieutenant degli Uberti, officer of the watch, was also found guilty of negligence, and was ordered to undergo a disciplinary measure to be decided upon by the Minister of Marine. Both officers were ordered to pay costs and damages. The court of enquiry held previously exonerated Rear-Admiral Cagni, who was on board at the time, from blame. Vice-Admiral Viale presided over the court-martial, which was composed of three rear-admirals, three captains, and two civilian officials.

JAPAN.

GOVERNMENT'S RESIGNATION.—Following the reductions in the Navy Estimates by both the Upper and Lower Houses (referred to last month),

and the deadlock between the two Houses which resulted, the Cabinet resigned on March 24th. Reuter's correspondent at Tokio stated that "the clamour aroused by the naval scandals did not influence the Cabinet." In spite of the excessive taxation and the high cost of living, the Ministry introduced Navy Estimates which the two Houses of the Diet reduced by £7,000,000 between them. A conference of both Houses restored the £4,000,000 refused by the Peers, but the latter declined to give way, hence the Ministry's resignation.

LAUNCH OF THE "FUSO."—The battleship "Fuso," which was laid down on March 11th, 1912, and is the first of a class of four battleships, was launched at Kure on March 28th, in the presence of Prince Fushimi. She is the ninth Japanese Dreadnought, including the "Satsuma" and "Aki" and the four battle-cruisers of the "Kongo" class. Her displacement is 30,000 tons, and engines of 45,000 horse power will give her a speed of 22 knots. The armament includes twelve 14-inch and sixteen 6-inch guns, but it is not stated whether the disposition of the former is to be the same as that of the twelve 12-inch guns in the "Settsu" type.

RUSSIA.

LIGHT CRUISERS.—The eight light cruisers authorized in the programme of June, 1912, are now in hand, and have been named. For the Black Sea, the combined companies at Nikolaieff are building two of 7,600 tons, to be called the "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Admiral Lazarev." Four of the same tonnage, three named after Admirals Butakov, Spiridov, and Greig, and one called the "Svietlana," are building for the Baltic, the first two at the Putiloff yard and the others at Reval. All these six vessels will be armed with sixteen 5.1-in. guns. Two smaller cruisers of 4,300 tons displacement, the "Admiral Nevelskoi" and "Muraviev Amurski," are building at Elbing by Messrs. Schichau.

UNITED STATES.

"OKLAHOMA" LAUNCHED.—The battleship "Oklahoma," one of the two authorized in 1911, was launched on March 23rd, the naming ceremony being performed by Miss Cruce, daughter of the Governor of the State after which the vessel is named. Unlike her sister-ship, the "Nevada," which has Curtis turbines, the "Oklahoma" will be driven by triple expansion engines. The armament is the same as that of the "New York" type of the previous year, including ten 14-in. and twenty-one 5-in. guns, but there is an increase in the armour protection, the main belt being 13½-in. instead of 12-in., while the turrets have a maximum thickness of armour of 18-in. instead of 14-in.

"TEXAS" COMMISSIONED.—The battleship "Texas," of the 1910 programme, was commissioned by Captain A. W. Grant on March 12th, at the Norfolk Navy Yard. Her keel was laid down on April 17th, 1911, and the ship had, therefore, occupied two years and eleven months in building. She is the first battleship completed with 14-in. guns, of which she carries ten, in five electrically-controlled turrets. She is also the best protected vessel in the American Navy, having a waterline belt 12-in. thick, tapering to 6-in., surmounted by belts of 10-in. and 8-in. Her coal capacity is 3,000 tons, giving a cruising radius of 5,000 miles. Oil is also carried in tanks in the double bottom.

MILITARY NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS.—The following are the principal of these events during March:—The King has approved of the following appointments:—Major-General Herbert Edward Penton, Indian Army, retired, to be Colonel of the 107th Pioneers; Major-General Hugh O'Donnell, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Bannu Brigade, to be Colonel of the 6th Gurkha Rifles; Brigadier-General John Thorold Evatt, D.S.O., Indian Army, retired, to be Colonel of the 39th Gurhwal Rifles, dated March 3rd; Colonel Lionel Herbert, C.V.O., C.B., Indian Army, to be Major-General, vice C. G. M. Fasken, C.B., dated 2nd January, 1914; Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Charles P. W. Pirie, Indian Army, commanding Ambala Cavalry Brigade, to be Major-General, vice Sir H. Bower, K.C.B., dated 30th January, 1914; General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., C.I.E., Indian Army, to be Commander-in-Chief in India, vice General Sir O'M. Creagh, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., dated 8th March, 1914. The King has approved the appointment of General Sir Beauchamp Duff, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., C.I.E., Indian Army, Commander-in-Chief in India, to be an Aide-de-Camp General to His Majesty, vice General Sir O'Moore Creagh, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Indian Army, dated 8th March, 1914; Major-General Granville G. A. Egerton, C.B., to command a division, Territorial Force, vice Major-General J. Spens, C.B., dated 21st March, 1914; General Sir Charles John Burnett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., to be Colonel, the Royal Irish Rifles, vice Lieut.-General and Honorary General W. H. Bradford, deceased, dated 15th March, 1914.

STRENGTH OF THE FORCES.—On the 17th March the War Office issued a White Paper giving the latest statistics relating to the strength of the Regular Army and the Auxiliary Forces. The establishment and numbers on February 1st were as follows:—

REGULAR ARMY.

		<i>Officers.</i>	<i>N.C.O.'s. and men.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Establishments		10,547	233,218	243,765
Strength		10,431	223,995	234,426
Wanting to complete ...	116		9,223	9,339

SPECIAL RESERVE.

		<i>Officers.</i>	<i>N.C.O.'s. and men.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Establishment		2,882	75,832	78,714
Strength		2,422	62,133	64,555
Wanting to complete ...	460		13,699	14,159

TERRITORIAL FORCE.

	Officers.	N.C.O.'s. and men.	Total.
Establishment, Jan. 1st...	11,233	301,167	312,400
Strength, Jan. 1st ...	9,366	239,819	249,185
Wanting to complete ...	1,867	61,348	63,215

In the Special Reserve 16,820, and in the Territorial Force 79,322 non-commissioned officers and men were under 20 years of age on October 1st last.

Last year 7,099 officers and 157,827 other ranks in the Territorial Force attended camp for the full period of 15 days.

As regards musketry, the following particulars are given for the year ending on October 31st last:—

	Recruits.	Trained men.	Total.
Tested Standard Test ...	51,724	112,987	164,711
Qualified Standard Test	42,213	105,413	147,626
Failed Standard Test ...	9,511	7,574	17,085

A total of 196 infantry battalions carried out field firing during the musketry year 1912-13.

For last year's Yeomanry training the number of horses in camp was 20,430 of which 7,899 were the property of officers or men, 12,432 were hired, 11 belonged to the Government, and 88 to County Associations.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

ARMY AUGMENTATION.—At the close of last year a new scheme was presented to the two Chambers of the Dual Monarchy, which has the object of accelerating the effect of the Law of 1912. It proposes to augment the annual contingents furnished to the Common Army, the Austrian Landwehr, and the Honved during the years from 1914 onwards as follows:—

	Common Army.	Austrian Landwehr.	Honved.
In 1914	+ 5,600	+ 4,580	—
„ 1915	+ 11,000	+ 5,785	+ 2,500
„ 1916	+ 17,000	+ 6,749	+ 4,000
„ 1917	+ 17,500	+ 6,845	+ 5,000
„ 1918—23	+ 18,000	+ 7,038	+ 6,000

The actual contingents should thus arrive at the following numbers:—

	1914.	1915.	1916.	1917.	1918-23.
Common Army ...	172,738	178,488	184,226	184,763	185,263
Landwehr ...	29,196	31,751	33,754	34,864	35,057
Honved ...	25,000	27,500	29,000	30,000	31,000

These increases in the contingents will allow of augmenting the effective strengths of the units, of simplifying organization, and of creating fresh units: there will consequently result a substantial augmentation in men and horses in all arms, an increase in the strength of the artillery, and the placing on the same footing, so far as actual effectives are concerned, of the units of the Common Army and of the Landwehr.

COMMON ARMY.—In the infantry only certain battalions on the Bosnian and the Herzegovinian frontiers enjoy an effective strength of 128 men per company. In future the strength of companies in all battalions stationed on the frontiers (*i.e.*, Serbia, Italy, Galicia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), will be 120 rank and file. The peace establishment of their machine gun sections will also be raised. The effective strength of companies in other battalions is very low, but steps are being taken to create special lists for detachments, such as at schools of musketry, brigade and divisional staffs, etc., so that companies shall not be reduced under any circumstances below 95, exclusive of officers. From this time forward each infantry regiment is to find three machine gun sections during peace, and the necessary personnel (trained) for the provision of a fourth on mobilization.

In regard to artillery, the establishment of horses has been so greatly reduced that in peace time no battery can at present horse more than four guns; it is considered indispensable that those at least in garrison on the frontier should be able to horse two additional ammunition wagons, and for this an additional 14 men and 14 horses is to be provided per battery occupying frontier stations. A certain number of horse artillery batteries have been allotted 17 men and 23 horses, extra to present establishment, in order that in peace they may be able to horse four guns, four wagons and the observation wagon. The other batteries are to receive only two additional draught horses, but *all* are to be supplied with a pack-horse to carry the battery instruments.

The heavy howitzer batteries (frontier) get 11 more men and 22 more horses, while mountain batteries receive from eight to twenty men and four additional horses each.

In the cavalry peace strengths are made equal to those of war, and an extra ten men and ten horses are given to the cavalry machine gun detachments employed on the frontiers, while the number of such detachments is increased by six.

During the Balkan crisis a fifth battery was provisionally added to each artillery regiment, although the number of guns per division remained at 42. This is to be raised to 60, *viz.*, ten batteries, of which six will be armed with field guns and four with howitzers. It will be necessary to create 14 new regiments of field howitzers. Three new regiments of mountain artillery and three new batteries of horse artillery are also under contemplation.

AUSTRIAN LANDWEHR.—Since these troops would be employed in the first line in the same way as would be those of the Common Army, it is imperative that they should be similarly organized and have the same number of effectives. In the infantry an effective strength of 98 men per infantry company (the law of 1912 stipulated only for an establishment of 80) will be arrived at in 383 companies by the year 1918. Thirty-three companies stationed on the frontiers will be raised to 120 effectives as quickly as possible. Four men and two pack animals will be added to frontier machine-gun detachments, and for two battalions of mountain troops these detachments will be given four instead of as now two guns.

In the cavalry the peace effectives per squadron will be raised to 166 men and 150 horses. In the artillery the frontier batteries will be increased by 14 non-commissioned officers and men and 14 horses. In regard to new creations there are to be two new Uhlan regiments of the Landwehr, each of six squadrons, and 16 batteries of field guns and 16 of howitzers.

HONVED—Three hundred and seventy-six infantry companies are to have 95 effectives instead of 81 only laid down by the law of 1912; three frontier battalions will have companies 120 strong; 32 machine-gun detachments are to be increased by three men and three horses. In the Honved cavalry the peace effectives in 60 squadrons will be raised from 114 men and 100 horses to 166 men and 145 horses. The second Honved cavalry division will receive two new machine-gun detachments. Trifling augmentations are to be made to the artillery as now existing, while 16 new batteries are to be created. The estimated cost of these augmentations and creations is £12,518,800.

BELGIUM.

THE NEW CAVALRY DIVISION.—The new cavalry division about to be formed will be composed as follows:—1st Brigade: 1st and 2nd Regiments of Guides; 2nd Brigade: 4th and 5th Lancers; 3rd Brigade: 4th and 5th Chasseurs à cheval. On mobilization these take the field with four squadrons only. From the sixth squadrons of each of these six regiments is to be formed a fortress cavalry regiment, divided into two groups each of three squadrons for employment at Antwerp.

THE FIELD OF WATERLOO.—The Senate has passed, by 58 votes to 10, the Bill voted on March 25th by the Chamber for the preservation of the battlefield of Waterloo. A plan annexed to the Bill specifies an area of about 1,350 acres of the battlefield to be secured, empowers the Government to acquire compulsorily any portion required, and makes the Government authorization necessary for building or planting.

FRANCE.

MANŒUVRES, 1914.—Some considerable alteration appears to have been made in the scope of the manœuvres planned, or rather announced, earlier in the year, and especially does there not now appear to be any intention of having any concentration of troops on the very large scale previously foreshadowed. The following are some of the arrangements now reported. The 1st, VIIIth and XXth Army Corps will be exercised in the neighbourhood of Mailly, the IVth, Vth and VIth Corps about Châlons. There will be fortress operations near Epinal, but neither ball cartridge or live shell will be used; these manœuvres will last for ten or twelve days, exclusive of the preparatory work, concentration, etc. Besides the engineers and artillery of the ordinary garrison, there will take part the 13th Division, the two fortress regiments from Epinal and Toul respectively, the 1st Chasseurs à cheval and some reserve units. Hill warfare will be practised in the mountainous country about Nice, and for this exercise the Alpine troops will join the XVth Army Corps, which will be further strengthened by the 2nd Colonial Division, a Reserve Division, the 6th and 11th Hussars, and some artillery from the 14th Corps. All corps, with the exception of the IIIrd, Xth and XVth, will engage in brigade, divisional and corps manœuvres, known as *manœuvres progressives*, and each of these will last only from two to three days.

The cavalry will be exercised as follows:—The 3rd Cavalry Division at Sissonne, the 10th in La Courtine; the 3rd then moving on to take part in the manœuvres of the 1st and IInd Corps, while the brigades of the 10th Division will be distributed for manœuvre purposes among the XIIth, XVIIth and XVIIIth Army Corps. The 6th and 9th Divisions move into the field from their garrisons, and then take part in the operations of the IXth, XIVth and XVth Corps. All the remaining divisions have field manœuvres of seven days duration—the 1st, 4th and 5th about Châlons, the 2nd, 7th and 8th about Mailly. Finally each

of these three cavalry divisions are to be united into a cavalry corps, and will manœuvre against each other for three days under the direction of General Sordet. To each of these cavalry corps a mixed brigade will be attached, drawn from the XIIth Army Corps, for which only brigade manœuvres are in contemplation.

THE STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY.—In the March number of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, Major-General von Gersdorff gives details of the strength which the French cavalry will reach under the *Loi des Cadres* of March 13th, 1913. The French cavalry will contain 81 regiments each of five squadrons, *viz.*, 12 of cuirassiers, 32 of dragoons, 23 of chasseurs à cheval, and 14 of hussars. Sixty of these compose 10 cavalry divisions each containing three brigades of two regiments, the remainder (21) being distributed by regiments among the army corps, but these may, with the exception of a squadron allotted to each infantry division as divisional cavalry, be employed to strengthen the army cavalry—an eventuality which may be counted upon at the outset of a campaign. Each of the four service squadrons of a regiment will have a strength of 150 men, the fifth squadron forming the dépôt squadron. The French cavalry on the African establishment is composed of ten regiments each of five squadrons, *viz.*, four regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique and six of Spahis. A certain portion of these would be called upon for service in the event of a war in Europe. In his *Vers la Renaissance de la Cavalerie*, Commandant Lavigne-Deville reckons the strength of the French cavalry in a European theatre of war at from 324 to 336 squadrons. The *Loi des Cadres* puts the actual numbers at 60,000, *viz.* :—

63	Regiments	at a strength of	780	
22	"	" " "	"	720
20	"	" " "	"	680

but the War Minister has put a proposal before the Chamber advocating the creation of two new regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, raising the number of horses per regiment to 770, and creating 14 new horse artillery batteries, thus adding three to each cavalry division. With the introduction of the three year period of service, General von Gersdorff notices a tendency to further increase the strength of the cavalry. Frontier regiments are to be raised to 810 men, making the paper strength of squadrons 175, and actually not less than 150. The remaining regiments are to have an establishment of 780, and are to be immediately mobilizable. The establishment of the regiments of divisional cavalry must also be raised, as these are to have six squadrons on mobilization. General von Gersdorff gives the comparative strengths of the cavalry immediately available on either side of the frontier as—German, 24 cavalry regiments each of 745 men and 726 horses; and French, 30 regiments formed into five permanent cavalry divisions. Each of the ten cavalry divisions in France has a cyclist detachment of eight officers and 320 men, capable of considerable expansion in the event of war; each cavalry regiment has a 2-gun machine-gun section, each gun being mounted on a 2-wheeled cart, drawn by four horses; the gun can also be used dismounted from its vehicle. Each cavalry division has two batteries of four guns, a light telegraph detachment and ambulance. The cavalry are all armed with the 8mm. carbine (66 rounds being carried on the person) and sword. The front rank of the dragoons carry lances.

ITALY.

LOSSES IN LIBYA.—The *Bolletino Ufficiale* of the 13th December last publishes the sixth list of death casualties among the Italian troops in

Libya, and these have mainly occurred during the operations subsequent to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October 10th, 1912. From that date to December 13th, 1913, the pacification of the conquered territories has cost the Italian Army 28 officers and 293 of other ranks; included in this last are 39 native soldiers. The losses are thus distributed:—

Infantry (including Alpini and Bersaglieri) ...	232
Cavalry	13
Artillery	28
Engineers	5
Other Services	4

COMMANDS IN LIBYA.—By a Ministerial circular dated December 23rd last the commands in Libya are thus organized:—Tripoli, including the coastal zone of Tripoli, Garian, Misda, Zuara, Jeffren, Beni-Ulid, Ban-geim, Sirte and Sultan; also Homs and Misurata—under General Garioni.

Cyrenaica, including Benghazi, Merg, Cirene, Derna and Tobruk—under General Ameglio.

STRENGTH OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DURING THE WAR.—From a return presented to the Italian Parliament, it appears that on May 31st, 1912, there were in Lybia 3,522 officers and 98,551 other ranks; on August 15th these numbers were 2,973 and 94,470—including 81 officers and 4,145 other ranks of the Colonial Troops; and on November 15th, that is at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, the numbers were 3,506 officers and 96,411 other ranks, including 108 officers and 6,627 men of the Colonial Corps. The average daily strength in Africa during the war was 2,835 officers and 84,186 men; the average daily cost was £55,650.

The actual figures have now been published giving the whole of the cost incurred for the conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the temporary occupation of the islands of the Ægean, and the measures rendered necessary by the European situation while the war in North Africa was in progress, and during the Balkan crisis up to the end of last June. The total is given as £45,960,000, and if from this is deducted the amount spent in connection with precautionary military measures adopted during the Balkan War, viz., £3,280,000, it will be seen that Italy's conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica has cost the country something over 42 millions. The following is the general distribution of the major expenses:—

	£
Pay of officers	4,760,000
Medical services	460,000
Artillery	5,080,000
Engineers	4,480,000
Aviation	1,040,000
Rationing	7,100,000
Oversea transport	3,480,000
Hire of shipping	1,020,000
Clothing	7,100,000
Expenses local troops	520,000
Various	1,560,000

ROUMANIA.

ARMAMENT ORDERS.—According to the *Militär Wochenblatt* the Roumanian Government has lately placed orders at the arms factory at Steyr

for the supply of 150,000 rifles and 60,000 revolvers—all to be delivered by the end of the current year. It is also stated that contracts have been placed for the delivery of a large number of machine-guns and small arm ammunition with other Austrian manufacturers. Further, Krupp and Ehrhardt have orders for 150,000 rounds for field guns, and Schneider-Creusot have on hand for the Roumanian military authorities several 15cm. howitzer batteries as well as mountain guns.

RUSSIA.

The *Russki Invalid* of February 18th gives in a tabular form the comparative strengths of the Russian and Japanese Armies at the more important battles of the war in Manchuria, based on the estimates drawn up by the General Staff. It is pointed out that of the 18,000 Russians present at the Yalu only 5,000 were engaged, in another battle only 3,800 took part out of 17,500 present in the field. Thus while strategy succeeded in placing enough men on the scene, tactics failed to make complete use of them.

At the Yalu there were 18,000 Russians and 42,500 Japanese.

At Wafangou „ „ 41,400 „ „ 33,600 „

At Liao-yang „ „ 224,600 „ „ 134,533 „

At the Sha-ho „ „ 221,600 „ „ 120,800 „

At Port Arthur „ 33,700 „ „ 50,765 „

INCREASE IN THE ARMY.—The St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Temps* learns from a trustworthy source that the Tsar has expressed a desire that the increase of 90,000 men in the effective strength of the Russian Army promised to M. Delcassé should be raised to 111,000, which at the end of three years' service would make 133,000 men. Counting the additional 75,000 men voted by the Duma last year, the total increase in the Russian effectives will thus amount to 408,000 if the new proposal is accepted by the Duma.

La France Militaire of the 16th February gives some details of the peace strength of the Russian Army, and states that the period of Colour service has been raised for infantry from three years to three years and three months, and for mounted troops from four years to four years and three months, while on the west and south-west frontiers the number of troops has lately been gradually increased. At the present moment the total peace strength of the Russian Army is given as 1,843,295 of all ranks, of whom 1,323,248 are garrisoned in European Russia. This strength falls between the 15th April and 15th October, but even then it is not less than 1,418,000, with 1,020,000 in Russia in Europe. A great deal of money is being spent on maintaining the efficiency of the Reserves, and during the last five years the appropriations for this purpose have risen from 300,000 to 12 million roubles. In the course of the current year the artillery material is to be improved and increased, while 19 additional regiments are being added to the Russian cavalry, when it will be numerically equal to the combined cavalry of the whole of the rest of Europe.

DECORATION FOR THE GARRISON OF PORT ARTHUR.—A special decoration has been designed for the garrison of Port Arthur, and will be issued to all officers, civilian officials, clergy, rank and file of both services, and hospital employees who served in Port Arthur during the siege, or who took part in the battles from the 8th February to the 14th May, 1904, fought outside the fortress. The decoration is a cross in oxidized silver with polished edges. In the centre in black on white enamel is the

representation of a battleship, and on the bar is a view of Port Arthur. The cross is suspended from two crossed swords.

OFFICERS' RAILWAY SCHOOL.—The newly-organized Railway School for officers of the army is to be opened on the 28th September of this year; its staff will be composed of a permanent establishment of seven officers, two subordinate officials, two non-commissioned officers, and ten other civilians. The object of this school is to afford special training to officers of the Railway Corps, and to prepare them to undertake responsible work in connection with the building and maintenance of military railways. The officers attending this school will also be given special opportunities for the study of such discoveries and inventions as might be of service in the working of military railways or matters connected with them. The director of the school will have the rank of a divisional commander, and will be immediately under the section of the Director of Communications of the general staff. The Director of Military Communications will every year nominate a number of officers of the Railway Corps to attend a two-year course at the school—the course commencing on the 28th October. The course of instruction will be both theoretical and practical, and will be carried out in the lecture room, in the open country, and on military railways; the main subjects for study will be mechanics, railway construction, broad and narrow gauge railways, and the organization of military railway communication generally; also explosives as relating to the destruction of railway lines. The practical part of the course will comprise information about railways of varying gauges, the aligning of lines, the erection of temporary bridges, permanent way, improvements, technical working of the line, practical telegraphy, station routine, workshops, driving of locomotives, etc. Such officers as pass successfully through the school will have a preferential claim for employment in the construction or the working of military railways.

SERVIA.

LOSSES IN THE BALKAN WARS.—The Servian War Minister has lately published the losses of the Servian Army in the two last campaigns. In the Serbo-Turkish War there were 5,000 killed and 18,000 wounded, and in the Serbo-Bulgarian War from 7,000-8,000 killed and 30,000 wounded—2,500 men died of wounds, 11,000 to 12,000 died of disease, and 4,300 of cholera—apparently not included in the numbers of those who succumbed to other diseases.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.—According to a statement made by the War Minister, the present peace strength of the Servian Army amounts to 2,800 officers, 7,100 non-commissioned officers, and 41,700 men.

SPAIN.

LOSSES IN MOROCCO.—The *Memorial de Infanteria* of the 8th December, 1913, publishes a list of officers killed in Morocco since 1909, up to date. The list contains 116 names, a proof of the devotion and fine leading of the officers of the Spanish Army. The losses are thus distributed:—

Generals of Brigade	2
Colonels	3
Lieut.-Colonels	6
Commandants	7
Captains	32
First Lieutenants	28
Second Lieutenants	38

AERONAUTICAL NOTES.

BRITISH EMPIRE.

CASUALTIES AMONG ARMY AIRMEN.—When on February 25th Colonel Seely made his statement in regard to the military aeronautical service, he was able to say that while since the end of the previous July the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps had flown in all weathers well over 100,000 miles, there had been no fatal accident to any officer or man of the Military Wing, or even any case of breakage in the air of any main part of a machine. Within some three weeks of the War Minister making this satisfactory announcement several fatal accidents occurred at short intervals, and our air service is the poorer by the loss of four gallant officers who were killed on duty and whose loss is very generally and sincerely regretted. On March 10th Captain C. P. Downer was killed while flying near the school at Upavon, owing to the wing of his biplane breaking during a steep and fast descent. On the following day Captain C. R. W. Allen and Lieutenant J. E. G. Burroughs lost their lives when at a height of some 300 feet by the breaking of the rudder-bar of the B.E. biplane in which they were carrying out a flight; and finally, on March 19th Lieutenant H. F. Treeby was killed whilst flying a Maurice Farman biplane.

"LESSONS ACCIDENTS HAVE TAUGHT."—In an address given by Colonel H. C. Holden at a meeting of the Aeronautical Society of Great Britain on March 18th, he said it was clear that want of sufficient knowledge or skill was not the most frequent cause of accidents with fatal results, or more pupils and learners would have been killed than skilled pilots. Errors of judgment had caused a number of fatal accidents through side-slips, overbanking, diving too steeply when close to the ground, and over-estimating the speed of the aircraft. Accidents occurring from momentary loss of control would appear to call for improved designs. He also recommended medical examination of would-be pilots, since no one who was not absolutely sound in wind, body or limb should be permitted to fly at all.

BELGIUM.

OBSERVERS.—In an order of the War Minister, dated February 3rd, rules for the creation of a class to be known as "aviator-observers" have been published. These will be supplied from the *école de guerre*; such officers who, on entering the war school, accept training for aviator-observers, have to bind themselves to perform the following duties and accept certain obligations. *a.* To do such duty for two months—the first year from the middle of August to the middle of September, during the second year after May 1st—at a selected air station; *b.* To undergo a practical examination during the manœuvres at the Beverloo camp before an examination board; *c.* To attend observation exercises carried out at a certain time—not during that mentioned in *a*—at an air station. Further, during their stay at the *école de guerre* these officers engage to take part, during their first and second years in two, and during their third year in four, long flights, and also during their final examination at the war school to make a special air reconnaissance. Other officers wishing to earn the title of "aviator-observer" must be practised for two months at an air station, must pass a test, and take part as observers in four manœuvres. To retain this title these officers must annually practice for a fortnight at

a flying station and carry out four flights during manoeuvres. The period passed at an air station is allowed to count as war service, and special monetary allowances are given while there employed.

GERMANY.

According to the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* of February 26th the commencement will shortly be made, at Heligoland, with the construction of a new type of airship harbour. A double shelter will not only revolve on a pivot, but will be so built that it can be lowered by hydraulic machinery into a long, ditchlike depression till the top of its roof is on a level with the surface of the ground.

The hangars for waterplanes, which have been erected on land reclaimed from the sea, on a lower level of the island, are to be extended, and so, the paper named states, when all the works at this rock fortress are completed, "Heligoland will, in conjunction with the High Sea Fleet, present a factor of power which must make a blockade of our coasts appear impossible."

RUSSIA.

The *Internationale Revue über die gesamten Armeen und Flotten* for March contains a long review of the progress of military aviation in Russia during the past few years. As to what has lately been done, says this journal, but very meagre accounts have appeared in the Press, for the Russian Government has been very chary of exposing what it has been doing and what it has left undone. But it is declared that so far as can be determined from reliable accounts, Russia has, in the past few years, made extraordinary progress towards reducing the lead which other nations had obtained over her in regard to aviation. Up to but a comparatively short time ago the State and the private individual were working wholly apart and on different lines; this has now been entirely altered, all are working hand in hand towards a common goal, and every day is to be seen in the Russian papers the names of wealthy men, of rich corporations, and others, who are supporting the new movement in money and in gifts of machines.

The organization of the military flying corps was actually completed in July, 1912, when it was placed under a directorate or section of the General Staff, the Director at that time being General Tschitschkievitsch, who had charge of material and *personnel* of the corps. The section was divided into two parts, the one for training and service, the other for technics and equipment. The aviation training of officers and men is carried out: 1, at the officers' aviation school in St. Petersburg, where there is an instructional battalion and a detachment of the corps; 2, at the newly-created military flying school in Tashkent; 3, at the quarters of the training detachment at Sebastopol; and 4, in the schools of the different aero clubs, of which there are several in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw and Odessa. Only 1 and 2 of these are organized on purely military lines, but up to a short time ago these were quite insufficiently equipped to afford a really thoroughly satisfactory course of training, and even now the aviation school at St. Petersburg can accommodate no more than 30 officers. But the War Ministry appreciates the need for expansion, and arrangements are in hand for putting double the number of officers through the course. Very many aviators, both of the army and navy, have hitherto been trained at Sebastopol, but this, like the aero clubs' schools, is a private enterprise. The instruction of officers in theory and practice is carried out in a course lasting for from four to six months.

Complaint has been made that with so much of the training carried on at private or unofficial schools, discipline is inclined to suffer, and for this and other reasons the Government is now proposing to start a school of instruction of its own in Moscow. Only gradually has public opinion in Russia recognized that aviation has acquired the position of a fifth arm, and that armies must have their own flying machines and flying corps. There are now already three flying battalions—one, that already mentioned as employed for instructional purposes at the aviation school in St. Petersburg, a second of two companies near Warsaw, and a third of three companies at Vladivostock, attached to the 1st Siberian Army Corps. There are, in addition, nine independent airship companies, of which three are in the Vilna district, two in the Warsaw district, one each in the St. Petersburg and Kieff districts, one attached to the 1st Caucasian Army Corps and one to the 2nd Siberian Army Corps. Finally there are four flying companies stationed respectively in St. Petersburg, Sebastopol, Kieff and Warsaw. This organization is only intended to endure for three years, by which time it is hoped that every fortress and each of the 36 army corps will have its own flying section, with a reserve of four sections, making a total of 40 in all. Each section will be composed of nine officers (including the commander), two assistants, a subordinate staff, 12 machines, one mobile motor-workshop, and three motor-driven wagons. Of the 12 machines eight will be in active use, forming two sections each of four machines; these will be with the corps headquarters; the remaining four machines will form a reserve.

Conflicting accounts have at various times been published regarding the number and description of the airships in possession of the Russian Army. As a matter of fact Russia has four quite new well-built airships, and of these a *Parseval* (9,800 cubic metre capacity) is of German origin; an *Astra* (10,000 c.b.m.), and *Clément Bayard* (9,600) are French, while the *Albatross* (8,000) has been built in Russia. Besides these there are about 12 smaller airships, of which some are used for manoeuvre and training purposes, while others have been dismantled.

In order to become by degrees independent of foreign works, the Russian Government a short time ago gave the contract for the construction of a large airship of a capacity of 20,000 cubic metres to a Baltic ship-building firm. This craft, known as the "Gigant," is well forward, and when completed will be stationed at St. Petersburg.

The military authorities are very anxious not only to build airships in Russia, but also to make their own machines and engines. Up to recently the whole of these came from French works, and many machines of a large variety of models were in use in Russia. At the present moment, however, two firms in St. Petersburg and one in Moscow are making their own machines, though for the most part after the French models; the engineer Sikorski has built several machines which have proved excellent fliers. So far seaplane construction in Russia has hardly got beyond the preparatory stage. Engines—both Gnome and Kalep—are being built in Moscow and Riga. In one of its latest sessions the Duma voted the sum of 36 million roubles for purposes of military aviation, while orders for 1,000 machines have been placed with Russian firms—these to be delivered by 1916. At the moment the Russian Army is in possession of 360 aircraft of different descriptions.

TRAINING OF GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS AS OBSERVERS.—It is now laid down that in order to ensure a uniform standard among observers from aircraft, a number of General Staff officers, not exceeding ten, are every

summer to be selected by the Chief of the General Staff to go through a three-months' course attached to the flying corps, in order that they may receive practical instruction in observing from the air. Priority of choice is to be given to unmarried officers. They will receive a special allowance while going through the course. The instruction will be partly theoretical, but for the most part practical. During the first six weeks they will be practised in observing from captive balloons and from airships, but during the second portion of the course, which may be lengthened at the expense of the first half, they will be employed in observation from aeroplanes. The examination is mainly practical; those who obtain certificates as "good" or "excellent" will be recorded as "observation-fliers," and placed on a special list; they will wear a distinguishing badge, and are eligible for accelerated promotion. When the course is over they go back to their appointments, and can be called up for observation duty when required.

UNITED STATES.

THE YEAR'S FLYING RECORD.—According to the *Army and Navy Register*, during the year 1913 27 army aviators carried out 3,271 flights. The time actually spent in the air amounted to 714 hours and 17 minutes, during which 39,294 miles were covered. During the year 14 officers qualified. In the last week of December at the Signal Corps Flying School at San Diego, California, 111 flights were made during a period of twenty-seven hours and seven minutes.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The King's Ships, together with the Important Historical Episodes connected with the Successive Ships of the Same Name from Remote Times, and a List of Names and Services of Some Ancient War Vessels. By Halton Stirling Lecky, Lieutenant, Royal Navy. In six volumes. Illustrated. Vols. I. and II. London: Horace Muirhead, 1913.

Histories of the Royal Navy are plentiful in many forms, and by many hands. Some are merely a compilation of facts and statements, or a chronicle of occurrences; others deal with the subject in its more personal aspect—biographically under the names of the great commanders; while yet again a few, and these the more recent, seek by a survey of the events of the past to draw conclusions and to inculcate lessons which may be applicable to the present and the future. Commander H. S. Lecky, who has been promoted since he first undertook the work, has adopted an altogether new line, and weaves history around the names of the vessels of the Navy. In the fulfilment of his intention "to perpetuate the story of the splendid ships passing out of the memory of living men," he has related, in vivid style and with graphic detail, the romantic and stirring tales of valour and heroism on the seas which make glorious and picturesque many pages in the annals of the British nation.

Commander Lecky's plan has been to give details of construction, armament, place of building, and the like, for every successive ship which has borne a name now in the Navy List, and to supplement these particulars with a narration of the incidents of battle, stress, and storm connected with each one of them. Every name is traced back to the beginning of its use

in the Fleet, and whether selected as a reward of merit, to commemorate victory, or for some less important purpose, its genesis and introduction are recorded and elucidated. Where, for instance, the name indicates a capture from the enemy, what happened is described, or if taken from heathen mythology the meaning is explained and illustrated. The experiences of each individual ship are related under the name, and, where called for, short sketches of the lives and actions of distinguished officers coupled with her doings are inserted. From many sources are drawn characteristic anecdotes, apt poetical quotations, and much curious information, thus adding largely to the value and attractiveness of the work, and making each ship history alive with actuality and interest. In appendices the author gives those names which are no longer in use, and for the ships which have borne them a statement in tabular form of their war services.

In form, each volume is a large quarto of some 300 odd pages, this size being chosen doubtless to give adequate space for the numerous illustrations, of which at least one, and sometimes more, accompany each name history. Many of these narratives occupy from eight to ten pages, and several 14 or 15, or more, the space allotted depending on the number of ships that have borne the name and upon the part these vessels have played in noteworthy events. Sometimes, therefore, the experiences associated with a single name are almost an epitome of naval history, while in the case of others the recital, although shorter, seldom covers less than a page. Nearly a hundred detailed stories are supplied in each volume, with an average of about seven ships to each one, and thus in the six books which are to complete the work there will be no fewer than 4,000 of these chronicles, and nearly as many more in the tabulated lists. The names are placed in alphabetical order, and in the two volumes already issued range from *Aboukir* to *Encounter*, while the consecutive ships of the same lineage are chronologically arranged, thus facilitating reference to what is an almost inexhaustible mine of naval knowledge and information.

In the selection of matter for his text, there are signs that Commander Lecky has not relied entirely on the better known historians, but has also made use of the works of the diarists and essayists, and has ransacked the collections of naval ana which are to be found, in the older magazines, and in the *Naval Chronicle* and *United Service Journal*. Beyond this, he has evidently studied the original records and manuscripts, and has had access to private papers and official correspondence. A number of quaint details and curious circumstances are woven into his narrative. Commander Lecky's style is plain and straightforward. He has manifestly devoted much persevering industry and painstaking investigation to ensure accuracy and fulness. It is, indeed, surprising that an officer on active service and almost constantly employed should have been able to accomplish the research necessary for the accumulation of the mass of miscellaneous material, literary and pictorial, comprised in this delightful storehouse of naval lore.

Possibly the work will to the many possess a still greater attraction as a repository of British naval art, and a revelation of the Navy as the episodes in the life of the seamen and the appearance of the ships were presented to contemporary artists. Each pedigree is lavishly illustrated, and there are from 400 to 500 pictures in each volume, including some coloured plates by Mr. N. Sotheby Pitcher, showing the dress of the seamen at different periods, and a frontispiece in photogravure. These illustrations in the main are reproduced from paintings or engravings in public and private collections, and many of them have never before been shown in this manner.

Photography has been freely used, and especially for the craft of later date, including nearly every vessel now in the Navy, from a battleship to a submarine. All the important operations in which the two services were combined, battles, duels, and the ships themselves, nautical mishaps and disasters, feats of seamanship and navigation, are pictured in profusion, with portraits of admirals and naval crests, the whole forming a marvelously graphic record of glorious deeds and scientific progress. This gallery of naval pictures, which will amount to nearly 2,500 in all the volumes, should be of the greatest value and interest to the antiquary, the historian, the marine artist, and indeed, to all those to whom the sea and sailors make a special appeal.

The faults of the book as compared with its value are few, and may chiefly be traced to a desire for lucidity and comprehensiveness. The author has obviously wanted every narrative to be complete in itself. This has led to the repetition both of matter and illustration. The story of a battle, for example, is re-told for every ship which took part in it, but with additions concerning the particular ship under review. This method at times has taken up more space than would have been needed for another arrangement. It is not, however, easy to suggest a better. In like manner, the same picture is repeated several times, now as a whole and elsewhere in part. A few modern drawings also have been used where contemporary pictures might have been found, and the titles to the illustrations are not in all cases exactly appropriate. Nevertheless, there is much more reason for commendation than for criticism.

There can be no hesitation in saying that the work will take a permanent place in our naval literature. It is of national interest, and must become indispensable to all students of naval history. It is clearly printed, and apparently no expense has been grudged to give the contents an adequate and suitable setting. Further volumes will be looked for with eagerness and pleasurable anticipation. Author, artist and publisher are alike to be congratulated on the excellent start they have made in their praiseworthy undertaking.

FOREIGN PERIODICALS.

NAVAL.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

MITTHEILUNGEN AUS DEM GEBIETE DES SEEWESENS. **March.**—Not received.

FRANCE.

REVUE MARITIME. **January, 1914.**—The safety and scope of the Mercantile Marine.† Navigation without logarithms.† The past, present and future of Spain as a Naval Power.§ Naval recollections of Surgeon Gestin.†

LA VIE MARITIME. **March, 10th.**—Battle and other cruisers. **March 25th.**—British action in the Mediterranean. Unarmoured ships.

MONITEUR DE LA FLOTTE. **March 7th.**—Topmen and steersmen. The Navy in Parliament. **March 14th.**—On speed. **March 21st.**—Promotion. **March 28th.**—M. Gauthier, Minister of Marine. Defence against torpedoes.

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GERMANY.

MARINE RUNDSCHAU. **March.**—An account of the occurrences at Manila from May to August, 1898. The Republic of Mexico, its political and economic conditions. § Russian experiences in the care of the wounded in naval war of to-day. The fisheries and how they may be developed in Germany.

ITALY.

REVISTA MARIITIMA. **January, 1914.**—The duties of an admiral in command. An ideal arsenal. On aerial navigation.

UNITED STATES.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS. **March.**—Not received.

MILITARY.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

KAVALLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE. **February.**—Is the Russian remount sufficiently enduring for war of the future. Old time cavalry. First line transport of the cavalry division. Communication companies. Russian cavalry regulations for 1912. Shorter lances. Our jumpers. The motion of the horse. **March.**—Army cavalry and attached infantry. The Japanese cavalry regulations for 1912. The German army remount. The Russian cavalry regulations for 1912. Our wireless stations. The mounted arms and forage supply.

STREFFLEUR'S MILITÄRISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT. None received since the November, 1913, number.

BELGIUM.

BULLETIN DE LA PRESSE. **March 15th.**—The siege of Adrianople. § The battle of annihilation in history and according to modern ideas. † The reorganized Dutch Army. † **March 31st.**—The battle of annihilation in history and according to modern ideas. § The Imperial German manoeuvres of 1913. The reorganized Dutch Army. †

REVUE DE L'ARMÉE BELGE. **January, 1914.**—Not received.

FRANCE.

REVUE MILITAIRE DES ARMÉES ÉTRANGÈRES. **February.**—Not yet received. **March.**—The English manoeuvres in 1913. A glance at the Balkan Wars of 1912—13. The Imperial German manoeuvres of 1913. The Japanese Army.

JOURNAL DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES. **March 1st.**—The French and German artillery in 1914. The conditions of the offensive in strategic operations.* The soldiers of 1870. † Views on the training of artillery for battle. † A study of the operations of the eastern group at the Battle of the Sha-ho. † **March 15th.**—The conditions of the offensive in strategic operations. § The soldiers of 1870. † The fight of the battalion and its lesser units.* Swiss and French. Discipline and punishment in the French Army. †

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SPECTATEUR MILITAIRE. **March 1st.**—A quartermaster-general of Napoleon in the East.* The reorganization of the Greek Army. † The French military mission to Peru. † In Morocco. **March 15th.**—A

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§—concluded.

quartermaster-general of Napoleon in the East.† The reorganization of the Greek Army.§ The French military mission to Peru.† In Morocco.† A splendid page in our Colonial history.

REVUE MILITAIRE GÉNÉRALE. **March.**—The naval wars of the Republic in the Mediterranean in 1794—5. Reflections on the manœuvres of 1913. About the new regulations. From Coulmiers to Loigny.†

REVUE DE CAVALERIE. **February.**—Not received.

REVUE D'INFANTERIE. **March.**—The education of the infantry soldier.* Concentration zones and probable manœuvres of French and German Armies at the outbreak of war.§ The infantryman in the field: the Danish soldier. Intellectual and moral training of the section leader.† Tactical schemes in the Japanese Army (from the *Army Review*). Light infantry; Italy.†

REVUE D'ARTILLERIE. **March.**—The battle of the Pyramids. A doctrine for heavy artillery. The organization and working of artillery establishments.* Signalling in the British Army.§ The breaking or initial training of artillery remounts.†

GERMANY.

MILITÄR WOCHENBLATT. **March 3rd, No. 31.**—A hundred years ago. Is protection from the observation from the air possible? Congress and army in the United States. **No. 32.**—The importance of a large ammunition supply in the artillery. Improvements in the sighting of machine guns. Military mechanical traction. **No. 33.**—A memory of 1864. Proposals for changes in the arrangements of the French War Ministry. Cavalry divisions from 1870 to 1914. Russia and Japan. **No. 34.**—Changes in formations in the French Army. The army service corps in the Belgian Army. **No. 35.**—Consequences of ammunition expenditure in the field. The latest news from the Austro-Hungarian Army.† The Egyptian camel corps and its employment. Health conditions in the British Army. **No. 36.**—Divisional manœuvres. The French horse artillery. The latest news from the Austro-Hungarian Army.§ English views on the art of riding. **No. 37.**—Distant and close reconnaissance. Disappearance of mounted infantry from the British Army. **No. 38.**—A hundred years ago.† From Mukden to Portsmouth.* Notes on the eastern frontier of France. **No. 39—40.**—A memory of 1864.† Heavy guns of the future in France. Artillery views.* **No. 41—42.**—Promotions, etc. **No. 43.**—Military associations. **No. 44.**—The French Army Budget and the *Loi des Cadres*. Artillery views.§ **No. 45.**—A hundred years ago.† Practice regulations for artillery. Cyclist companies. **No. 46.**—A memory of 1864.† From Mukden to Portsmouth.†

JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE DEUTSCHE ARMEE UND MARINE. **March.**—Battle training of infantry battalions in regard to the tactics of the two arms. The masking of fortresses. The War of Liberation of 1813—15. Military training of the youth of a nation. The Arab-Berberine troops of France. Are different types of guns really required for a field army?

ARTILLERISTISCHE MONATSHEFTE. **February.**—Manœuvre retrospect of 1913. Co-operation of artillery and infantry in attack. The question of the employment of massed guns. The twelve main principles of the French field artillery. The tactics of searchlights. The true causes of the Turkish defeat in the Balkan War.


SWITZERLAND.

REVUE MILITAIRE SUISSE. **March.**—Instruction of young officers prior to entry into the Service. Pistol practice among officers. Infantry transport. Bridging regulations.

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FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EDWARD BLAKENEY, G.C.B.,
Governor of Chelsea Hospital.

[From photograph of painting by W. A. Hobday, R.A., kindly lent by F. M. Hobday, Esq.]

